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Abstract
The Concept o f Person in a World Mediated by Meaning 
and Constituted by Significance
A lanJ Kearns
In this dissertation I examine the technological advances benefiting health care 
today I point to the fact that such progress is accompanied by a number o f ethical 
concerns With the assistance o f technology, for example, the life o f a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) can be prolonged This raises ethical questions 
including when we morally ought to, or ought not to, enable a patient to live or to die 
Some ethicists attempt to answer such questions by distinguishing between the concept 
o f person and human being The former (1 e person) automatically qualifies for moral 
consideration, whereas the latter (1 e human being) does not The concept of person, 
compared to human being, can offer a clearer benchmark for deciding whom to include 
in the moral domain In the case of a patient in a PVS it may be easier to let go when we 
ascertain that s/he is no longer a person with any moral claims on us
Although the distinction between human being and person might be helpful in 
ethical decision-making, the concept of person tends to end up excluding a large number 
of human beings from the moral realm In lieu of this, I outline a concept of person as a 
self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance My concept attempts to dismantle the arbitrary 
boundaries of exclusion that are erected by contemporary definitions of person
Finally, I examine some of the implications of the concept of person for the 
European Charter of Patients’ Rights I contend that the rights outlined can be logically 
denied to those who are not strictly persons Against this, I argue that my concept of 
person may provide a possible route to counteract the Charter from becoming an 
exclusive rather than an inclusive code
vm
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0 1 Introduction -  Background
The general context that paves my way into an inquiry concerning the concept of 
person is one of applied philosophical ethics in health care As someone coming from a 
philosophy background rather than a health care background, I am interested in how 
critical thinking and evaluative reflection can help those engaged in the canng service, 
especially when dealing with issues that pose ethical quandaries
It is accepted by some scholars that, due to the nature o f the work, health care 
has an intrinsic moral dimension (see Nortvedt 1998) Indeed, the nurse-philosopher 
Steven Edwards makes the case that health care professionals face many ethical 
problems on a daily basis that are not encountered m other occupations Edwards (1996) 
asks us to consider “ actions such as moving a person from one chair to another 
without speaking to the client, removing the coat from a conscious, confused client 
without their permission, preventing a confused, elderly client from leaving a day 
hospital, coercing a person with learning difficulties into having a bath, or a wash ” 
(pi 1) Other issues concerning confidentiality and informed consent together with the 
autonomy of the patient have also triggered much of the ethical discussions in the 
delivery of day-to-day health care There are also the more “sensational” topics 
highlighted by the media including abortion, stem cell research and various other life 
and death issues that can affect particular branches o f health care From this it follows 
that there can be no doubt that in many ways moral issues infiltrate health care
From teaching nursing ethics, it has come to my attention that at the core of 
these various ethical concerns in health care is the issue of the concept of person, i e the 
question regarding what makes a person a person 1 There is a way of dealing with 
ethical questions from the perspective of the distinction between human being and 
person In general, the former (i e human being) does not automatically qualify for
1 A concept has been described as a “mental word” (Sullivan 1992 p73)
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moral consideration, whereas the latter (1 e person) does Judging when personhood 
begins and ends is one of the central issues in the great debates concerning, for example, 
euthanasia and abortion (Tooley 1983 p50) However, it must be said that this 
distinction between person and human being is not universally accepted For some 
scholars there is no difference and for others the difference should be discarded2
I will argue, however, that there is a distinction to be made between human 
being and person without necessarily accepting the contemporary criteria for 
personhood My reasons for this will become clearer in the course of the thesis 
However, some preliminary remarks might be of help at this stage in order to clarify 
why I think that the distinction between human being and person is acceptable and why 
the concept of person is worthy of philosophical analysis
0 2 The Concept of Person and Human Being
Firstly, it is sometimes assumed that the concept o f human being and the concept 
o f person are inseparable In other words, to be a human being is to be a person If one 
accepts this, then the issue o f deciding when an individual becomes a person is 
automatically resolved But it does not necessarily help us with the aforementioned 
abortion and euthanasia debates if  we accept that intentionally ending the life o f a 
person is always morally wrong or at least morally questionable If it is accepted that a 
foetus is a human being and therefore a person, then logically abortion is morally wrong 
or at least morally questionable On the other end of the spectrum, if we accept that the 
patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is still a human being and therefore a 
person, then logically any kind of active euthanasia, whether voluntary, involuntary or 
non-voluntary is morally wrong or at least morally questionable3
2 See chapter two pp55-58
3 The term “euthanasia” is derived from two Greek words eu and thanatos, meaning “a good death” 
(Kuhse 1993 p294, also see Burzagh 1995 p i 15) Traditionally, three kinds of euthanasia are 
distinguished voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia An act o f euthanasia is said to be
3
Secondly, the argument that the concept o f person is inseparable from the 
concept o f human being is driven by the view that life is morally valuable from the 
moment of conception In Christian ethics, this premise concerning the moral dignity of 
human life is called the sanctity o f life doctrine4 The Australian philosopher Peter 
Singer (1994) makes the compelling case that the traditional western ethic has basically 
collapsed (p i) Singer writes, “after ruling our thoughts and our decisions about life and 
death for nearly two thousand years, the traditional western ethic has collapsed” (ibid ) 
According to Smger, the decline in religious authonty together with the development in 
the understanding of the origin and nature of the human species has weakened the 
sanctity of life doctrine Singer is persuaded that the various new advancements of 
medical technology are bringing this doctnne to a close (ibid p4) The sanctity o f life 
doctrine cannot cope with the array of new ethical issues produced by the success of 
technology in the health care arena5 This was highlighted by two major milestones, 
which both took place in 1993 The first one was the case of Anthony Bland, when 
Britain’s highest court discarded many centuries of traditional law and medical ethics 
regarding the value o f human life and the lawfulness of intentionally ending it (ibid ) 6
voluntary when an individual is deemed to be competent to decide to have his or her life terminated An 
act o f euthanasia is said to be non-voluntary when an individual is not competent anymore to choose 
between life and death Someone else decides for him/her because s/he has not made known his or her 
preferences in advance or has never been able to An act o f euthanasia is said to be involuntary when an 
individual is competent to choose to die but has not given permission Therefore, the act is carried out 
against his/her will (see Kuhse 1993 pp295-296, Brock 1992 pplO-12)
4 For Smger, the sanctity of life doctrine can be summed up by the belief that it is “ never nght 
intentionally to take an innocent human life” (Singer 1994 p74) However, the stark reality o f both 
abortion and euthanasia in contemporary health care institutions poses a challenge to this belief
5 1 outline these achievements in chapter one pp 16-23
6 Anthony Bland was one of the people involved in the tragic 1989 Hillsborough Football Stadium 
disaster m which hundreds of football fans were involved m a deadly crush As a result o f Anthony 
Bland’s lungs being crushed and his brain being deprived o f oxygen, he fell into a persistent vegetative 
state (PVS is a condition where the upper part o f the bram is seriously injured and where the patient lies 
in a sleep-like state) Bland was provided nutrition and hydration by means of a nasogastric tube until 
1993 when feeding was withdrawn in order to allow him to die following the wishes o f his doctors and 
his family “ the administrator o f the hospital in which Bland was a patient applied to the Family 
Division of the High Court for declarations that the hospital might lawfully discontinue all life-sustainmg 
treatment, including ventilation, and the provision of food and water by artificial means, and discontinue 
all medical treatment to Bland ‘except for the sole purpose o f enabling Anthony Bland to end his life and 
to die peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least distress’” (Singer 1999 p297) Indeed, Anthony 
Bland could not end his life himself, he needed others to assist him
4
The second one was the law on voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands, when its 
parliament decided to legalise what had become accepted practice among some doctors 
of giving lethal injections (ibid , see also Gordijn and Janssens 2001 pp299-309)
Singer (1994) suggests, therefore, that in 1993 the traditional sanctity o f life 
doctrine was finally exposed and was brought to a conclusion (p4) 7 Singer equates this 
sanctity o f life doctrine to Hans Christian Anderson’s story of the Emperor's New 
Clothes Like the people’s reactions to the emperor’s new clothes, some people will not 
admit that the sanctity of life doctrine is without content, i e that it is simply 
meaningless (ibid) Why is this7 The sanctity o f life doctrine purports that those who 
belong to the Homo sapiens species automatically have moral standing However, 
Singer contends that just because an individual belongs to the Homo sapiens species, 
does not mean that s/he automatically has any moral claim on us In other words, there 
is nothing particularly special about being a member of the Homo sapiens line
According to Singer, the collapse of the traditional western ethic should not be a 
cause for dismay or despair but should be envisaged as an opportunity for a cathartic 
expenence It is an opportunity for a new ethic to emerge that will help people to 
approach the issues concerning the beginning and the end of life, in a more practical and 
humane way (ib id )
Following Singer’s thought, it could be claimed that the concept of human 
being, compared to the concept o f person, is not an evaluative concept In other words, 
being a human being is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for having moral
The 1996 Irish Ward of Court case resonates with the Bland case However, there are a number 
o f differences The Ward of Court (i e the woman) was fed by a gastrostomy tube and was not in a 
complete PVS but in a semi-vegetative state However, similar to the Bland case, the removal of 
nourishment and hydration was legally sought m order to allow her to die with dignity (see O ’Carroll 
1995)
7 Indeed, for Singer, “ modem medical practice has become incompatible with belief in the equal value 
o f all life” (Singer 1994 p i 89)
5
Q
worth Being a person is a necessary and a sufficient condition for having moral worth 
The concept o f person, compared to human being, can offer a clearer benchmark for 
deciding whom to include in the moral arena and at which stage o f their development 
Consequently, the concept of person provides a new ethic that helps people to approach 
the issues regarding the beginning and the end of life, in a more practical and humane 
way For instance, if  a foetus is not a person, then logically it may not be morally wrong 
to end its life In a similar way, if  the patient in a PVS is not a person, then logically it 
may not be morally wrong to end his or her life
Thirdly, the traditional sanctity of life doctrine has been discnminately applied 
only to human beings and not to animals In light o f this, Singer outlines a new period 
of opportunity with a senes o f new commandments, contrasting them with the so-called 
old commandments For example, the so-called fifth commandment Treat all human 
life as always more precious than any nonhuman life, is exchanged for a more 
sophisticated principle Do not discriminate on the basis o f  species (ibid pp201-202) 
Singer points out that some nonhuman animals, which are o f a high intellectual and 
emotional level, equal, in every respect, and even surpass, some of the profoundly 
disabled human beings In contrast to the traditional sanctity o f life doctrine, the nght to 
life should not be based on a nght given by species membership, in this case the Homo 
sapiens The nght to life belongs solely to those who possess “personhood”
The distinction between human being and person allows other entities that were 
formally excluded (1 e some animals) to be included Therefore, not all members o f the 
Homo sapiens species are persons and not all persons have to be members of the Homo 
sapiens species Thus, instead of the concept o f person being a restrictive concept, 
unlike human being, it actually has the potential to be an inclusive concept
8 A necessary condition is one that a concept or a term must demonstrate For instance, X is necessary for 
Y otherwise Y cannot be true A sufficient condition is one that guarantees the occurrence of something 
For instance, X cannot occur without Y occurring
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There is no doubt that Singer’s thought concerning the moral dignity of animals 
compared to the mentally handicapped is logically coherent and very persuasive But, as 
the paradox of Zeno reminds us, you can have a logical argument and still end up with a 
false conclusion9 This points to the traditional distinction between the truth of a 
proposition and the validity o f the argument The argument might be quite logical but 
the truth o f its propositions might be questionable Perhaps, this is why many health 
care workers find it hard to accept some of Singer’s conclusions, especially regarding 
the moral status of infants, who are not yet considered to be persons
Fourthly, it could be claimed that we can still use a qualified concept of human 
being instead of the concept of person For instance, it could be argued that only those 
human beings that exercise rationality and are morally accountable should be deemed to 
have moral worth In this way, this qualified concept o f human being takes over the role 
of the concept o f person Yet, it still does not stand up to the objection that it is 
inherently discriminatory because it automatically excludes nonhuman beings
From the above arguments I think that the distinction between the concept of 
person and the concept o f human being is philosophically legitimate
Having accepted the distinction between the concept of person and human being, 
I was left with a feeling of philosophical uneasiness For a while I was not sure what 
was at the root o f my philosophical discomfort concerning the distinction between 
human being and person I was not entirely happy with the boundary that is 
automatically set between those who are deemed to be o f moral standing and those who 
are not Therefore, m order to remedy this philosophical uneasiness, I set out to analyse
9 Zeno gives the example of Achilles and a tortoise having a race Achilles decides to give the tortoise a 
head start by 100 meters Logically, Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise because when Achilles 
reaches the 100 meter mark, the tortoise will have moved on to, perhaps, the 101 meter mark, and when 
Achilles reaches the 101 meter mark, the tortoise will have moved on again Therefore, logically, Achilles 
can never win the race Of course, in reality it is quite different Therefore, logical arguments like this can 
have false conclusions depending on the premise from which they begin
7
the various driving forces underpinning the concept of person, the fruit of which is in 
this research
0 3 The Core of the Thesis
In this dissertation I analyse how the concept o f person has the effect o f being 
more exclusive than inclusive In my investigation I use the work of Henn Bergson 
(1986) to argue that certain concepts o f person, which inevitably end up excluding those 
who are deemed non-persons from the moral realm, reflect the static morality o f a 
closed society rather than the dynamic morality o f an open society I propose that this is 
demonstrated when the benefits of medicine and technology are confined to those who 
are deemed worthy For example, m the context o f the creative interface between 
technology and medical expertise, persons -  not necessarily human beings -  are 
considered to be at the centre o f the health care and moral umverse As the bioethicist 
H Tristram Engelhardt (1996) writes “Medicine is concerned with persons m the stnct 
sense of moral agents, which includes patients who discuss their problems with their 
physicians and come to agreements about treatment” (pl35 and p 2 3 9 )10
In order to counteract the concepts o f person that reflect the static morality o f a 
closed society, I outline a definition of person as a self-interpreting-dependent~ 
vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance My concept attempts to dismantle the arbitrary boundaries o f exclusion 
established by certain concepts o f person However, I accept the fact that this concept 
risks becoming another definition of exclusion rather than inclusion In view of this, I 
point to two chief directions in consciousness as outlined by Bergson (1999) intellect 
and intellectual sympathy The intellect tends to use concepts to set boundaries between
10 Engelhardt makes the case that “the character of medicine depends upon the ontological status o f the 
subject with which it is concerned” (Engelhardt 1973/74 p230) He also argues the case that “medicine is 
the agent o f persons It is engaged on their behalf It is restrained by obligations to respect the wishes o f 
persons and directed by the goal o f doing good to persons” (Engelhardt 1996 p276)
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objects whereas intellectual sympathy tends to engage with objects and goes beyond
/
boundanes From this, I argue that it is only through intellectual sympathy that we can 
become aware o f a kind o f a “current” between persons, which helps us to recognise 
others as “persons” Therefore, I contend that in the last analysis it is through 
intellectual sympathy that my concept can become and remain part o f the dynamic 
morality o f an open society
Finally, I draw out some of the implications of my argument regarding the 
concept o f person, for the new European Charter o f Patients’ Rights (2002) Firstly, I 
examine whether the Charter is an example of the static morality of a closed society or 
the dynamic morality o f an open society Secondly, I make the case that, from the 
perspective of some contemporary concepts of person, many individuals are 
automatically excluded from this Charter In light o f this, I argue that my definition of 
person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance may provide another avenue 
through which so-called non-persons could be given a moral standing
0 4 Conclusion
To sum up, it can be argued that compared to human being, the concept of 
person provides a more useful tool which helps solving some o f the ethical difficulties 
that health care professionals face, especially with concerns relating to the beginning 
and end of life The concept o f person provides a benchmark for discerning whose lives 
are to be considered to have moral worth In lieu of this we need to understand what we 
mean by the term “person” and to whom that term can be applied Consequently, 
pertinent ethical issues in health care can only be fully comprehended and, therefore 
resolved to some extent, by clarifying our concept o f person, especially if we are going 
to decide whom to include in this concept For that reason, how we philosophise about
9
the concept o f person has crucial ethical implications for health care, especially if the 
concept ends up being more exclusive than inclusive
Finally, I use the work of a number of philosophers in order to navigate my 
approach to finding a more inclusive concept o f person In this way, the dissertation is 
not a thesis about one particular philosopher but rather a collage of different voices 
because, as Isaac Newton once remarked, it is only by standing on the shoulders of 
giants that we see further I do not claim to solve all the difficulties with the concept o f 
person But, as Albert Einstein said, the formulation of a problem is sometimes more 
important than its solution 11
11 Quotations are taken from the Nobel Museum, Stockholm
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0 5 Chapter Summary 
0 51  Chapter One The Creative Revolution in Health Care
In this chapter I make the case that there is a propensity towards positive and 
negative manipulation o f human creativity The creative revolution that benefits the 
world of health care is faced with the constant risk of becoming a search for the 
perfection of humanity within history for a chosen few Using the work of the German 
philosopher Erie Voegelin, the case is made that this search for perfection is spurred on 
by an ideological consciousness that seeks to reach perfection within history at 
whatever cost and to confine the benefits to a chosen group Using the work of the 
French philosopher Henri Bergson, I argue that this ideological consciousness is rooted 
in the phenomenon of a closed society, derived by the static morality, which 
automatically excludes those who are outside the pale o f the group from the benefit of 
the creative revolution In health care ethics, the concept o f person may be used by a 
closed society to exclude those who do not fit the criteria of personhood
0 5 2 Chapter Two Concepts of Person
In chapter two I examine some of the literature from the vast intellectual 
landscape concerning the various concepts o f person that have emerged I point to the 
fact that the word “person” originally has no philosophical meaning and is used in the 
context o f theatre However, it takes on a particular philosophical meaning because of 
the Chnstological and Trinitarian debates concerning the humanity and divinity of Jesus 
Christ and the relationship between God the Father, Son and Holy Spint Gradually, the 
concept becomes more specialised, but at the heart o f it remains the notion o f the 
rational nature o f the human being The locus o f personhood is to be found in the 
inherent rational nature o f the Homo sapiens However, the analogical employment by 
the Christian Church of the term “person” in order to justify how Jesus Christ is not a
11
human being but a divine person with two natures (1 e human and divine) demonstrates 
that an entity can be a person but not a human being This idea is developed with the 
work of the English philosopher John Locke He shows that personhood is something 
that is not intrinsic to human beings but is something that can be attached to entities that 
show the necessary attnbutes of consciousness, the exercise o f rationality and a concept 
of self Therefore, species membership is no longer essential Now, the epicentre of 
personhood is to be found, for example, in the display of rationality and m the 
manifestation of self-consciousness This has a major influence on contemporary 
philosophers working in the health care arena including Michael Tooley, Peter Singer, 
and H Tristram Engelhardt For them, the concept o f person can be applied to any 
entity that displays signs o f rationality and self-consciousness, for example However, 
m the last analysis, their concepts of person end up excluding far more entities from the 
moral realm In light o f this, their concepts tend to illustrate the static morality o f a 
closed society
0 5 3 Chapter Three An Aesthetic Presentation of the Concept of Person
Following on from the examination of the various concepts o f person, I argue in 
this chapter that such concepts belong to the world o f facts rather than to the world of 
meaning I explore the concept o f person from the context o f reality, which is mediated 
by meaning and constituted by significance Firstly, I use Bernard Lonergan’s analysis 
o f the three worlds o f meaning the world of immediate experience, the world mediated 
by meaning and the world constituted by meaning I then go on to interface the three 
worlds with Charles Taylor’s work on significance, language and human agency For 
Taylor, it is through the act of self-interpretation that the person bestows significances 
on his/her experiences Part o f this self-interpretation is an evaluative dimension 
whereby the person evaluates his/her significances It is through this act o f self-
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evaluation that persons have standards of behaviour and are able to recognise those as 
standards From Lonergan’s and Taylor’s analysis, I outline a definition of person as a 
self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance
0 5 4 Chapter Four An Instructive Presentation of the Concept of Person
In this chapter I examine the definition of person as a self-interpreting- 
dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance and ask whether I, too, am m danger of succumbing to the 
static morality o f a closed society In other words, if  certain entities do not fit my 
concept, am I also working from a closed society’s mentality7 In answer to my own 
question, I look at difficult and controversial cases and see whether embryos, infants 
and/or PVS patients do fit my concept Although, some seem to fit better than others, I 
make the argument that even normal human adults may not fulfil the criteria all the 
time In light of this, I return to Bergson for some philosophical help in understanding 
why my good intentions o f having an inclusive concept rather than an exclusive 
concept, run the same risks as other concepts Here I examine the notion of complex and 
simple forms of the intellect and show how the intellect tends to make what is in itself 
simple, quite complex, through the use of concepts As well as that, it seems that 
originating experiences can never be fully packaged into concepts It is only at the level 
of intellectual sympathy where we can enter into the originating experience In other 
words, it is at this level that we can share experiences with people, where as concepts 
can never fully communicate those expenences In this context, I make the case that 
there is, what I call, a “current” between persons that helps them to recognise each other 
as “persons”
13
0 5 5 Chapter Five The Implications of the Concept of Person for the European 
Charter of Patients’ Rights
This final chapter examines the new European Charter of Patients5 Rights from 
the perspective of the concept o f person The case is made that such a charter could end 
up becoming another static code o f a closed society, m this case it could become the 
closed society o f patients I argue that the various concepts o f person weaken the case 
for those who are most vulnerable in society (1 e those so-called non-persons) to be 
included in the Charter Following this, I argue that my definition of person may 
provide an antidote to this closed mentality by appealing to the health care 
professional’s intellectual sympathy
14
in Health Care
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1.1 Introduction -  The New W orld
It could be argued that the twentieth century has witnessed the greatest personal, 
moral and social disorder that humanity has ever encountered. It is a century that will be 
remembered for its wars fuelled by its buttressed ideologies. The insecurity of humanity 
continued in the twenty-first century with the fall of the twin towers of the World Trade 
Centre on the 11th of September 2001, which almost grinded the western world to a halt. 
The sorry picture of the fresh acts of international terrorism around the world expresses 
alarm and raises disturbing questions about humanity’s capacity to vent evil. It is clear 
that although the great political ideologies of the twentieth century have come to an end 
there are still veils of intellectual distortion that penetrate the moral climate that 
encircles humanity in the infancy of the twenty-first century. The world of health care is 
not an idle bystander or immune from this world plagued by veils of intellectual 
distortion. Health care professionals have to work within this world and provide a 
palliative and curative response. In this chapter, I will examine how veils of distortion 
that arise from ideological consciousness, rooted in the phenomenon of a closed society, 
can affect the creative revolution in health care.
1.2 The Creative Revolution
(Medicinhistoriska Museet 2004)
Bo Pettersson’s watercolour of a woman having a hand-wrestle with a skeleton 
figure aptly depicts the unremitting struggle between health and sickness. When we
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look closely at the present world of health care, we can see that it has greatly benefited 
from, what could be descnbed as, a creative revolution facilitated by technology, 
science and medical expertise 1 Humanity has ingeniously developed technology for the 
sake o f humankind’s well-being The creative quest to conquer illness and premature 
mortality has gathered pace m recent times The post-war years provide striking 
testimony to the medical revolution that is assisted by technology In many ways the 
Second World War marked a turning point in the technological advance of health care, 
when it activated an expeditious and an avid pursuit o f innovation To take one 
example, the critical state o f casualties from the D-Day invasion of Normandy led the 
medical professions to discover how to remove bullets from the heart of a soldier 
without causing his death This, m turn, led to great strides m heart surgery (Le Fanu 
1999 p i 91) In many ways, the vast achievements from the interface between 
technology and medicine are akin to the great Industrial Revolution When 
industrialisation made its breakthrough in Europe it replaced human and animal power 
with machinery The technological revolution, however, is on a larger scale and at 
greater propulsion Yet when we throw a sharp eye over the technological advances 
benefiting the world o f health care, we can observe that they have been accompanied by 
a number of ethical concerns
Firstly, there can be no doubt that the development o f organ transplantation -  
facilitated by immunological tolerance drugs -  has been a major surgical advancement 
within the last decades Heart, kidney and liver transplants save many lives on a regular 
basis, they have become almost routine operations This is not to imply that each 
transplant does not have its own complexity But, they have certainly become an
1 Nature itself provides various medical and healing remedies against diseases that beset humanity For 
instance, Alexander Fleming accidentally discovered penicillin when he noticed a mould, in a leftover 
culture dish, preventing bacteria from spreading (see Le Fanu 1999 p7)
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essential part o f everyday general hospital life2 Nonetheless, they raise ethical concerns 
regarding the nature of valid consent and the harvesting of organs, especially when 
considenng the present-day reality in some parts o f the world where demand surpasses 
supply There is also the question as to whether Xenotransplantation (1 e the taking of 
organs from animals and transplanting them into humans) as opposed to 
Allotransplantation (1 e the taking and transplanting of organs within the same species) 
is ethically acceptable
Secondly, the intensive care unit (ICU) symbolises the remarkable achievements 
o f contemporary medicine when intermixed with technology3 New advancements in 
prolonging life, including hfe-support systems, ventilator machines and resuscitation 
techniques, introduce ethical issues regarding when we morally ought to, or ought not 
to, prolong life Consequently, they pose new ethical questions regarding those who 
survive, but who would have otherwise died, and are left either in a coma or a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) Patients in a PVS experience a loss o f the function of the higher 
brain while the brainstem (1 e lower bram) remains intact (Lustig 2001, Shewmon 
2001) From the perspective o f the brainstem criteria o f death, they are not clinically 
dead, whereas from the perspective o f higher-bram death, they might be considered 
dead4 These issues, together with the shortage of vital bodily organs for transplantation, 
have prompted new criteria for defining death 5 They have also sparked a debate
2 The hand transplant o f Matthew Scott in 1999 marked a historic break in the history of conventional 
transplantation (CNN 1999)
3 Ronald E Cranford (1996) remarks that the rise m the use of intensive care units in the last twenty years 
has been phenomenal ( p i94)
4 The term PVS was proffered by B Jennett and F Plum (1972) Adam Zeman (1997) offers an 
informative distinction between coma, brain death and PVS He states that “coma is a state o f 
unconsciousness m which the eyes are closed and sleep-wake cycles absent It is usually transient 
Bram death implies the irreversible loss of all brainstem functions It is, in a sense, the converse o f 
PVS, in which brainstem function survives while the function o f the cerebral hemispheres is lost or 
gravely impaired (p797)
For example, it was Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goulon who detected the condition o f bram death in 
1959 (Houssin 2003 p26) The Harvard Report officially introduced the concept o f brain death in 1968 
(Report o f the Ad Hoc Committee 1999 p287, Bemat 1998) According to Singer (1999), “this change in 
the definition o f death has meant that warm, breathing, pulsating human beings are not given further 
medical support If their relatives consent their hearts and other organs can be cut out o f their bodies 
and given to strangers” (p293)
18
concerning whether intravenous feeding, for example, is artificial as opposed to natural, 
and thus whether it is morally acceptable to have it removed when it becomes too 
burdensome for the patient This, in turn, points to the euthanasia debate Is it morally 
right to help a patient to die by “mercifully” omitting life-sustaining medicine and/or 
nutrition and hydration?6 In debates about the ethics of withdrawing such sustenance 
technologies, two schools of thought are often distinguished On the one hand, those 
who believe that feeding tubes should be removed tend to focus on the artificial means 
by which food and fluids are given to the patient According to this school o f thought, 
the patient’s death is not caused by the removal o f the feeding tube but by the condition 
of his/her health In other words, the patient is already dying On the other hand, those 
who disagree with the removal of sustenance tubes argue that we should not concentrate 
on the perceived artificial method of feeding but on the nature of the act of feeding In 
other words, they argue that feeding the patient is a basic human act Therefore, the 
patient’s death is not caused by a deterioration in the condition o f his/her health but by 
starvation and dehydration7
On a related front, some writers raise the question regarding whether active 
euthanasia is more “humane” than passive euthanasia (Rachels 1999 p227)8 Is it 
ethically correct to use a lethal injection in order to shorten the life o f a patient so that 
s/he can forego excruciating suffering and, thus, die with dignity? All of these
6 Voluntary euthanasia has been practiced openly in the Netherlands for some time Dan W Brock (1992) 
offers an informative assessment of this (pp 10-22) Some philosophers argue that killing a patient in a 
PVS is not an act o f euthanasia because the patient cannot consciously benefit (McMahan 2002 p448)
7 Terri Schiavo, who was in a PVS for fifteen years, died thirteen days after her feeding tube was removed 
(BBC News 2005a)
8 Passive euthanasia occurs when life-sustaining medicine and/or nutrition and hydration are omitted In 
other words, the patient’s death is not directly caused Active euthanasia occurs when the patient’s death 
is directly caused through a lethal injection, for example There is major debate regarding whether the 
distinction between passive and active euthanasia has any ethical weight (see Thornton 1999 p414, Foot 
1979 pp 14-40, Dixon 1998 pp25-29)
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viewpoints bring into question the ethical role of the health care worker in the dying 
process 9
Thirdly, on another front, the reproductive technique of m vitro fertilization 
(IVF), which is designed to facilitate human conception, has become a common 
occurrence in many health care institutions Since the birth o f Louise Browne in 1978 -  
the first baby conceived through the IVF process -  other forms of reproductive 
technology have been developed including gamete mtra fallopian transfer (GIFT), IVF 
with donor egg and IVF with frozen egg (see Koch 1998 p 2 1 )10 The process o f freezing 
spare embryos liberates IVF and embryo transfer from certain time constraints (Smith 
1996 p66) It is now possible to have children from the same act o f conception to be 
bom at different times Still, the fertilization of many eggs in the IVF process raises the 
question as to what is to become of those embryos that are not placed in the woman’s 
uterus (see Wamock 1985 p 3 0 )11 Are they to be destroyed or are they to be frozen and 
used as “spares” for research purposes?
Advancements m embryonic stem cell research elicit further issues as to whether 
we morally ought to sacnfice the life o f the embryo in order to make progress in 
attempting to alleviate conditions such as diabetes, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
disease Such degenerative conditions owe their source to the death or dysfunction of 
cells In 1998, scientists successfully isolated and cultured human embryonic stem cells
9 Without a doubt, this is not an issue only for doctors directly involved but also includes other health care 
professionals such as nurses This is a fact acknowledged by Bandman and Bandman (1995) when they 
write that “at the primary level o f prevention and care, patients and families look to ‘their’ nurses for 
information, advice, and support when facing difficult decisions o f this nature At the secondary level o f 
curative care, nurses are actively involved in monitoring and sustaining treatment modalities such as hfe- 
support systems At the tertiary level, nurses are practicing advanced levels o f clinical competence and 
shared decision making At a societal level, nurses are or are expected to be actively involved in policy 
formulation within the health organization, in professional societies, and in legislative bodies” (p4)
10 See Edwards (1998), Harcourt (1995) and Koch (1998) for an informative account of the history and 
development o f IVF
11 Also see Stoppard (2000 p51), Smith (1996 p65) Thomas A Shannon (1997) points out that although 
three embryos are generally transferred to the woman’s uterus after fertilisation, there have been 
occasions when this number was “significantly” higher (p61) Dyson (1995) argues that a large number of 
embryos are produced for research purposes (p35) According to John Haldane’s (2000) research, about 
100,000 embryos are destroyed or experimented upon in British laboratories every year (p i90) However, 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authonty (2004) has reduced the number o f embryos per 
transfer from three to two (p2)
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for the first time Thus, they hoped that by reintroducing new healthy cells, the patient’s 
neurological and biological functions would be regenerated Consequently, it would 
appear that how the embryo is valued is somewhat ambivalent On the one hand, an 
embryo does not qualify as a “person” in the strict philosophical sense In other words, 
an embryo is not a being that possesses self-consciousness, a sense of past, present and 
future and does not exercise rationality 12 The embryo is not morally accountable 
Therefore, an embryo has no moral claim on us On the other hand, an embryo’s cells 
are extremely valuable for research Although, technically an embryo is a collection of 
cells, this fact is sometimes presented in a pejorative sense, especially in abortion 
debates But, for those involved in stem cell research, this collection of cells is very 
important
Fourthly, the attempt o f cloning humans is another route to produce embryonic 
stem cells Dolly the sheep represented a new breakthrough in cloning The sheep was 
cloned not by splitting embryonic material but by a new technique called “nuclear 
transfer” 13 With this procedure, the nucleus (1 e genetic material) is removed from an 
unfertilised egg and is replaced with the nucleus o f a cell in further development For 
some, cloning offers perilous futunstic visions o f Aldous Huxley’s (1998) Brave New 
World Yet, as the English philosopher John Hams (1998) points out, cloning does not 
create identical copies o f the same individual, but only o f the same genotype (p24) In 
this way, clones are -  or would be -  like identical twins If we do not feel anxious when 
identical twins are bom, why should we when identical twins are deliberately made 
(ibid y> Notwithstanding this argument, the morality o f the cloning method has only 
been accepted by a paucity o f thinkers and organisations 14 However, the same was true
121 will examine this in more detail in the next chapter
,3 The various aspects o f this debate are well documented in McLaren (2002)
14 The European Parliament (1998) and the World Health Organisation (1999), for instance, have both
rejected it Also Kass (1985) raises a number of ethical questions surrounding cloning including
experimenting on the unborn and the discarding of embryos, for example (pp66-69)
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for IVF but given time, it has become more accepted It will be interesting to see how 
the debate about cloning advances and legislation develops
Fifthly, with the application of molecular biology to medicine, it is argued that 
the emergence o f genetics has been at the centre o f the scientific revolution in the latter 
part of the twentieth century (Mattel 2001 p i 1 ) 15 The discovery by James Watson and 
Francis Cnck of the double helix structure o f DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in 1953, 
with its implications for genetic manipulation, gives us a biological power that emulates 
the historic significance of the nuclear energy generated by the splitting of the atom (Le 
Fanu 1999 p i 89) Three techniques have become popular Genetic Engineering, which 
seeks to develop new drugs, Genetic Screening, which seeks to eradicate inherited 
diseases and Gene Therapy, which seeks to correct and, as it were, re-engineer genetic 
defects (ibid p275) 16 Yet again, we are compelled to face the question as to whether it 
is legitimate to add a hyphen between the words “gene” and “ethics” and call it “gene -  
ethics” In other words, does ethics have any place m genetics9 If so, what are the 
ethical implications involved in soma and germ-lme therapy m terms of genetic 
enhancement? The former (l e soma therapy) fixes dysfunctional genes, whereas the 
latter (i e germ-lme therapy) detects which gene has a (dormant) disposition towards 
degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease and, thus, gives us the option to 
halt the malevolent gene from developing and from affecting further generations that 
belong to that hereditary line (Anderson 1982 p513, Lacadena 2001 p47, Manaranche 
2001) It would appear that there are no serious ethical misgivings about fixing a 
dysfunctional gene, but is it ethical to tamper with future generations in the germ-lme?
15 Paul Billings and Sophia Kohopoulos (2001) explain that the gene is a unit o f heredity, which transmits 
information to the cell, whereas the genome is the home o f the gene (p20)
16 Alongside with this, the Human Genome Project is an attempt to map the three billion base pairs o f 
genes that make up the human genome It is often referred to as the “book o f life”, the “blueprint o f 
human life” and the “holy grail”
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As well as that, do we have the moral right to seek to have our own genetically tailored 
child7'7
Finally, there have been a number of inventions o f diagnostic tools and products, 
such as the laparoscope and the CT scan, that have provided doctors with a fantastic 
mner-vista o f the workings o f the human body O f course, from an ethical perspective, 
some of the findings from these tools force us to face difficult issues For instance, 
ultrasound enables us to detect foetuses with severe malformations and poses the ethical 
question of whether we ought to abort them before they come to full term
From the above, it can be concluded that at the dawn of the twenty-first century 
health care practitioners face many ethical predicaments, directly or indirectly, 
engendered by the vanous great advancements made by medico-technology in this 
creative revolution 18
Although some health care professionals may see such predicaments as affecting 
doctors primarily and nurses and other health care practitioners secondanly, I think that 
it can be fairly argued that these kinds of moral questions are becoming more and more 
pertinent for all those involved m the health care service Accordingly, health care 
professionals are called more and more to be morally reflective regarding the ethical 
repercussions o f their work Indeed, ethical issues in health care also affect those in 
civic society It is often the case that ethical problems and dilemmas19 about the 
utilisation of biomedical and biotechnological advancements are brought to the fore of
17 “Our future is technological, but it will not be a world of gray steel Rather our technological future is 
headed toward a neo-biological civihzaton” (Kelly 1994 p i 83)
18 Some would claim that the new frontiers in health care have also led to a mass médicalisation o f society 
and an irrational fetishisation about health (Le Fanu 1999 pxix)
19 A moral problem, by definition, usually has a number o f possible solutions, whereas a moral dilemma 
mvolves a conflict between two moral principles or values As Soren Holm (1997) puts it “ ethical 
dilemma has a precise technical meaning, which distinguishes it from ethical problems For the 
philosopher, an ethical dilemma occurs when, after full consideration o f all relevant factors, I find myself 
m a situation in which I ought to do two different and mutually exclusive acts That is, I ought to do act A 
and at the same time I ought to do act B, but I cannot do both I am therefore in a situation in which I 
cannot fulfil all my moral obligations” (p83) See also Ian E Thompson, Kath M Melia, and Kenneth M 
Boyd (1994) for their discussion on the distinction between a moral problem and a moral dilemma (pp4- 
6)
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people’s consciousness by heated debates, as it was the case with Zain Hashmi This 
young child had a fatal blood disorder -  thalassaemia -  and needed a bone marrow 
transplant but unfortunately no suitable match could be found By using IVF his parents 
sought to produce an embryo from which doctors could remove stem cells that could 
regenerate bone marrow that would offer a good tissue match (BBC News 2002) The 
public was faced with the issue of whether it is ethically right to create a number of 
embryos -  and discard them -  in order to find a genetically perfect match to save the 
life o f a child?
Yet, the various ethical issues surrounding the use of technology may seem a 
little peculiar because obviously if used for the good of humanity, whether it be the 
creative revolution made possible by technology, bioscience or the random discovenes 
of what nature has to offer, surely this is extremely positive On the other side o f the 
coin, what may be positive for humanity in general, may turn out to be negative for the 
individual in particular The question that faces us is whether technology is inherently 
problematic or value free There can be no doubt that the funding of certain types of 
technological research can be spurred on by vested interests The funding of a project 
has to be justified and it has to find a financial return on the initial investment In this 
sense, technology, or at least its use, may not be entirely value free There can also be a 
race to be first with new breakthroughs and discovenes Ethical norms and legal laws 
tend to be seen as an impediment to winning the technological race This is sometimes 
referred to as the technological imperative that propels us to keep going no matter what 
the costs may be While it may be acceptable then to argue that technology is not value- 
free, I am still more inclined to agree with the position that it is not technology itself
that is the problem but the use we make of it (Cassell 1996 p i 7 8 )20
\
20 Gisela Konopka (1992) makes a similar argument She writes, “we have to remember a very basic 
principle, that science in itself is valueless and so is technology In the use o f both in a world inhabited by 
people, human ethics and values must enter” (p i8)
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However, it is clear that the creativity o f humanity concretised m technology and 
interfaced with medico-bioscience can have both positive and negative effects This 
finds echoes in the ancient African Yoruban myth of Ogun In Yoruban mythology, 
Ogun is the god of creativity who, through his power, points to the double-edged sword 
of ingenuity and destruction in the exercise o f creativity (Larsson 2002 pi 1) Ogun 
shows that creativity is accompanied by destruction In this way, Ogun is known as the 
god of both creativity and war (ib id) One modem example o f the positive and negative 
effects of creativity is Mane and Pierre Cune’s investigation of the radiation that is 
discharged by uranium They discovered that radiation could also be denved directly 
from uranium atoms (Semor 1998, Larsson 2001 pp441-43) This led to a radical 
knowledge that can be used for either the treatment o f cancer or for the manufactunng 
of atom bombs
Even the atomic bomb venfies the great and homfic vigour of humanity’s 
creative streak when utilised m the deployment o f science and technology In a small 
village of Haigerloch in the south of Germany lies the Atomkeller (i e the “atom 
cellar”), which is a testimony to the success o f the German nuclear research 
(Atomkeller-Museum 2005) The atom research project at Haigerloch belonged to the 
Berlin-based Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute The atom cellar was deliberately located 
underneath a castle church (i e the Schlofikirche) m order to avoid potential bombing by 
the Allies dunng the Second World War From a retrospect position, it is easy for us to 
see two possible effects stemming from the research conducted at this cellar There are 
positive and negative consequences emerging from the creative feats of the scientists 
who dedicated their life to this work On the positive side, they proved that a chain 
reaction could be set m motion and maintained by using uranium and thermal neutrons 
This was due to Otto Hahn’s discovery o f how to divide the atomic nucleus of uranium 
(Hoffmann and Cole 2001) It was now possible to instigate a neutron chain reaction by
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a splitting of this kind, with an ensuing discharge o f large amounts of energy On the 
negative side, it was also possible to develop a nuclear weapon Although, it is a 
documented fact that the scientists involved m the work of the atomic experiment had 
acquired both theoretical and practical knowledge, they had neither the intention nor 
enough material to develop a weapon of mass destruction (Atomkeller-Museum 2005 
pi 1) Nonetheless, others took up this potential and the homfic atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima on the 6th of August and Nagasaki on the 9th of August 1945 are poignant 
examples o f this fact
1 3 Understanding the Distortion
The positive and negative use of the creative feats of humanity in health care 
raises ethical issues for health care professionals who may be left wondering, “where 
can I go”9 in the ever-changing labyrinth of health care that is affected by the creative 
revolution The British Romanticist poet William Wordsworth reminds us that 
sometimes it is only through reflective distancing that we can begin to grasp the true 
significance of something When Wordsworth saw a daffodil he could not fully grasp its 
true beauty immediately It was only afterwards, when the experience was recalled in 
his memory, that he was able to “see” its true significance
For oft, when on my couch I lie 
In vacant or in pensive mood,
They flash upon that inward eye 
Which is the bliss of solitude,
And then my heart with pleasure fills,
And dances with the daffodils (Wordsworth 1994 p61)
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For Wordsworth, the best precondition for penetrating reality is reflection 
through recalling the reality of the thing within the context of solitude Applying this to 
the ethical issues surrounding the creative feats in health care, I decided to take 
Wordsworth’s advice and try to understand “what’s going on” by distancing myself 
from the immediate health care ethical issues and by looking elsewhere for some 
direction In attempting to penetrate, to some extent, to the roots of the positive and 
negative manipulation of humanity’s creativity, I have found that Erie Voegelin’s 
analysis of the ideological pursuit of human perfection together with Henn Bergson’s 
analysis o f the closed and open societies, provide helpful apertures 21
1 4 Towards a Philosophical Understanding of Positive and Negative Uses of 
Creativity 
1 4 1  The Ideological Pursuit of Perfection
As I have previously shown, health care faces a complex mosaic o f new, 
startling developments arising from the creative revolution in medicine and 
biotechnology, which seek to extirpate suffering and the various limitations o f the 
human condition The clinical practitioner’s expertise intermixed with technology and 
science amasses great new possibilities to ease suffering and pain To forestall any 
misunderstanding, it must be stated that this in itself is extremely positive Nevertheless, 
as I have said, the creative use o f technology may have not only positive effects but also 
negative implications for the individual and eventually for humanity The focus of my 
study in this section is to examine the possible sources o f both the positive and negative 
side o f the creative revolution in health care
One of the sources o f this creative revolution is the innovative drive for 
perfection that seems to have always accompanied humanity This is well illustrated in
21 Voegehn (1952) refers to Bergson’s symbols of closed and open societies m his own work (pp60-61)
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the short story “The Birth-Mark” by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1974), which recounts the 
tale of a scientist (Aylmer), whose life is a quest to find a way to conquer his wife’s 
(Georgiana) facial imperfection To the rest o f the world his wife is beauty personified 
To him, however, she has one noticeable imperfection A birthmark on her left cheek, 
which is likened to an imprint of a small crimson hand (p38) Aylmer says to 
Georgiana, “ you came so nearly perfect from the hand of Nature, that this slightest 
possible defect shocks me as being the visible mark of earthly imperfection” (ibid 
p37) The rest o f the narrative depicts Aylmer’s search to discover a potion that will 
remove this facial flaw from his wife A blemish that symbolises her humanity and 
mortality Although Georgiana is at first reluctant to participate in Aylmer’s 
experiments, she quickly succumbs to his desire and declares that she wants to “put off 
the birthmark of mortality by relinquishing mortality itself m preference to any other 
mode” (ibid p53) In the end, Aylmer succeeds m developing a concoction that 
removes the birthmark while at the same time causing his wife’s death
The story illustrates that the dnve for perfection in the face o f human 
imperfection inspires people to invent remedies to counteract any flaws Aylmer 
achieves his goal m discovering a potion to make his wife become the most beautiful 
woman in the world However, in achieving this positive effect, he also instigates a 
negative reaction from her, which causes her death It would appear that the double- 
edged sword of ingenuity and destruction strikes here again
The last sentences o f the story suggest that Aylmer’s search for perfection seeks 
to go beyond this world to attain the perfect future within the present moment
Yet, had Aylmer reached a profounder wisdom, he need not thus have flung 
away the happiness, which would have woven his mortal life of the self-same 
texture with the celestial The momentary circumstance was too strong for him,
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he failed to look beyond the shadowy scope of Time, and, living once for all in 
Eternity, to find the perfect Future in the present (ibid p56)
I think that these sentences point to, what could be described as, the 
“ideological” dimension of humanity’s search for the perfect future within the present 
According to the German political-scientist Enc Voegelm, the pursuit of reaching 
human transfiguration within history is the driving pulse o f the many ideologies o f the 
twentieth century The ideological movements, which characterised the “Age of 
Ideology” from the middle o f the nineteenth century up to the twentieth century, are not 
simply consequences o f political and social conditions but point to something inherent 
in human nature itself In other words, the various ideologies do not stem from a 
reaction to the political conditions of the time but point to the imperfect state of the 
human condition living within a deficient social reality The ideological systems 
endeavour to give an account o f reality and humanity’s place within it in order to 
transform reality and the human condition
What is at the bedrock of this tendency to transform the human condition and 
reality itself9 According to Voegelin’s philosophical anthropology, human existence is 
structured by a dramatic field of numerous tensions We live in tension between time 
and timelessness, between hope and fulfilment, between perfection and imperfection, 
between knowledge and ignorance and between plenitude and deficiency (Voegelm 
1990d p i 76) The ideological consciousness seeks to overcome this tension of living 
between perfection and imperfection by inaugurating withm reality a utopia o f human 
perfection Consequently, the ideologist attempts to transfigure imperfect existence into 
a permanent state o f perfection However, this perfection cannot be realised within 
present reality because important sectors of reality are omitted by the ideologist
22 This period of time is referred to as the “Age of Ideology” by a number o f writers including Voegelm, 
(1978) and Aiken (1961)
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including the inherent limitation o f the human condition (Voegelin 1990a p316) For 
this reason, the ideological tendency does not solely belong to the modem period -  
although it is one acute manifestation of it -  but is a perennial universal propensity that 
belongs to the human condition
In this way, Voegelin departs from the conventional view that ideology is a type 
o f fallacious thinking on modem problem s23 He is convinced that the motivating 
expenence of the ideological activists is similar to that o f the ancient Gnostics24 The 
Gnostics were an ancient religious sect that claimed to possess special knowledge of 
spintual things According to their tradition, the world is a prison and is the source of 
alienation Through their esoteric knowledge they seek to escape from the shackles of 
the human condition They seek to pulverise the limits o f the human condition by 
transcending its precinct and by becoming identified with the divine However, this 
expenence is reserved for the few Gnosis is “the equation of salvation with knowledge, 
the belief that knowledge will enable man to tnumph over the matenal world and over 
his own physical limitations, and finally the belief that saving knowledge must remain 
esotenc, accessible only to a spintual or intellectual elite ” (Rossbach 1996 p241) 
The argument, as put by Voegelin, is that gnosticism is a deformation of Chnstiamty It 
is an attempt to compress the eschatological fulfilment to a this-worldly reality 
Gnosticism is a deformation of the Chnstian expectation of an other-worldly 
transcendent event, drawn wholly into a this-worldly event, i e that the perfect other­
worldly kingdom of God is pulled down into this world (Voegelin 1952 p i 29, also see 
Walsh 1990 p92) 25 The finesse o f gnosticism is that it claims to provide an efficacious
23 The ideological consciousness is described by Voegelin as a “closed” consciousness, a “disorientation”, 
a “pneumapathological consciousness” and an “egophantic revolt” (Voegelin 1990a pp 111-162 and 
Voegelin 1990b pp265-291)
24 The word “Gnostic” is derived from the Greek word gnosis, which means a special type of knowledge 
It is a mystical knowledge that provides an escape from the world It is not philosophical because it aims 
at the divimsation o f humanity, whereas philosophy aims at the love o f wisdom (Voegelin 2000b p244)
25 It is accepted that there were variants o f gnosticism before Christianity (see Perkins 1990 pp421-422) 
Voegelin acknowledges this when he writes “moreover, besides the Christian there also existed a Jewish, 
a pagan, and an Islamic gnosis, and quite possibly the common origin o f all these branches o f gnosis will
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and arcane knowledge that supplies the ontological bridge to the realm of identification 
with the divine 26
For Voegelm, the milieu o f modernity is essentially gnostic in character because 
the modem ideologues seek to trigger a world-immanent transfiguration that will 
liberate them from the oppressive conditions of existence He believes that this gnostic 
ingredient is to be found in the epistemological and sotenological manoeuvres of 
modem political revolutionaries The distorted veil o f ideology spurns the imperfection 
o f the human condition in order to make the world a better place Their perfectionist 
project seeks a paradise regained with considerable aplomb For example, Karl Marx 
desired to conquer the alienated, but malleable, human condition Through dialectic 
materialism, this takes the form of primitive communism, o f class society and of final 
communism This class struggle inevitably leads to revolution and, through this, to the 
birth of the classless society, the final goal for humanity (see Marx 1994 pp 102-156 and 
pp 157-186)
The hefty ideologies of the twentieth century were ushered in by a voracious 
pursuit to eradicate human suffering The vanous ideological movements sought to get 
nd of social oppression and to introduce justice m society and peace in the world Their 
intention o f inaugurating social justice and world peace was surely praiseworthy Yet,
have to be sought in the basic experiential type that prevailed in the pre-Christian area of Syriac 
civilization” (Voegelm 1952 p i 26) Nonetheless, it would appear that, for Voegelm, it is m response to 
Christianity that gnosticism finds its mature manifestation because he contends that “nowhere, however, 
has gnosis assumed the form of speculation on the meaning o f immanent history as it did in the high 
Middle Ages, gnosis does not by inner necessity lead to the fallacious construction o f history which 
charcatenzes modernity since Joachim” (ibid )
26 For Voegelm, the beginning of this deformation of the Christian expectation o f the Kingdom o f God 
finds its seeds m Joachim o f Flora Joachim applies a Trinitarian framework when he seeks to find 
meaning in history The first period o f history is the age o f the Father It is the life of the layperson The 
second age in history is that o f the Son It is the life o f the priest Finally, the third age, the time in which 
we are living, is that o f the Spirit It is the life of the monk This third stage is the final realm, i e the 
fulfilment o f the eschaton within history (Voegelm 1952 ppl 10-127) The discovery o f the Coptic 
Gnostic library at Nag Hammadi in Egypt led to an expansion of documentary material about this ancient 
sect Webb pomts out that the early Gnostics tended to reject the world rather than transform it, which has 
made Voegelin’s use o f the term rather controversial (Webb 1981 p200) However, Webb argues that the 
use of the term is still appropriate because both the modem ideological movements and the Gnostic sect 
seek absolute knowledge of reality Therefore, Webb encourages the use o f capitalising the name o f the 
ancient sect (i e Gnostic) to distinguish it from gnosticism (ibid pp201-201)
31
on the other side o f the fence, at the apex of the extensive flowering of so-called social 
emancipation in history, unprecedented systematic human cruelty was instigated This 
systematic destruction o f human life found its decisive expression in ethnic cleansing 
At the height of this social liberation, unparalleled human brutality was used in order to 
achieve the utopian aim of a perfect society This bespeaks the inherent flaw of 
ideological movements that attempt to truncate reality into a particular system The 
pursuit o f transformation provides a smoke-screen for the morality of the efficient 
destruction of humanity
However, within some philosophical circles, it is accepted that there are no more 
ideologies27 Nonetheless, I think that the ideological attempt at seeking to perfect 
humanity, while confining this to a select few, still penetrates some of our contemporary 
thinking and is therefore a veil o f distortion If Voegehn is correct in saying that 
ideological consciousness arises out of a response to various tensions intrinsic to the 
human condition, then clearly this does not end with the post-modern penod I think 
that it is the interface between technology and bioscience, not alchemy or political 
systems, that is now the creative key that may be used to unlock human limitation and 
human mortality for a specific group o f people28 In other words, the creative intermix 
between technology, science and medicine can be used m a negative way by becoming a 
camouflage for an ideological consciousness that seeks to outgrow humanity’s present
27 See W alsh’s (1995) analysis o f ideology Voegeltn (2000b) makes the same argument as Walsh 
(pp224-251)
28 David F Noble (1995) argues that the technological outlook m contemporary society is, m essence, a 
“religious phenomenon” (p i28) He writes “Hiroshima, a stark reminder of the impermanence of 
progress and the contingency o f history, provoked what historian Paul Boyer described as an ‘atom- 
induced revival o f eschatological thinking,’ and a ‘mood o f approaching apocalypse ’ ‘This atomic bomb 
is the Second Coming in W rath,’ exclaimed Winston Churchill” (ibid p i 08) Noble points to the 
argument that the emergence of technology and the religion o f technology are one and the same 
phenomenon At the same time, the energetic development o f technology is in fact medieval in origin and 
spirit There is now an ideological mamage between technology and transcendence, and thus technology 
becomes a form o f eschatology (see Maurer 1982 pp253-265) Similarly to Noble s thinking, Lewis 
Mumford believes that there is a “ faith in the religion of the machine ” (cited in Noble 1995 pl28) 
Mumford (1934) also states “The dream of conquering nature is one o f the oldest that has flowed and 
ebbed in man’s mind Each great epoch in human history in which this will has found a positive outlet 
marks a rise in human culture and a permanent contribution to m an’s security and well-being” (p37) We 
are on the verge o f a human epiphany that is inspired by a profound aspiration for the creation of a new 
humanity
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condition and gives control of this to a precise group The abolition of suffering that is 
underpinned by an ideological consciousness can lead to devastating consequences, as 
we have witnessed and continue' to witness in wars and genocides There is ample 
evidence in history o f occasions where we have been propelled into moral chaos in the 
name of the quest for human perfection
Take the example of the atrocities of eugenics that were earned out in the name 
of the scientific quest for human perfection in Nazi Europe (Distel and Jakusch 1978) 
In light of this, as put by Daniel Callahan (1996), the dreams o f technology are simply 
the other side o f the nightmare coin (p i4) Therefore, while evidently technology can be 
used to ennch humanity, it can also be used to debase that very humanity From this, 
the question anses as to whether there is a limit to seeking to delimit the human
o o
condition
I think that, in health care, many of the ethical issues posed are created by 
humanity’s creative attempt to lift itself out o f its limiting condition and, in some way, 
to find the perfect future in the present With the creative revolution in health care new 
possibilities are opened to humanity to determine its own destiny and not to succumb to 
biological determinism imposed on us by nature Such advancements have brought 
numerous benefits to humanity To name a few examples There has been a 
considerable increase m life expectancy and a reduction in infant m ortality31 The use of 
technology in neonatal intensive care units enables premature, underweight babies to
29 David Smith (1996) remarks that “this century has experienced both the heights of human scientific 
ingenuity and the depths o f human depravity” (pvn) Dawson S Schultz and Franco A Camevale (1996) 
argue that “it can only be expected that modem man will be a difficult patient because the sick bed 
dictates to him the task for which he is least prepared confrontation with (or suffering) the vulnerability 
of his body and the transience of his life ” (p 189)
30 David Cook (2003) formulates this question in another way “ it is appropriate to ask whether there is 
a limit to human existence” (p83) As he puts it “human beings cannot escape from key moral reflections 
on what we as humans do and can do Just because we have the capacity to perform a particular 
procedure, develop and use a specific drug, machine or technique leads us to the ethical question of 
whether we should actually do any or all o f these things” (Cook 2003 p82)
31 Still, circulatory diseases and cancer make up about 65% of deaths in Ireland each year (The 
Department o f Health and Children 2001 p25) In addition, we continue to struggle with (relatively) old 
and new life-threatening diseases such as AIDS and SARS
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develop and survive As well as that, various life-threatening diseases such as 
tuberculosis have been almost alleviated
Yet, in spite o f all this, there are a number o f paradoxes in the present-day use of 
medicine and technology to conquer the various imperfections o f the human condition 
For instance, m trying to lessen disease and to avert death, medicine and technology 
seem to heighten our fear o f disease and death (Callahan 1996 p i 7 ) 32 This is a peculiar 
phenomenon Undoubtedly, the elimination of suffering, disease and other negative 
attnbutes of the human condition appear to be intrinsically good Clearly it is m our 
interest to overcome vulnerability at whatever level m order to survive Notwithstanding 
this, it could be claimed that it points to the perennial tendency of attempting to 
transform the reality of the human condition, which may not always have completely 
positive consequences and therefore can become a veil o f distortion
But is the transformation of the human condition as radical as gnosticism9 It is 
true that gene therapy carries the technical advances to their definitive conclusion by 
attempting to correct the germ-line itself This brings to mind the image that humanity 
might finally obtain power over its own destiny and over the limitations imposed by the 
sweepstake o f genetic inheritance (Le Fanu 1999 p301)
Unlike Voegelm, James F Keenan (1999) places the search for perfection within 
the context o f a teleological understanding of human flourishing, enabled by the virtues 
(pi 10)33 According to Keenan’s research, perfection signifies whatever is lacking in 
actuality In this way, seeking perfection is quite natural to the destiny of any living 
being because it is intrinsic to its nature The problem lies in the type of perfection 
sought For example, if  perfection is seen as a market commodity -  e g a perfect body -
32 Armando Roa (2002) argues that “the so-called post-modern culture stands alien to the inner lives of 
persons, and sets its goal in the faith that technology will ultimately solve all our anxieties and problems, 
and that life must become a permanent source of pleasure” (p87) A good example o f this is the popularity 
of cosmetic surgery In light o f such practices, Melanie Phillips and John Dawson (1985) are convinced 
that “ there is a tendency on the part o f many people to treat the doctor simply as a technician whose 
job it is to give the public what it wants” (p6)
33 This pursuit for perfection is the key to virtue ethics, according to Keenan
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it is not really human perfection34 The difference m seeking perfection m the sense of 
achieving what is potentially withm the human condition is completely different to 
seeking what is not Potentiality puts a boundary on a substance For example, a human 
baby boy has the potential to become a man, but not a dog Additionally, we are mortal 
beings We cannot escape from the fact that one-day we will die Even if we could live 
far longer than the average age -  say two hundred years -  there are questions 
concerning whether this would be in our best interest, both psychologically and socially 
Clearly, this is not the meaning of potentiality in Keenan’s sense of the term For him, 
potentiality signifies what is ontologically possible, which may or may not be actualised 
(ibid p i 07)
In contrast to Keenan’s understanding of the search for perfection, the 
ideological consciousness pursues a perfection that is not inherent in human nature 
Therefore, if  the perfect “man” and the perfect “society” are not achievable, there is 
recourse to violence The French Existentialist philosopher-wnter Albert Camus (1994) 
illustrates this point dramatically m his play The Just The rebels want to inaugurate 
social peace and justice m society However, after the rebels’ failed assassination 
attempt on the life of the Russian Grand Duke (because of the presence of his nephew 
and niece), we are given an insight into the rebellions’ initial system of thought, which 
drives them to commit murder in the name of justice It is interesting to follow the 
dialogue between Dora and Stepan, members of the terrorist group, m the aftermath of 
the aborted attempt
Stepan Because Yanek did not kill those two, millions o f Russian children will
die of starvation m the next few years Have you ever seen children starve to
34 Keenan (1999) claims that “ biotech firms are now making the same offer The perfect child, chin 
line, and buttocks are now available, for a price This, obviously, is not human perfection” (pi 05)
35
death7 I have, and death by a bomb is a breeze next to that death But Yanek 
did not see them He only saw two intelligent dogs of the Grand Duke
Dora But the death of the niece and nephew of the Grand Duke will not 
prevent one child from dying Even m destruction, there is order, and there are 
limits (ibid pp 186-187)
With Dora, the rebels eventually realise that there are limits to their revolt They 
agree that there has to be a limit even when faced with tyranny If there are no limits 
governing the rebellion then they will sooner or later take the place o f the tyrant To put 
it another way, if  they accept that all is permitted, they will end up being no better than 
the tyrant against whom they are rebelling This is the heart of the problem of the 
ideological drive In seeking to reach perfection within history, cnmes against humanity 
are enacted in order to reach social utopia
To conclude this section, I do not believe that the search for perfection is 
intrinsically negative and ethically questionable The story of “The Birth-Mark” and 
Voegelm’s analysis demonstrate that the double-edged sword o f positive and negative 
aspects o f creativity owes its source to an ideological pursuit of perfection at all cost 
without regard to those who get in the way of this chase Ideological thinking reserves 
the results o f this creative revolution for the chosen few and paradoxically perpetrates 
cnmes against humanity m order to reach the social perfection for humanity However, 
it must be said that not all utopian pursuits are necessanly ideological In other words, 
the pursuit for perfection within history may not necessanly be negative if it is not 
accompanied by an ideological desire to reject the mtnnsic limitations o f the human 
condition and to refine the search for perfection for a chosen few
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1 4  2 The Closed and Open Societies in the Creative Revolution
In this section, I will use Henn Bergson’s (1986) analysis of the closed and open 
societies as another avenue to understand the phenomenon of the positive and negative 
aspects o f the creative revolution in health care This French philosopher o f life places 
his investigation in the context o f his discussion regarding the sources of morality and 
religion35 For the purpose of my examination, I will concentrate exclusively on the 
moral sources 36
Bergson argues that there are two sources o f morality The static and the
37dynamic These two sources o f morality are inherent m what we might call the genetic 
endowment of the human species and both give rise to two radically different forms of
o
human social organisation the closed society and the open society However, Bergson 
shows that the sources o f morality are not to be found in the fact o f the existence of 
societies If individuals form societies, then the source of morality cannot be found m 
societies but m individuals For that reason, Bergson does not accept a social explication 
o f the source of morality He believes that we must dig deeper than society to find the 
source o f morality As he maintains, “we must delve deeper still if  we want to 
understand, not only how society 'constrains’ individuals, but again how the individual 
can set up as a judge and wrest from it a moral transformation” (Bergson 1986 p i00) 
As it will be shown, this moral transformation takes place through a dynamic morality 
that transcends social boundaries that are driven by static morality But before
35 Bergson is considered a philosopher o f life because o f his views regarding the evolution o f the species 
in history
36 I find Bergson’s argument compelling because it offers another window onto the problem of the 
positive and negative uses of the creative revolution in health care His analysis of static and dynamic 
moralities offers a philosophical tool to understand the phenomenon of the double-edged sword of 
positive and negative applications o f the creative revolution to health care As well as that, his study 
offers a philosophical lens through which we can understand why the concept of person tends to set a 
boundary between those who are deemed persons, and those who are not, in the moral domain For that 
reason, I think his argument is msightful and germane for the present discussion and therefore merits 
serious consideration
371 am aware of the fact that contrasts can often be construed as perilous dualisms What needs to be 
made clear at this stage of the thesis is that these various poles (static and dynamic, closed and open) are 
in tension within any society See p44, footnote 41 of this chapter and see general conclusion to the thesis
38 Bergson does not use the word “genetic” It is a modem word that I adopt to explicate Bergson’s 
thought Bergson’s book, The Two Sources o f  Morality and Religion, was originally published in 1935
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explaining both static and dynamic moralities, it is important to note that Bergson seeks 
to demonstrate that the source o f morality is essentially biological (ibid plO l)
Let us look first at static morality If we reflect on our moral experiences as 
children, we might ask ourselves why we felt guilty for taking apples from our 
neighbour’s tree At this basic level we sensed that we had done something wrong, not 
only because our parents and teachers may have taught us not to take what did not 
belong to us, but because o f something more primordial Even though no one actually 
saw us doing the “malevolent” deed, it seemed as if society itself was interposing and 
making itself felt because we had m some way put the social order out o f joint Bergson 
states “We did not fully realize this, but behind our parents and our teachers we had an 
inkling of some enormous, or rather some shadowy, thing that exerted pressure on us 
through them Later, we would say it was society” (ibid p9) He therefore locates this 
expenence m nature itself, which has erected a mechanism of social compulsion in 
order to maintain natural social order
A friend described a similar expenence of this shadowy social pressure to me 
One day, when he was at work, he began to have a temble headache It became so 
unbearable that he asked his supervisor whether he could “pop out” for some minutes in 
order to buy a packet o f painkillers When he was out, he discovered that there was no 
pharmacist close at hand So he had to walk a little further and it took him a little longer 
than he expected Rationally, he thought to himself that there was nothing wrong with 
taking a little extra time, it was just an unfortunate situation and he would hurry back to 
his work as soon as he found a chemist However, as he went on he began to feel he was 
doing something wrong and he felt that there was an unknown force compelling him to 
hurry back From Bergson’s perspective, this miasma of culpability is a social morality, 
endowed by nature, making its weight felt Bergson descnbes this compelling force o f 
social obligation as moral obligation (ibid p266) It is a static morality because it stems
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from nature’s demand on us to cohere with the interests o f the social group to which we 
belong It is experienced as a pressure or as a restraint wielded by society upon its 
members
In general, the social cohesion demanded by nature is analogous to that o f an 
ant-heap and an ant (ibid p266) Society assigns specific roles to its members and they 
respond naturally to the needs o f the society in a similar fashion as the ants in an ant- 
heap At the nucleus o f a society is a compelling social force that holds it together It is 
the social pressure to conform to the needs o f the ant-heap that induces the ants to act on 
behalf of the group But this social pressure is grounded in the instinct of the creature 
In the case of humanity, although this social pressure is primarily genetic and becomes 
part of our social make-up, it is more than an instinct Putting it simply, unlike the ants 
that comprise the ant-heap, human society is constituted by collective free wills 
Therefore, each particular experience of moral obligation is contingent That is to say 
we have the freedom to follow or not to follow this force By using our reason, we can 
weigh up the pros and cons o f our proposed action or inaction and picture to ourselves 
various ensuing consequences To return to the example of my friend, for the sake of 
argument, instead of rushing back to the office he might decide to go for a coffee and 
take it easy and just tell his boss that there was a long queue at the apothecary His 
actions would show that human reason can pose a danger to the unity o f the human 
society and thus to its preservation (Gallagher 1970 p61)
Even though each particular expenence o f moral obligation is contingent, at the 
same time moral obligation in general is necessary In this sense, although moral 
obligation is more than instinct, it is less than intelligence In basic terms, this social 
demand is rooted not m human reason but in nature In view of this potentiality to 
ignore the moral force and to deceive the social group, nature instils a “virtual instinct” 
in humanity in order to counterbalance any anti-social propensities, mainly caused by
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reason (Bergson 1986 p28) It is a “virtual instinct” because it is not purely an 
instinctive reaction, otherwise my friend would not even dream of deceiving his 
superior
Instinct and intelligence are to be found along two divergent paths of evolution 
that were once intermixed Instinct represents the distinctive mark of the animal 
kingdom whereas intelligence represents the distinctive mark of humanity However, 
according to Bergson, a residual o f intelligence exists m instinct and a residual o f 
instinct exists in intelligence The ant-heap is preserved because nature has implanted in 
the ants the instinct o f working together for the common good Human society is not 
preserved because of instinct alone but also because o f intelligence However, as it has 
been said, this intelligence can act as a threat to the social cohesion of the group 
Therefore, human society is preserved because nature has imparted in humanity a 
“virtual instinct” to counteract any anti-social tendencies o f the intelligence
Obligation takes on reason m the battle for social cohesion Reason will seek 
ways to maximise the benefit of an action for the individual and not necessarily for the 
society But the “virtual instinct” o f moral obligation is the “totality o f obligation” that 
makes itself felt m each experience of obligation Therefore, although each particular 
expenence o f moral obligation is contingent (1  e we may choose to follow or not to 
follow it), obligation in general is necessary (1 e the closed society can only exist if this 
sense of social pressure is in our nature)
Let us come back again to my friend, supposing he decides to work only to the 
minimum because he earns the same money regardless o f whether he works harder or 
faster In this case the “totality o f obligation” might make itself felt and my friend may 
be forced to re-evaluate his action For instance, if  he and others took this type o f action, 
then the company would eventually not withstand the competing forces in the market 
and would go bust Thus, in the long-term it would not serve my friend’s interests if he
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worked “out of sync” with the social whole of the company Therefore, he would be 
wise to plug into this social order The virtual instinct of the totality of obligation 
attempts to counteract any anti-social tendencies of intelligence But this expenence is 
still contingent -  even if  my fnend listened to the argumentative voice of obligation he 
might still decide to pursue his own self-mterested goal Likewise, we might continue 
stealing apples from next-door without feeling moral remorse
The static morality gives form to, what Bergson calls, a closed society (ibid 
p30) The resulting closed society is one whose members care only for their specific 
social group The closed society includes a certain number of associates and excludes 
those outside its social pale Its members care little for any outsiders and are wary of 
any so-called foreigners who pose potential threats to their social unit In the case o f my 
fnend, one could say that the company is the closed society and its code o f conduct is 
its codified static morality
Groups that differentiate themselves from others constitute a closed society This 
“them and us” trait of the closed society can be observed in many aspects of life To 
take a couple o f examples On a political level, we have nation states that emphasise 
differences rather than commonality the Insh and the English, the Germans and the 
Austnans, the Canadians and the Amencans, etc Some Canadians are quick to point out 
that although they might have American sounding accents according to European ears, 
they are definitely not Amencans On a professional level, there are social barriers that 
stress the professional role o f each group and thus form a sort o f closed society teachers 
and students, nurses and doctors, managers and staff, etc On a societal level, there are 
collective differences between villages, towns and counties It is quite natural to form 
such communities To put it another way, we are made for such a society There are 
varying degrees of closed societies Some are quite harmless while others are not
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Clearly, there is a vast disparity between the closed society o f hospital porters and care 
attendants compared to the antagonism between nations
Language is one tool that can distinguish one group from another and therefore 
helps m the formation of a closed society For instance, if  I travel to France and I cannot 
speak French, I am inevitably excluded from the inner French social realm unless the 
native French speakers are willing to make the effort to speak to me in English This, of 
course, may not be noticeable if  I just take a weekend trip to Pans But if I was to stay 
any longer the urgency to learn the language would become more and more pressing, 
not necessanly because o f the love of French, but because of a deep-seated feeling of 
not wanting to be excluded I am not suggesting that each nationality with its own 
distinct language is automatically a closed society but language can create a gap 
between people and help groups to form closed societies In Germany, for example, 
Hochdeutsch (i e “high German”) is the national language that all Germans can 
understand Yet, in the vanous regions o f the country, people have their own dialects 
that, at times, can be so completely different to the lingua franca  of the country that it is 
like a “foreign” language As well as that, you can have two villages, which are only 
some kilometres distance apart, which have a vanance on a dialect, so they may not 
even understand each other easily
On the other end of the spectrum, there is the expenence of the dynamic 
morality and its resulting expression in the form of an open society (ibid p267) 
Compared to the static morality o f a closed society, dynamic morality is inspired by the 
expenence of love for those outside the social penphery Dynamic morality throws a 
“spanner in the works” of social obligation by embracing all of humanity and by not 
restncting the expenence to one social group Whereas static morality is rooted in the 
genetic inherent structure o f the human species, dynamic morality -  although it finds its
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seeds in our genetic make-up -  is something that can create social forms that are new 
and original
Dynamic morality is represented by a privilege few that have an intuitive 
expenence o f love of humanity which transcends their particular social club These 
inspired individuals appeal to the dynamic morality of ordinary people and attract them 
to follow their lead I think that a poignant example would be someone like Martin 
Luther King, who preached and lived a life that was marked by universal humanity in 
the face of racism and discrimination In his expenence, there is a dynamic leap from 
what is programmed for the survival o f the closed group (as represented by the then 
white Amencans) to the universal fellowship of the whole o f humanity (as represented 
by K ing)39 Following Bergson’s thought, it can be claimed that King only had 
influence because he was backed by a dynamic social movement that he both inspired 
and was inspired by
Bergson makes the claim that the leap from static to dynamic morality is not one 
of degree but of kind In many cases it is the difference between the love o f country and 
the love of humankind (ibid p32) From an evolutionary perspective, static morality is 
an impediment to the process o f life developing towards a universal humanity, whereas 
dynamic morality is a leap in being 40 This dynamic morality is emotional, inspirational 
and a creative love for all humanity (Gallagher 1970 p71) It finds expression in the 
resulting open society The static morality of moral obligation within the closed society 
is incomplete and imperfect, whereas the dynamic morality of moral aspiration within 
the open society is complete and perfect This is perfection not in an ideological sense -  
where the search for perfection does not consider human limitation nor does it concern 
all o f humanity The dynamic morality is complete and perfect because, unlike the
39 I will give more attention to this in chapter five p p l7 1-176
40 According to Bergson’s philosophy, this dynamic leap is driven by the elan vital (“vital impulse”) 
According to his philosophy o f evolution, life is a creative evolution, which is due to an original impetus 
of life “ passmg from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the 
developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations” (Bergson 1998 p87)
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ideological search, it does not involve only certain sectors o f humanity but all of 
humanity and it considers human limitations.
Static morality is compulsive; dynamic morality is attractive. According to 
Bergson, static morality is “a system of orders dictated by impersonal social 
requirements,” whereas dynamic morality is “a series o f appeals made to the conscience 
of each of us by persons who represent the best there is in humanity” (Bergson 1986 
p84). In this way, static morality is social while dynamic morality is human.
Dynamic morality is an uplifting and an inspiring experience that, after we catch 
our breath, can be mediated through the intellect. The experience is like a lava-flow that 
is cooled and solidified in the mode of reason and language. It finds expression in the 
creative intellect o f men and women. Static morality tends not to be progressive or 
creative but rather regressive and bland because it becomes confined to the narrow 
interests of the particular social group. To return to my friend, we can picture a scenario 
where the company for which he works is an open democratic society where the 
workers have an active participation in the decision-making process o f the company. In 
such a company my friend will be inspired to hurry back to his work, not because of a 
shadowy social pressure but because of his own willingness to work for the common 
good of the company -  a willingness that may be inspired by the actions o f its leaders.
Bergson admits that his analysis of static and dynamic moralities does not lend 
itself to strict empirical scrutiny today because both moralities can no longer be found 
separately in a pure primitive state: There is a mélange between them.41 The static has
41 In view o f this, I am not inclined to use categories such as “bad” and “good” to describe static and 
dynamic moralities. I am slow to argue that static morality is “bad” and dynamic morality is “good”. They 
represent two sources of morality. As I argue in the general conclusion to the thesis, we tend to live in 
tension between both moralities. However, static morality, with its resulting closed society, has society as 
its aim. This society tends to be closed in on itself. It tends to seek to protect itself from other societies 
because o f distrust and fear (Bergson 1986 pp32-33). The relationship then between the various closed 
societies tends to be one o f mutual hostility. Closed societies include a certain number o f individuals and 
exclude others (ibid. p30). In spite o f this, we are naturally made for this society (ibid. p266). By nature, 
we look after the inner circle o f our family, for example. This is not necessarily “bad”. As Bergson notes, 
“not that nature was wrong in attaching us by strong ties to the life she had ordained for us” (ibid. p52). In 
this case, the life that is naturally ordained is the life for the closed society. The dynamic morality, with
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handed on to the dynamic morality some of its compulsive obliging force -  the closed 
society might use the rhetoric of the open society42 -  while the dynamic has handed on 
to the static something of its wider regard for all o f humanity (Bergson 1986 p50) The 
dynamic infuses new life into the static, while the static tends to turn what is 
inspirational and appealing into a fixed moral code 43
Through the work of reason the two moralities interact and make mutual 
exchanges allowing moral progress to ensue Nonetheless, the essence o f dynamic 
morality is emotion and is not like obligation and is not to be found in reason (Bergson 
1986 p44, p89 and plO l, Bergson 2002 pl28) In this way, Bergson takes exception to 
the Kantian tradition, which argues that morality is founded in reason alone For 
Immanuel Kant, people are not mere followers o f the universal moral law but are 
legislators o f this law They can decipher how the central maxim of the categorical 
imperative, i e “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1993 p30) will be applied in each 
situation For Bergson, neither reason nor social facts are the sources o f morality But, 
this dynamic morality needs concepts and language to make itself known That is why 
reason has an important role to play m the evolution o f morality because it puts matter 
into the form of obligation and creative emotion, which is concretised m customs, 
traditions and institutions
its resulting open society, has humanity as its aim The open society does not seek to protect itself from 
other societies It does not exclude but includes members from other societies However, we do not 
completely leave the inner circle o f family Bergson claims that when passing from the static to the 
dynamic morality “ we break with one particular nature, but not with all nature” (ibid p58) Families 
can live within the open society A possible example of a family attempting to live in an open society is 
one which encourages their children to take part in exchange programmes in order that they meet people 
from various cultures
42 For example, the closed society might claim that it respects umversal human nghts But, m reality, such 
rights are only applied to its members rather than to those who happen to reside m their society but who 
are not members
43 Gallagher (1970) notes that “we do not become aware o f pure social pressure or pure aspiration acting 
f upon our will because as soon as these forces have been felt the intellect represents them in concepts” 
| (P89)
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The last chapter o f Bergson’s The Two Sources o f  Morality and Religion, begins 
to bnng into focus the dual aspect of the creativity of humanity from the perspective of 
the closed and open societies Bergson descnbes how both instinct and intelligence have 
different tools for carrying out their work Bodily organs are designed by nature and 
tend to be immutable Invented tools, on the contrary, are not given by nature but are 
created by humanity and therefore tend to be diverse, incessant and unpredictable 
(Bergson 1986 pp309-310) Emotion is at the core o f the unforeseeable and ever- 
recumng novelty m the culture of creativity Emotion stimulates and motivates reason 
to pursue activities and persevere in the face of obstacles and disappointments 
“Creation signifies, above all, emotion” (ibid p45) In this way, Bergson argues that 
inventions are almost like an extension of our bodily organs He writes, “the workman’s 
tool is the continuation o f his arm, the tool-equipment o f humanity is therefore a 
continuation of its body” (ibid p309) Through their creative minds, men and women 
attempt to use matter itself in order to overcome matter Men and women use tools to 
surpass bodily limitations
The natural propensity to invent is due to the limitation o f the human condition 
As we have seen in the analysis o f the genetic root of the closed society, instinct and 
intelligence are closely connected However, with the creative feats of humankind, it 
can be observed how intelligence and instinct diverge, although they never completely 
separate We still remain beings with instincts For example, if  I place my hand over a 
fire and the fire gets too hot, I will instinctively withdraw my hand I do not need to 
think and to reflect about the matter I perform the withdrawal o f the hand immediately 
The same instinctive reaction to protect oneself kicks in with somnambulistic 
states Unbeknown to consciousness, instinct reacts when danger lies ahead Bergson 
gives the real-life example of a woman approaching a dysfunctional elevator Instead of 
flinging herself unknowingly into the void she has a hallucination of some force, which
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prevents her from making a fatal mistake (ibid p i20) This is a natural defensive 
mechanism working to protect humanity But with intelligence, as opposed to instinct, 
novelty and invention are possible In the creative evolution o f the species, the animal 
world has the necessary tools at hand to carry out their genetically-specified tasks, 
whereas the human world does not have all the necessary tools to carry out its 
genetically-specified tasks The faculty of intelligence enables the creative invention of 
new instruments Bergson (1998) argues that “ instinct perfected is a faculty o f  using 
and even o f constructing organized instruments, intelligence perfected is the faculty o f  
making and using unorganized instruments” (p i40)
Instinct and intelligence represent two radically different types of knowledge In 
the former case, knowledge is inbuilt and instinctively acted on and therefore 
unconscious In the latter case, knowledge is not inbuilt, but is learnt, reflected on and 
conscious Since human beings possess intellects as well as instincts, they have the 
possibility of transcending their own nature Indeed, m today’s terms, the 
biotechnological revolution is a step towards transcending the limits of the human 
condition There is a natural tendency on the part of the intellect to transform given 
matenals provided by nature into an instrument of action Following from this, one 
could argue that the ideological pursuit of reaching perfection at all costs and the 
technological imperative have their roots in the work of intelligence The problem anses 
when we forget about the human condition that we are trying to make better, when we 
use others as a medium towards such discoveries and when we exclude others from the 
benefits o f such discoveries When examined from a Bergsoman perspective, it can be 
said that the creative impulse o f humanity is pulled down and concretised in the closed 
society for its own narrow objectives The created invention is used for the good of the 
i closed society, which may have negative consequences for those outside its fringe The 
| moral impetus to cohere in the social group may encourage participants o f the closedii
i
i
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society to take measures that may appear quite moral to them, but not to the rest o f the 
world
The classic case is Alfred Nobel’s inventions, which were used not only to 
create a better world, but also to destroy it (see Larsson 2001 pp 15-26) For example, 
dynamite has both positive and negative effects The positive effect is that m the open 
society it can help destroying m order to rebuild It can be used, for example, to explode 
one bndge m order to make way for a new and better one Thus, it can be used in many 
ways for the good of humanity However, when pulled down by the interests o f the 
closed society, it can be used as military hardware for an attack on foreign foes
I think that, m a similar fashion, the creativity o f humanity (via the creative 
revolution in technology, bioscience and medicine) when operated in health care, can be 
pulled down into the narrow objectives of the closed society There can be no doubt that 
the technological and the medical expertise that enables transplants to take place on a 
daily basis points to the startling creativity of humanity When used in an open society -  
spurred on by a love for universal humanity -  it can be a gift o f life to all those who 
need it Bodily organs can be transplanted from different races, ethnic groups, etc, 
because there are no obvious boundanes, apart from biological ones When used in a 
closed society -  urged on by social cohesion -  transplantations can be used for a select 
few who can afford it, especially when there is little supply Then the bodily organs are 
used as market commodities illicitly sold for profit-making purposes
Similarly, the astonishing creative revolution o f the life-support system which 
enables us to halt the dying process and provide another avenue for maintaining life, has 
no boundanes in an open society It is open to all who require it But the social- 
economic concerns o f the closed society will consider a hierarchical ranking of those 
who have more of a chance of survival If the closed society is utilitanan in outlook, 
then the potential utility o f the survivor will be taken into consideration Unfortunately,
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in an emergency situation, the general sorting out o f those who have the greatest 
chances of survival is often sadly necessary, especially in the face o f the stark reality of 
finite resources In some cases, if doctors do not prioritise, they risk lessening the 
chance of recovery for those who are not wntten off But, if  it is taken to extremes in a 
closed society, then we may have the allocation o f patients according to their social 
standing
Following this line o f thought, the question arises as to whether the debate 
concerning when we morally ought to, or ought not to, prolong life points to a closed or 
an open society? Can we say that if we turn off the ventilating machine, that it is a static 
response rather than a dynamic response? Surely, one could argue that when we stop the 
ventilator we are also showing love for humanity in the face o f suffenng So, it is not 
always clear what our motivations are As well as that, we have to ask whether the 
brainstem criterion of death belongs to the open society, and whether the higher-brain 
death cntenon belongs to the closed society? Is the latter merely interested m harvesting 
organs for their society7
The creative revolution o f IVF, which enables infertile couples to transcend the 
barriers o f nature, is also astounding Surely it is for the greater good of humanity to be 
able to conquer infertility or at least provide a route around it?44 The work on stem cells 
also shows how humanity can use its creative reason to out-manoeuvre nature in order 
to surmount debilitating diseases Surely, this is the work of an open society? But, as 
with the above, it can still be pulled down into the narrow objectives of the clique The
44 It could also be argued that IVF is inherently static because it can be used to maintain genetically 
related family lines
Another question that could be raised is whether we should always look out for those in the 
broader society I think that static morality can justify the moral view that we should take care of our 
family (and our self) before we look to the needs o f the wider society
The argument could be made that the moral vision of the open society is too demanding It is 
difficult to look out for those, for example, beyond the inner family circle It is true that dynamic morality 
is not a natural response but requires much effort and a new way o f understanding other people from 
different societies Still, I think dynamic morality does not entail that we abandon the moral demands o f 
the inner circle of a family life However, with the experience of dynamic morality, we obtain a new way 
of seeing how the moral demands of the inner circle o f our family are not isolated from the moral 
demands o f the “wider family” of humanity to which we belong
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biggest question posed by IVF and embryonic stem cell research is whether the embryo, 
which may be discarded or expenmented on, is a person
1 5 Conclusion -  The Need to Examine the Concept of Person
From my reflective distancing, I have come to the conclusion that the creative 
revolution m health care is open to the distorting veils of the ideological urge to achieve 
human perfection for a chosen few and to the narrow-mterests of a closed society Thus, 
while the creative revolution m health care has benefited the overall practitioner’s 
clinical expertise, m some cases the patient’s vulnerability has increased This may not 
appear obvious because clearly the aim of the health care professional is to diminish (or 
take away completely) the patient’s feeling of vulnerability by using his/her clinical 
expertise, helped by the technology available, within a canng environment
However, what might not always be obvious (even to the health care workers 
involved) is the philosophical vision (whether it be ideological, closed or open) guiding 
their clinical expertise Surely this also has an impact on the patient’s vulnerability, 
especially if  s/he is considered to be no longer a person but only a human being For 
instance, the distinction between human being and person may make it easier for the 
health care practitioner to decide on the appropriate care for those in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) For some it may seem reasonable not to expect that a human 
being m a PVS would be given the same amount of medical attention and nursing care 
as someone on renal dialysis who has full consciousness and use o f rationality Still, if  
you ask a health care practitioner whether we ought to prolong the life o f the patient in a 
PVS, you will receive a variety o f answers Some will claim that if there is no hope of 
recovery then we should forego all extraordinary or disproportionate means of 
prolonging the individual’s “suffering” The individual is not living but merely existing
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It is easier to let go when we ascertain that what remains is not a person but its 
biological outer shell Conversely, others will find this morally repulsive and will claim 
that we should still give basic palliative care, but will find it difficult to justify their 
reasons when pressed Their position might be motivated by a feeling that this is (or 
was) still “someone” and should be given the same respect as any patient or at least be 
given minimum respect
It is at this point that the work of philosophy can attempt to clarify some of our 
thinking especially regarding our concepts o f person Philosophy provides a sort of 
“spring cleaning” of our thoughts At the same time, for some, it can be like a bomb that 
explodes our preconceived ideas and beliefs m the hope o f resolving difficult ethical 
issues In this way, the issue o f personhood remains no longer in an academic quandary 
but must be faced by every health care practitioner
To return to Wordsworth’s insight regarding the daffodil It can be argued that 
sometimes it is only by distancing ourselves from immediate reality that we can really 
begin to grasp true beauty I think that it is the role of a philosopher to understand “what
is going on” regarding the ethical issues prompted by the creative revolution affecting
/
health care practices and to attempt to provide a passage from the cave of confusion to 
the sun of transparency (Plato 1987 pp316-325, BkVI 514-521) This does not imply 
that the philosopher can take away the confusion completely Nonetheless, with such 
nascent creativity infused m health care, it is the task of the philosopher to provide the 
lenses through which to examine the vanous new ethical questions m the wake of 
turbulent times ahead brought on by veils o f distortion
Consequently, I believe that the philosopher is called to recover a fuller 
understanding o f personhood and therefore to initiate a “healing process” by helping the 
health care practitioner to utilise his/her clinical expertise in a way that does not
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heighten the vulnerability o f the patient but protects i t 45 Both the health care 
practitioner and the philosopher can work together to make present what Vaclav Havel 
(1985) describes as the “essential aims of life”, which are naturally present in everyone 
“In everyone there is some longing for humanity’s nghtful dignity, for moral integrity, 
for free expression of being and a sense of transcendence over the world o f existence” 
(PP27-28)
In our contemporary society, I feel that this will be the philosopher’s key role, 
1 e to capture the reality of what makes a person a person and, thus, to protect its 
nghtful dignity, its moral mtegnty, its free expression of being and its sense of 
transcendence This will be crucial for humanity if  it is not to succumb to new 
ideological forces that seek to hijack biotechnology and transform it into a mechanism 
that transfigures the human condition only for those who are deemed worthy in a closed 
society As Bergson reflects “Mankind lies groaning, half crushed beneath the weight 
of its own progress Men do not sufficiently realize that their future is m their own 
hands” (Bergson 1986 p371) I am convinced that a step towards this is achieved by 
taking a closer look at some fundamental attitudes regarding what makes a person a 
person For this reason, I will examine the concept of person in the next chapter m order 
to discern whether it belongs to the static morality of a closed society or to the dynamic 
morality of an open society
45 This does not mean to suggest that helping health care professionals to develop critical tools o f 
reflection is not a valuable and indeed a crucial aspect o f the work of the philosopher
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2 1 Introduction -  Korperwelten
Some time ago, m Stuttgart, Germany, I had the opportunity o f visiting Gunther 
von Hagens’ Korperwelten (“Body Worlds”), which is an anatomical exhibition of real 
human bodies In the aesthetic spint of Renaissance, the exhibition displayed part and 
full body specimens, which had been preserved through the technique of plastination 
The various specimens gave me the opportunity o f viewing the inner workings of the 
human body and its organs, including the digestive system, the nervous system and the 
bram I could even detect the life-styles o f some specimens, from blackened diseased 
lungs due to abusive smoking to enlarged infected livers owing to years o f heavy 
consumption of alcohol This would have indeed fascinated any medical student or lay 
enthusiast It provided a window into the inner sanctuary o f the human body Needless 
to say, Korperwelten prompted much debate about whether it was ethical to have the 
remains of the dead plastinated and exhibited in a museum Yet what struck me was the 
popularity o f the exhibition in spite o f this It has been shown all over the world, from 
Britain to Japan, where over 16 million people have already seen it (Body Worlds 
2005) In Stuttgart, the exhibition was originally opened during day hours, but because 
of the large numbers o f people, the Stuttgart Town Hall decided to allow the exhibition 
to open for twenty-four hours a day Even with this, thousands upon thousands of 
people queued for up to ten hours to see it Some were even willing to queue all night to 
get into the exhibition in the early hours o f the morning 1
Personally, as I was viewing the various specimens, I never fully realised that 
what I was observing was once a living human being, who was probably married, had 
children and who belonged to a social network Some defence mechanism told me that I 
was looking at plastic models instead Perhaps, this was what actually helped me 
through what would have been otherwise an even more challenging experience Still,
1 For an illustration of the Korperwelten, appendix A p238
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the exhibition stimulated a desire within me to gam greater knowledge about the 
complexity o f my own body while, at the same time, it made me face the reality o f its 
vulnerability For instance, one of the posed plastmations was that o f a man holding his 
skin m his hand It was not only very impressive as a “work of art” but it also 
demonstrated the vulnerability o f humanity without skin It showed that the skin is an 
organ protecting our bodies from the outside world and communicating sensation to the 
brain
Without a doubt, the argument could be made that we can use plastic models to 
educate people about the workings of the human body Then again, von Hagens 
suggests (2002) that each human body is unique and plastic same-for-all models cannot 
capture this distinctiveness (pp32-35) Nonetheless, could it not be maintained that this 
uniqueness points to the “mystery” of the human body, 1 e although every human body 
has the same basic anatomical structure, each body has its own unique differences? 
Furthermore, if  no two bodies are completely the same, surely no two persons are 
completely the same -  although they may have the same ontological properties, they 
will inevitably have different personality traits, various levels o f intelligence and 
degrees o f self-awareness Yet, in medicine and philosophy, for example, we tend to use 
structures to pinpoint the quintessential character!sties and properties of the human body 
and the human person in our quest to understand them better 2 In medicine they help us 
to navigate our way through the many biological intricacies of the body and in moral 
philosophy they help us to make informed ethical judgments about whether someone is 
a human being or a person
In daily hospital life, nurses and other health care professionals go about their 
work without much problem concerning what constitutes a person They attempt to 
provide the best care, as far as possible, regardless of the fact that the patient in front of
2 This is not to imply that we have to accept Cartesian dualism
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them may only be a human being but not a person Perhaps, there is no conscious 
distinction made by the practitioners Some practitioners are quite surprised and 
shocked when they are informed that there is a distinction to be made between human 
being and human person However, as it has be shown, the issue has become more and 
more pressing in the context of the creative progress o f medicine and technology, which 
allows us to do what was impossible before When the creative revolution m health care 
is tarnished by ideological consciousness within a closed society, it inadvertently makes 
the patient more vulnerable 3
2 2 Why Use the Concept of Person7
There is no universally accepted definition o f the concept o f person and the 
leitmotif of personhood is something that is often confused by philosophers and 
ethicists alike when deciding who has a right to life and who has a right to death (i e to 
die with dignity) within the construction o f new exigent moral problems induced by the 
creative feat of medicine and biotechnology In an effort to deal with such difficulties 
philosophers and ethicists become architects o f new moral principles For instance, the 
paradigm shift from the value o f human biological life to the value of personal life 
becomes a stratagem for dealing with new moral problems Therefore, the immediate 
purpose of the philosophical analysis regarding what constitutes a person is one avenue 
to provide an apparatus to examine new moral problems facing health care and civic 
society
What should be established at the very outset is that this distinction between 
human being and person has not found universal acceptance among some health care 
practitioners, ethicists and philosophers alike There are those who argue that a concept 
o f person is incoherent and even obsolete (Dennett 1988 pl46) In the Bntish context,
3 A detailed analysis o f this argument is given previously in chapter one
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when examining the issue of reproductive technologies, the Wamock Committee 
chooses not to use the term “person” and sidesteps the issue by examining how we 
ought to ethically treat human embryos instead The Committee states, “although the 
questions of when life or personhood begin appear to be questions o f fact susceptible o f 
straightforward answers, we hold that the answers to such questions m fact are complex 
amalgams of factual and moral judgements Instead o f trying to answer these questions 
directly we have therefore gone straight to the question o f how it is right to treat the 
human embryo” (Wamock 1985 p60) 4 Mary Wamock (1987) believes that the word 
“person” only leads to confusion5 The question therefore remains as to whether the 
concept of person is helpful overall Why not simply stick to “human being”9 Would it 
not be less complicated to jettison the concept o f person and preserve human being? By 
using the concept o f person as something extra or even opposed to human being, are we 
not creating unnecessary difficulties? As Peter Allmark (1994) points out “ no writer 
using the ‘person’ approach to justify abortion has provided a definition of ‘person’ 
which will not exclude far more humans from moral consideration that they originally 
desired” (p33)
However, to decide to ignore the distinction between human being and person 
does not necessanly answer the accusation of moral discrimination based on species 
membership, which is the argument proposed by some philosophers including Peter 
Singer6 In other words, even if we discard the notion o f person and concentrate on 
human being, we are opening ourselves to the objection that we favour our species over 
another in the moral domain In some way this is the nemesis of not accepting the
4 Ronald M Green (2001) makes a related point when he argues that “all these [ethical] problems stem 
from the failure to realize that the judgments o f ‘humanity’, ‘personhood’, or any similar determination of 
moral protectedness are not a matter o f definition, o f finding the intrinsic biological property of an entity 
that makes it morally protectable, but are instead the outcome o f a complex moral choice involving many 
competing considerations” (p49)
5 W amock (1987) writes “Personhood is a notoriously difficult and ambiguous concept ” (p i)
6 See general introduction to thesis pp5-6 and pp74-78 of this chapter
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distinction between the concept of person and human being It is also a clear sign of a 
closed society’s approach by excluding entities from the moral domain that is only 
enjoyed by human beings because human beings biologically possess cells with forty- 
six chromosomes7
In contradistinction to Wamock and Allmark and others who do not favour the 
concept o f person, there are philosophers who argue that the concept plays a critical role 
in ethics (Tooley 1979 p83) For some, the question regarding what a being must be like 
in order to be a person, is one of the most remarkable and contentious subjects m 
contemporary philosophy (Goodman 1996 p443)8 The debacle o f personhood is the 
central and most crucial problem of our time (Corcoran 1982 p5) Yet, Michael Tooley 
(1979) rues the fact that the importance o f the concept o f person is, at the worst of 
times, overlooked and, at the best of times, taken for granted (p83)
Although the fifteenth-century Copemican revolution jettisoned the notion of 
man being at the centre of the universe, it is accepted in some intellectual circles that 
persons, not necessarily human bemgs, are at the centre of the medical and moral 
universe “Persons are central to morality The very world o f morality is sustained by 
persons” (Engelhardt 1996 p239) 9 If persons are at the centre o f ethics and health care, 
the need to understand what we mean by the concept o f person and to whom that 
category can be applied, becomes increasingly important In light of this, the thematic 
focus o f this chapter will be on various concepts o f person that underlie our thinking 
concerning what makes a person a person 10
7 For an analysis o f the closed society, see chapter one pp41-42
8 Stanley Rudman (1997) writes that “ the story of ‘personhood’ is nch and complex and contains a 
number of unresolved challenges for philosophers and theologians, not least in the field of ethics” (pi 3)
9 Engelhardt (1996) writes “Medicine is concerned with persons in the strict sense of moral agents ” 
(p240) He also states that ‘medicine is concerned as well with humans to whom a portion of the rights 
and prerogatives of persons, in general secular terms, is imputed” (ib id ) So, medicine is not concerned 
with human beings per se but with persons and with those who are deemed to be persons in some social 
sense
10 The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) offers several definitions for the word “person” Firstly, it refers 
to a character assumed or sustained in a drama, secondly, to an individual human being -  man, woman or 
child, thirdly, to a man or woman of distinction or importance in the sense o f personage, fourthly, to the
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2 3 Concepts of Person 
2 3 1 The Puzzle of the Concept of Person
There is a vast intellectual landscape concerning the issue o f what constitutes a 
person Along with this, there remains the bemusing question as to whether ammals, or 
indeed hypothetical aliens from other planets, could be or are in fact persons The 
inquiry pertaining to what makes a person a person is intertwined with history, 
theology, philosophy and culture Accordingly, it has received many definitions and 
redefinitions Today, there are various schools of thought regarding the essential traits 
and properties of personhood Here, I will concentrate on two major approaches The 
scholastic approach, as represented (and placed within a modem analysis) by Bernard 
Lonergan, and the contemporary approach, as represented by Michael Tooley, Peter 
Singer and H Tristram Engelhardt Jr 11 The former places the locus o f personhood in 
the inherent rational nature of the Homo sapiens, whereas the latter situates the 
epicentre of personhood m self-consciousness and the exercise o f rationality 12 It is with 
them (ì e Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt) that the use o f the concept of person reaches 
its greatest intensity when deciding who should benefit from the creative feats of 
technology The concept o f person now becomes a device for helping health care people 
to settle issues raised by technology including what to do with someone in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) -  should you keep him/her alive or not? The concept o f person
living body o f the human being, fifthly, to the self or the personality of the man or woman and sixthly, to 
a human being, body corporate having rights and duties recognised by law These are just some of the 
definitions given (pp596-597) It defines “personhood”, on the other hand, as the “quality or condition of 
being an individual person” (p604)
11 Obviously, these are not the only two approaches to the concept o f person and to the beginning of 
human life There are other approaches including the genetic and developmental schools According to 
the genetic school, human life begins at the moment of conception or shortly after, whereas for the 
development school, although conception may establish the genetic basis o f human life, further 
development is requned before one can justifiably speak of the life o f an individual human being 
(Pastrana 1977 p248 and p259) See Gabriel Pastrana (1977) for an extensive list o f various positions 
regarding personhood (p264)
12 There are other philosophers who also stress self-consciousness as the master key that unlocks 
personhood For instance, according to Robert C Solomon (1983), it is self-consciousness that confers 
personhood on what otherwise might be just another biological organism (p210)
59
thus becomes the key to solving the problems posed by the success of technology in 
health care
2 3 2 The Concept of Person Where does it come from7
Philip Allott (2001) persuasively contends that the way in which we understand 
the past influences the future (p62) Our understanding of the past affects the way in 
which we understand the potentialities of the future It also has an impact on the way in 
which we understand our moral responsibility in relation to the future In a similar way, 
I believe that it is beneficial to look at the history of the concept o f person to tap the 
resources o f what has been said m order to elucidate the issues confronting us now 
Evidently, to do justice to the history of the concept o f person, a full analysis would 
require much more detail and erudition on the subject However, this is not the focus of 
this dissertation Nevertheless, I am convinced that having some historical background 
helps to place the concept o f person m some context
Firstly, it is often claimed that the original Latin root o f “person”, persona , 
literally meant a mask, especially in the context o f theatrical performance 13 However, 
some scholars question whether persona is from a sound Latin root (Mauss 1985 pi 5) 
It would appear that the term persona could be traced back to Etruscan ongin (ib id ) 14 
Nonetheless, it was the Romans who gave it the specific meaning that we have today in 
the case of legal institutions Still, today there are personae, res and actiones m law 
(ib id)
13 Marcel Mauss (1985) argues that this usage can be dated back to the beginnings of Latin civilisation 
(p i3) The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines persona as a mask used by a player (p596)
14 Rudman (1997), too, argues that etymologically, ‘person’ is connected with the Latm word ‘persona’, 
whose derivation is disputed The medieval derivation from ‘per se una’ is certainly false ‘Personare’, 
meaning ‘to sound through’, which is related to the use o f the mask in the Roman theatre, is more 
probable, but not entirely certain Modem philology links ‘persona’ with the Etruscan word ‘persu’, a 
word found written beside a representation of two masked figures” (pp 125-126) Webster s Third New  
International Dictionary (1971) also makes a similar point that the word “person” comes from the 
Etruscan word for mask,phersu  (pl686)
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Secondly, according to John Habgood’s research, by the time of Cicero (106-43 
BC), persona had four strands o f meaning
1 Appearance, as m the case o f dramatic performance
2 Role or status, as in professional work or social life, pertaining to a certain social 
order
3 The individual attributes required by a role Here we find the initial stages o f the 
using the word to refer to the inner self
4 Dignity and privilege, a meaning that eventually “crystallizes” around the word 
“personage” (personage) (Habgood 1998 p35) 15
Thirdly, in the fourth and fifth centuries, the question regarding what constitutes 
a person becomes a critical issue in both philosophy and Christian theology Here, the 
concept o f person takes on a definite meaning within the context o f the Chnstological 
and Trinitarian debates 16 For St Augustine, the meamng o f person is heuristic It 
represents the three persons in the Trinity, i e the Father, the Son and the Holy Spint 
(Lonergan 1974 p i99) It is dunng the next nine centunes that theology and philosophy 
advance beyond the concept of person as a heuristic notion to vanous definitions
It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that most discussions about the 
concept o f person refer back to Boethius as he represents the first significant attempt at 
giving a philosophical definition of the term He defines person as subsistens distinctum 
rationahs naturae, i e “an individual subsistent being of rational nature” (Boethius
171918 p85) It is generally agreed that Boethius was primarily motivated by religious
15 Personage is a French word So it would appear that the word persona  seems to have been modified 
when translated into French Now it includes the stature o f the person (The Oxford English Dictionary 
1989 p598)
16 For Mauss (1985), the contemporary notion of the human person is still basically Christian ( p i9)
17 C J De Vogel (1963) argues that no philosophical definition of person is found before Boethius (p20)
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concerns when attempting to proffer a definition because he wanted to make the 
doctrine o f the Trinity explicit Nonetheless, Boethius remarks many times that human 
beings are also persons because they are also rational individuals (Teichman 1985 
pl80) In her critical inquiry on Boethius, Jenny Teichman concludes that Boethius’ 
philosophical definition is capable of a number o f interpretations For instance, it might 
imply that the person must be rational or self-conscious or both Then again, it could 
insinuate that the person belongs to a species, which is characterised by rationality or by 
self-consciousness or by both (ibid p i 81) Conversely, other philosophers have less 
sympathy for Boethius’ position, because he inadvertently directs our attention from the 
dialogical nature o f the person and gives new importance to their separateness and
1 ft
individualism (Habgood 1998 p62) With this short expose, we have to conclude that 
even as early as Boethius, there have always been many difficulties m coming to terms 
with the concept of person
The Christian theologian and philosopher St Thomas Aquinas advances another 
key development in the concept o f person For Aqumas, the human person is a being 
whose rational and physical natures are inseparable There could never be an animal that 
had the physical appearance of a human being, while not being one A being with a 
human nature is informed by a rational soul The “ soul is defined as the actualization 
o f an organized physical body, for it is soul that gives body its organized existence ” 
(Aqumas 1993 pl91) In other words, to have a human body is to have a rational nature 
A person is not just a thing of nature, it is a thing of a particular nature, i e rational 
nature (Doran 1989 p i 5 ) 19
18 Paul Mudathotty (1993) also critiques Boethius’ definition by arguing that his “ definition neglected 
the aspects o f freedom, action, relationship, beauty, goodness and dignity” (p2)
19 Doran (1989) elucidates this by stating that (1) Every person is a hypostasis/subsistent, but not every 
hypostasis or subsistent is a person, even though both terms are used frequently particularly of persons, 
and (2) every finite person, as subsistent or hypostasis, being composed of matter and form, has an 
essence which signifies it But this is not to suggest that the essence is the person [Essence needs 
existence, therefore essence is not the person ] The essence corresponds to the species which does not 
itself subsist The person is an individual subsistent of the species, having that essence as its principle” 
(Pl7)
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2 3 3 Updating the Concept of Person
There are numerous interpretations of Aquinas’ position Personally, I find 
Bernard Lonergan’s one both useful and insightful20 Lonergan explains that a person is 
a distinct subsistent being of a rational nature, which is finite (Lonergan 2002 p59) By 
“person”, he understands the particular being of operation, the “thing”, l e the id quod, 
that which the thing is By “distinct”, he emphasises that it is one thing and not another, 
l e it is distinct from other things By “subsistent”, he contends that it is undivided m 
itself and is divided from everything else By “rational nature”, Longeran takes it to 
mean that its intrinsic principle of operation is rational By “finite”, he concludes that it 
is a being-by-participation, or a being whose existence is not its essence If a person is a 
distinct subsistent m an intellectual nature, then creatures that belong to a non- 
intellectual nature are not persons What Lonergan has m mind here are animals, plants, 
and minerals (ibid p41) Lonergan gives a clear succinct summary of his position by 
explaining the following
Person a distinct subsistent m an intellectual nature
Subsistent that which is, a being in the strict sense, that which is simply both
undivided in itself and divided from everything else
Distinct things are distinct when one is not the other
Nature the intrinsic principle as related to operation
Intellectual a nature that can operate throughout the entire range of being
Finite a being by participation, a being whose act o f existence is not its essence
(ibid p59)
20 Some Thomists take issue with Lonergan’s general interpretation of Aquinas (Connell 1996 pp61-72)
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According to Lonergan, to constitute a finite person, s/he requires, firstly, a 
substantial essence o f an intellectual nature, otherwise there would be no person 
Secondly, an act o f existence is needed, otherwise there would be no subsistent, no 
“that-which-is” Thirdly, an act of existence by participation received m an essence -  
presumably from a divine source -  otherwise the person would not be finite Fourthly, a 
proper act o f existence is necessary, otherwise it (1 e the person) would have another’s 
act of existence and could be neither “undivided m itse lf’ nor “divided from everything 
else” (ibid p61)
Although Lonergan is not writing m the context of life and death issues affecting 
contemporary health care, at this stage the question still emerges as to whether the 
embryo is a distinct subsistent being of a rational nature, 1 e a person21 Is the embryo 
undivided in itself and divided from everything else*? Up to the point of gastrulation, the 
cells that will eventually develop into the embryonic membrane (1 e the chonon) and 
the placenta, for example, are indistinguishable from the cells that will form the embryo 
per se (Smith 1996 p87) Although, such cells have a vital function in the development 
of the embryo -  and later the foetus -  their functions come to a conclusion soon after 
birth Furthermore, due to the totipotential -  or plunpotential -  nature o f its cells, the 
embryo has the potential to divide into two separate entities, up to about the fourteenth 
day (1 e before the primitive streak stage)22 This is demonstrated by the phenomenon 
of monozygotic twinning For Lonergan, a being is a composite consisting of essence 
( ìe  what it is) and existence (ì e that it is) (Lonergan 2002 p i 5) A being is an 
undivided entity and is distinct from another Therefore, can we really say that the 
embryo is a thing since it can shed some cells and split up into two separate entities9 In 
answer to this, it has been argued that cell division and cell splitting does not place at
21 Aquinas held the position that the process of ensoulment took place after forty days for males and after 
nmety days for females (McMahan 2002 p i 3)
22 For a detail analysis see Cioffl (1995 p i 66) Smith (1996 p97) and Stoppard (2000 p33)
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nsk the very integrity of the “thingness” of the embryo because “organically” the 
embryo “knows” where it is going As Teresa Iglesias (1986) puts it, “the law of its 
organic finality is dynamically written within itself at every stage o f its existence from 
the moment it is formed as a conceptus when fertilization is completed” (p6) Perhaps it 
is the very fact that the embryo can execute its programme of division of cells -  
enabling it to continue on its path o f development -  that points to very core of the 
embryo’s “thingness”
As it will be shown, the exercise o f rationality plays a major part in 
contemporary versions o f the concept o f person Before examining such accounts o f the 
concept o f person, it is helpful to investigate what Lonergan understands by intellectual 
nature and the exercise of rationality
In his major work, Insight, Lonergan (1978) wntes
Man, then, is at once explanatory genus and explanatory species He is 
explanatory genus because he represents a higher system beyond sensibility But 
that genus is coincident with species, for it is not just a higher system but a 
source of higher systems In man there occurs the transition from the intelligible 
to the intelligent (p267)
As Kevin Doran (1989) explains, intellectual activity is the actualisation o f the 
potency for this act A potency is inherent in the rational nature o f the person (p91) In 
the knowing process, the person can move from what is experienced to what is known 
This implies that there is intelligibility -  that which can be understood and known -  and 
that the person can understand, know and therefore be intelligent However, intellectual
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activity is not the nature of the person, but rather a manifestation of the person’s nature 
The sensitive and intellectual operations o f a finite being are accidents23
I think that it is helpful to examine this intellectual activity against the 
background of Lonergan’s cognitional analysis His foundational methodology involves 
three successive stages Firstly, there is a cognitional theory, which answers the 
question What am I doing when I am knowing7 Secondly, there is an epistemology that 
answers the question On what grounds is doing that (1 e the operations o f knowing) 
really knowing7 Thirdly, there is a metaphysics which answers the question What do I 
know when I know something (Longeran 1990a p25)? Lonergan attempts to show that 
knowing is not like looking, and that the “real” is not just the “already-out-there-now- 
to-be-looked at” When we know something we have to undertake a series o f intentional 
operations that will help us to know what is true and what is real, regardless o f how we 
personally feel about it Lonergan’s cognitional analysis is based on performance, 1 e 
on what you are doing when you are engaged in the knowing process He demonstrates, 
through resolving various mathematical problems, that human consciousness consists of 
a set of interrelated intentional operations that unite to achieve cognitional and real self- 
transcendence They include experiencing, understanding and judging (see Lonergan 
1978) Therefore, Lonergan demonstrates that knowing is a structure which is given in 
consciousness It is a structure because it consists o f a set o f interrelated parts or 
operations He explains that no part o f the operations can be dispensed with Each part 
is related functionally to each other and not through similarity When we begin to know 
something, we automatically begin a process o f interrelated operations that have a 
definite structure characterised by expenencing, understanding and judging (Lonergan 
1990a pi 46)
23 Aquinas argues that “ existence actualizes, so to say, a thing’s essence, whereas activity actualizes its 
active powers and dispositions to be actual essences must exist but powers must act So we are forced 
to conclude that soul’s abilities are not its essence” (Aquinas 1993 p l25)
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Expenencing consists o f seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling, imagining, 
etc Without prior experience there is nothing for the person to understand and reflect 
on Furthermore, knowing consists of understanding the experience
Understanding includes wonder, inquiry, insight, conceptualisation and 
formulation I wonder and inquire into the experience and through this I grasp a pattern 
in the expenence called an insight This insight becomes conceptualised within my 
consciousness and when I attempt to articulate it, I formulate the insight in language- 
symbols
However, knowing is not just a combination of expenence and understanding It 
also requires reflection On reflection, I assemble and check out the evidence Firstly, I 
marshal the evidence I have before me, and then I weigh it and make a judgment 
concerning my insight, proving it to be true or false or probable or possible and so I 
start the process again Knowing, then, as indicated by Lonergan, is not expenence 
alone, it is not understanding alone, it is not judgment alone It is a combination o f these 
three activities Lonergan’s analysis o f knowing shows that the person has a capacity to 
self-transcend him/herself intellectually In this sense, knowing is a capacity to reach a 
truth which is independent o f the knower
Lonergan explains that consciousness is the intenor expenence of oneself and 
one’s acts (Lonergan 2002 p i58) Consciousness is the awareness o f the activities of 
seeing, heanng, tasting, etc He clanfies this by stating that “expenence” may be taken 
in a broad or a stnct sense In the broad sense, it is the same as ordinary knowledge In 
the stnct sense, it is a preliminary unstructured sort o f awareness that is presupposed by 
intellectual inquiry and completed by it Following the cogmtional process through self- 
appropnation, human consciousness is divided into empincal, intellectual, rational and 
moral operations
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In sense perception, we become conscious of our empincal acts and ourselves 
For instance, in the act of seeing a colour, I do not only become aware o f a colour but I 
also become aware of myself as a subject who sees and who experiences the act of 
seeing When we engage in intellectual inquiry and in acts o f understanding, we become 
conscious o f ourselves as intelligent subjects operating acts o f intellectual inquiry and 
acts o f understanding For example, in the act of understanding, I do not only grasp the 
intelligibility in the object but I also become aware of myself as a subject who 
understands and who experiences the act of understanding When we begin to reflect, to 
examine, to weigh and to judge the act o f understanding (1 e the insight) according to 
the evidence m front o f us, we become conscious o f ourselves as rational and reasonable 
subjects For example, in the act of judging that a certain thing exists, I do not only 
become aware of the existence of the object, but I also become aware o f myself as a 
subject who judges and who experiences the act of judging (ibid ppl59-161) Finally, 
in the act of moral deliberation, we become conscious o f ourselves as moral subjects 
when we go beyond what is intellectually known to consider the moral demands it has 
on us (ibid pp 165-167)
Lonergan argues that sensitive and intellectual operations are accidents, which 
are manifestations o f the substance o f a being24 He writes “ a subject is really and 
truly rendered conscious through accidental operations As it belongs to an accident to 
exist in a subject, so also it belongs to a subject to be perfected through its accidents” 
(ibid p i 85) The person is really and truly rendered conscious through accidental 
operations In this way, the person is perfected through his/her accidents Therefore, 
being “unconscious” does not negate the very being of the person To put it another 
way, being “conscious” adds nothing to the being of the person (ibid) An
24 An accident is the way in which a substance o f a being is manifested According to Aristotle, there are 
nine classes of accident Quantity, quality, relation, time, place, posture, action, passion and habit (See 
Aristotle 1998)
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“unconscious” state is simply being at a lower level of perfection, and so Lonergan 
argues that bodily processes including the growth of hair, the circulation o f the blood 
and the metabolism of cells are unconscious At the same time, he maintains that 
“consciousness” is simply being at a higher level o f ontological perfection (ibid pi 87)
The argument that human nature is rational does not imply that the person 
actuahses that rationality in each moment o f existing The exercise o f rational 
consciousness is an accident to the substance o f person This certainly appears to be an 
extreme position that points to the difference between speaking m the abstract about the 
substance of what constitutes a person as opposed to a living person Clearly, the 
exercise of rationality is not accidental to the life o f a person
2 3 4 The Modern Concept of Person -  Locke
The subject o f the active exercise of rationality and self-consciousness has a 
pivotal role in much of the contemporary literature on the concept o f person in health 
care ethics For many philosophers self-consciousness and the display of rational 
thought work as a kind of benchmark when deciding whether a human being is a person 
or not, and thus it is crucial for giving some guideline on how we ought to treat those 
who have not yet developed these capacities (e g foetuses) or who have lost these 
capacities (eg  PVS patients) Indeed, Ben A Rich (1997) argues that “ if 
consciousness were not necessary most o f the discussion of the subject of 
personhood would become completely unintelligible, as well as much of moral 
philosophy” (p216)
This change m emphasis from the substance to the active display of the accidents 
of a person including consciousness and rationality can be traced back to the English 
philosopher John Locke, who was one of the major founding fathers o f the 
Enlightenment philosophy and its emphasis on reason Locke turns away from the
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scholastic tradition and embraces the “new philosophy” -  as represented by René 
Descartes -  that exploits scientific observation and mathematics in the study of nature 
(Yolton 1968) Locke rejects the traditional metaphysical notion o f being and confines 
the capacity of human knowing by anchoring philosophy and morality in the then 
popular mechanistic model of the matenal w orld25 In this context o f empiricist and 
mechanistic world-view, Locke reflects on the term “person” and questions the 
possibility of personal identity For him, consciousness is something attached to the 
body, l e consciousness is that which constitutes personal identity by uniting the 
memories o f past and present states and actions Following on from this, the term 
“person” becomes detached from the metaphysical view of a subsistent being of a 
rational nature, and becomes a “forensic term”, which is appended to bemgs Thus, 
“person” is “ a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Ment, and so belongs 
only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery” (Locke 1975 
Book II §26 p346) A person is a thinking intelligent being that has the ability to reason 
and to reflect and that can consider itself as a self in different times and places (ibid §9 
p3 3 5) 26 “Person” is now a forensic term that we can apply to those who qualify In 
Locke’s eyes, qualification is based on whether one is actively intelligent and can be 
held morally responsible and accountable From now onwards, philosophers begin to 
define “person” in terms of signs of rationality and self-consciousness (de Vogel 1963 
p24) It is not enough to belong to the species Homo sapiens, the entity must show signs 
of rationality and consciousness of who they are Logically then, being a human being is 
not a necessary condition for being a person In other words, you do not have to be a 
human being to be a person The sufficient condition for being a person is having the
25 I examine the implications of this mechanistic view o f reality and o f the person in the chapter three 
pp92-99 and chapter four pp 146-149
26 Teichman (1985) claims that Locke is motivated by the same kind o f philosophical issues that 
compelled Boethius Locke also attempts to sort out the connection between the ideas o f God, substance, 
body living thing, man consciousness, and person The end result o f his endeavours is to hold up
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ability to reflect on oneself, to be conscious of oneself as a self and to show outward 
signs o f rationality Therefore, it now becomes possible for those who were once not 
considered as persons, namely animals that display signs o f rational behaviour and a 
sense o f self, to make an application for the concept o f person 27
If we move from Locke to today’s situation, we can observe at least two major 
strands o f thought concerning the concept of person There is an ontological strand that 
outlines a descriptive account of properties including consciousness, free will and 
rationality It is often descnbed as “metaphysical personhood” There is also the moral 
strand that outlines a normative account of properties including moral agency, rights 
and obligations It is sometimes descnbed as “moral personhood” (see Strong 1997 
p53)
I will now examine Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt’s work because I think that 
they provide helpful examples of philosophers who follow m the tradition of Locke and 
who bnng together the metaphysical and the moral strands
2 3 5 Tooley on the Concept of Person
Michael Tooley examines the concept of person in the context o f the nght to life 
debate The argument as put by Tooley (1988), sketches three indispensable conditions 
for personhood
1 An entity cannot have a nght to life unless it is capable o f having an interest 
m its own continued existence,
Boethius ’ understanding in a general way but to pulverise the connections between the notions of thinking 
substance and person ( p i80)
27 Although, they cannot make this application by themselves They need philosophers among others to 
do it for them
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2 An entity is not capable of having an interest in its own continued existence 
unless it possesses, at some time, the concept o f a continuing self, or subject of 
experiences and other mental states,
3 The fact that an entity will, if not destroyed, come to have proper ties that 
would give it a nght to life does not m itself make it seriously wrong to destroy 
it (pi 11)
According to Tooley, for any entity to share m the nght to life, it must be 
capable o f having an interest in its own existence For this to be possible, the entity 
must have a concept o f self In other words, the entity must have self-consciousness 
This condition is at the core o f Tooley’s concept o f person
Although, Tooley states that he will treat the concept o f person as a purely moral 
concept -  free o f all descnptive content -  he apparently moves from a metaphysical 
premise to a moral conclusion (see Tooley 1972 p40) He raises the question concerning 
what properties are required in order to be a person and, thus, have a serious nght to 
life He responds to his own question by stating that “an orgamsm possesses a serious 
right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing 
entity” (ibid p44) He believes that self-consciousness is the basic capacity in support 
of the conditions of personhood (ib id) In another context, he highlights this point when 
he argues that “ it is capacities such as self-consciousness and the ability to envisage a 
future for oneself and to have desires about that future that serve to distinguish persons 
from sentient beings that are not persons” (Tooley 1979 p80) Therefore, having a nght 
to life presupposes that one has a concept of self and that one is capable o f desinng to 
continue existing as a subject of expenences and other mental states This, in turn,
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presupposes both that one has the concept of such a continuing entity and that one 
believes that one is such an entity (see also Tooley 1988 p44)
It could be maintained that the apex of Tooley’s argument lies in the interface 
between desires and rights A desire has a relationship to the states o f consciousness 
Therefore, it is claimed that a machine, which is not capable o f being conscious, and 
consequently o f having desires, cannot have any rights (Tooley 1972 p45) Tooley puts 
forward the following expansive equation “‘A has a right to X ’ is roughly synonymous 
with ‘A is the sort o f thing that is a subject o f experiences and other mental states, A is 
capable of desiring X, and if A does desire X, then others are under a pnma facie 
obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him of it’” (ib id ) So an entity that 
lacks such a consciousness of itself as a continuing subject o f mental states does not 
have a right to life (ibid p49) Tooley also believes that the term “right to life” is 
“misleading” (ibid p46) He goes on to explain that “ since what one is really 
concerned about is not just the continued existence of a biological organism, but the 
right of a subject of experiences and other mental states to continue” (ib id ) Following 
this thought, it would be illogical to speak of a patient in a PVS as having a right to life, 
if s/he cannot enjoy this right because s/he cannot be a subject of expenences and other 
mental states 28
Tooley develops the discussion by giving a hypothetical example of a cat The 
kitten has not a senous nght to life The reason for this is explained by the fact that it
28 Tooley (1983) develops his thought regarding the interrelation between desires and interests Interests, 
in the morally relevant sense o f the term, presuppose desires According to Tooley, “ nothing at all can 
be m an entity’s interest unless it has desires at some time or other” (p i20) Tooley makes the case that an 
individual cannot have a right to life unless it is in his or her interest to continue existing However, this 
does not imply that an entity has a right to life simply because it may be in its interest to exist In other 
words, it cannot be maintained that an embryo, for instance, has a right to life because it is in its interest 
to develop into a baby and eventually into a young adult The embryo has no concept of this Tooley, 
thus, reiterates his basic philosophical argument An entity must have a concept o f a continuing self in 
order to have a right to life (ibid p l2 1) Therefore, it would not be possible to claim that the embryo has a 
right to life simply because o f its future interests (ibid p i 18) Tooley writes “A subject o f interests, in 
the relevant sense of ‘interest’, must necessarily be a subject o f conscious states, including experiences 
and desires” (ibid pp l 18-119) From this, he maintains that “ persons are to be identified with entities 
that have desires that are interrelated in such a way that the entities can be viewed as subjects o f non- 
momentary interests” (ibid p i 34)
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does not possess the concept o f a self Nevertheless, the kitten has a right not to be 
tortured The desire not to suffer pain can be ascribed to something without assuming 
that it has any concept o f a continuing self Tooley contends that “ while something 
that lacks the concept o f a self cannot desire that a self not suffer, it can desire that a 
given sensation not exist” (ibid p63)
Tooley believes that a newborn baby does not possess the concept of a 
continuing self any more than a newborn kitten possesses such a concept Thus, he 
accepts the fact that his argument does not rule out the possibility o f the moral 
acceptability o f infanticide (ibid) He states that infanticide during a time interval 
shortly after birth must be morally acceptable The practical moral problem can thus be 
satisfactorily handled by choosing some period o f time, such as a week after birth, as 
the interval during which infanticide will be permitted This interval could then be 
modified once psychologists have established the point at which a human organism 
comes to believe that it is a continuing subject o f expenences and other mental states 
(ibid pp63-64) So, infants do not have a serious right to life but, in a similar way to a 
kitten, they do have a right not to be tortured As a consequence, “ it may well turn 
out that human infants are not persons, since it is far from clear that human infants 
possess self-consciousness or that they are capable o f envisaging a future for themselves 
and of having desires about such a future” (Tooley 1979 p80)
2 3 6 A Non-Species Concept of Person
Tooley (1972) is persuaded that “once one reflects upon the question of the basic 
moral principles involved in the ascription of a right to life to organisms, one may find 
himself dnven to conclude that our everyday treatment o f animals is morally 
indefensible, and that we are in fact murdenng innocent persons” (p65, also see Tooley 
1979 p67) According to him, membership in a particular biological species is not in
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itself morally significant because “ basic moral principles will not involve the 
concept of species membership, nor terms refemng to particular species” (Tooley 1983 
P?7)
In a similar vein to that o f Tooley, Peter Singer has a non-speciesist vision of 
ethics and does not consider human life to be an absolute value Smger argues that 
barely anyone believes that all human life is o f equal worth (Singer 1994 p i90) The 
value of human life inevitably vanes Therefore, we should take the quality of life of the 
individual as well as other factors including consciousness, physical, social and mental 
capacity into consideration (ib id )
Singer contends that what has the most value is the life o f being a person A 
person is a rational and self-conscious being29 Consequently, there are some human 
beings who are not persons because they are not rational and self-conscious, whereas 
there are some nonhuman animals who are persons because they are rational and self- 
conscious (Smger and Kuhse 1994 p i 33) Therefore, being a human being is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for being a person In this way, not all members of 
the Homo sapiens species are persons and not all persons are members o f the Homo 
sapiens species For Singer, the nght to life is not a nght that belongs to members o f the 
Homo sapiens species per se but to persons (Smger 1994 p202)
As I have already indicated, what is at the nub of Singer’s philosophical 
enterpnse is the critique of the doctnne of the sanctity o f human life from a utilitanan 
ethical perspective 30 In defiance o f the sanctity o f life doctnne, Smger argues that 
species membership itself is not sufficient for moral consideration and accuses such a 
doctnne as being a form of discnmination, not unlike racism He refers to this bias as 
speciesism 31 As an aficionado of animal nghts, Smger believes that we have to bnng
29 John Hymers (1999) makes the point that Singer is explicitly indebted to Locke (p i27)
30 For Singer’s critique of the traditional western ethic, see general introduction to thesis pp4-5
31 A term accredited to Richard Ryder (Dawkins 1989 plO) Singer is not alone in his thinking about 
species membership For instance, Engelhardt (1983), too, is persuaded that the distinction between being
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nonhuman animals within the sphere o f moral concern and cease to treat them as a 
means to an end As well as that, we have to come to terms with the fact that profoundly 
retarded infants, for example, are only members of the species Homo sapiens, which m 
itself is irrelevant to how we should treat such infants morally (Singer 1979 p53 )32 
What is relevant for moral consideration is whether the retarded infant is a person or 
not It is doubtful that the retarded infant is rational and self-conscious, and is therefore 
a person On another front, it is also doubtful whether the foetus is rational and self- 
conscious and therefore a person (see Singer 1993 pi 51)
John Hymers (1999) proffers a critical overview of Singer’s work by seeking to 
untangle the structure o f his argument He believes that, contrary to appearances, 
Singer’s argument seems to imply that only humans are bom animals and become 
persons (p i33) Smger does not ask us to refrain from killing humans, but rather from 
killing human persons But, as indicated by Hymers, Smger never makes reference to 
“ape persons” (i e apes who qualify as persons in Singer’s view), rather only to apes 
per se, which seems to imply that they are automatically persons (ibid) Humans, 
apparently, must earn the title o f persons, whereas certain animals (e g apes) receive it 
implicitly (ibid p i34)
Singer (1994) also refers to a community o f chimpanzees -  living m Arnhem 
Zoo, near Amsterdam -  as “people”, the colloquial plural word for person (pp 162-163) 
He argues that evidence of personhood is most conclusive in the great apes whereas 
other animals such as whales, dolphins, elephants, monkeys, dogs and pigs may qualify 
for personhood if it can be shown that they are conscious o f their own existence and that
human and being a person is not arbitrary Being human is purely a biological designation and only 
indicates membership in the species Homo sapiens What is o f prime moral interest is not species 
membership, but whether an entity is in fact a person (pxv)
32 Smger was invited to give a talk at the 1989 European symposium on “Bio-engineermg, Ethics and 
Mental Disability” However, his invitation was withdrawn because of mounting pressure from the co- 
orgamzers o f the conference, Lebenshilfe, who represent the interests o f people with special needs and 
who did not agree with Singer’s understanding of personhood, and its implications for those who have 
mental disabilities and special needs Singer, himself, recalls how Lebenshilfe took offense to his claim
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they can exercise rationality (ibid. p i 82). Therefore, it might not be completely accurate 
to charge Singer with the view that apes automatically qualify as persons: They need to 
show signs o f self-consciousness and rationality. Although, it may appear that Singer 
tends to refer to apes as if  they were persons per se, is it not true that we do the same 
vis-à-vis human beings, i.e. we tend to speak about human beings as if they were 
automatically persons?
It could be argued that Singer’s argument about the concept o f person is 
cathartic in nature: It attempts to encourage us to rethink our views about animals and 
about the sanctity o f human life doctrine, rooted in the traditional western ethic.33
Following the principle o f equality -  as expounded by Jeremy Bentham -  Singer 
also maintains that our concern for others should not depend on what they are like or on 
their abilities but on their capacity to experience suffering. Therefore, it could be 
contended that our interest in not having them suffer should not depend on whether they 
are rational and self-conscious (ibid. p i 82). Singer (2002) writes:
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that 
suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature o f the being, the 
principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like 
suffering -  insofar as rough comparisons can be made -  of any other being. If a 
being is not capable o f suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment of happiness, 
there is nothing to be taken into account (p85).34
that killing a “defective” infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Singer defended his claim by 
asserting that this statement was taken out o f context o f his understanding o f what constitutes a person
33 Singer argues that “the doctrine of the sanctity o f human life ... has at its core a discrimination on the 
basis o f species and nothing else” (Singer 1979 p48).
34 Therefore, if the embryo does not experience suffering and pain, then the principle o f sentience cannot 
protect it from being discarded or mistreated. Singer and Kuhse (2002) believe that “ ...the minimal 
characteristic needed to give the embryo a claim to consideration is sentience, or the capacity to feel 
pleasure or pain” (p i97). However, for them, “the early embryo has no brain, no nervous system. It is
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However, Singer contends that the term “person” is not purely descnptive but 
has moral standing (Singer 1994 p i 82) He wntes, “ killing a person against her or 
his will is a much more serious wrong than killing a being that is not a person” (ibid 
p i98) 35 Thus, there is a moral difference between killing a person compared to a non­
person (ibid p i98)
H Tnstram Engelhardt also follows the tradition o f Locke and accepts the 
distinction between the concept o f person and human being However, as it will be seen, 
Engelhardt allows those entities that are not stnctly persons to be included in some 
social understanding of personhood
2 3 7 The Strict/Social Concepts of Person
Firstly, Engelhardt points to the fact that there are many competing 
philosophical perspectives in ethics today For example, the various modem and 
contemporary ethical theones, including Emotivism, Intuitionism, Rule/Act 
Utilitarianism, Deontological Ethics, Virtue Ethics, Ethics o f Care, Justice-Based Ethics 
and Rights-Based Ethics, seek to guide people in their quest to do what is morally 
nght Yet, depending on which ethical theory they follow, they can end up with vastly 
different answers to the ethical problems posed 37
Secondly, Engelhardt acknowledges the fact that the Enlightenment project of 
discovering a “content-full rationality” has not succeeded 38 Thus, what we have are
reasonable to assume that, so far as its mental life goes, it has no more awareness than a lettuce” (ibid 
p i 94)
5 Elsewhere he argue that “ to take the lives o f persons is, m itself, more serious than taking the lives 
o f non-persons” (Singer 1993 p i 18)
36 Stephan Darwell (1998) provides a good introduction to the various ethical theories It is argued that 
there are not only differences in various moral theones but also differences in ethical decision-making 
processes among health care practitioners From their study regarding how doctors and nurses form moral 
judgements, Kathleen Oberle and Dorothy Hughes (2000) sum up their findings by stating that “the key 
difference between the groups was that doctors are responsible for making decisions and nurses must live 
with these decisions” (p707 and p709)
37 Engelhardt (1996) argues, “moral diversity is real It is real in fact and in principle Bioethics and health 
care policy have yet to take this diversity seriously” (p3) L Levy (1997) describes the present state o f 
affairs as a proliferation o f different types of ethics that emerge from the necessity of the situation (p36)
38 MacIntyre (1985) offers a devastating critique o f the Enlightenment project (pp51-61)
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“moral strangers”, 1 e people with whom we do not share a common moral vision or 
common moral principles He writes
One encounters moral strangers, peoples with whom one does not share 
sufficient moral principles or enough of a common moral vision to be able to 
resolve moral controversies through sound rational argument or an appeal to 
moral authority When one attempts rationally to resolve such controversies, the 
discussions go on and on without a final conclusion Rational argument does not 
quiet moral controversies when one encounters moral strangers, people of 
different moral visions (Engelhardt 1996 p8)
We are therefore left with two options Either the “content-full” morality that 
“moral friends” share or the “procedural” morality that merely binds “moral strangers” 
(ibid p i 1)
Engelhardt places the concept of person in the context of his analysis concerning 
moral strangers seeking to reach moral consensus (ibid p i 36) He begins his analysis 
by making the claim that human bemgs have no intrinsic worth All that can be 
acknowledged is the moral authority that can come from persons (ibid p239) He argues 
that “ it is because general secular morality derives its authority and scope from the 
permission of persons that persons as moral agents, as permission givers, are central” 
(ibid p i 36) Persons constitute the very possibility o f a moral community because of 
their capacity to be self-conscious, to be rational and to be concerned with blame and 
praise Therefore, the concept of person should be defined within this context o f a moral 
community that is made up of moral strangers seeking consensus on moral issues “This 
concept o f person is thus defined wholly within the practice o f moral strangers
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resolving moral controversies by agreement, by giving and withholding morally 
authoritative permission” (ib id)
Engelhardt argues that the distinction between human being and person is valid 
“Not all instances o f human biological life are instances o f human personal life” 
(Engelhardt 1988 p i 71) Furthermore, not all humans are persons and not all persons 
are humans Angels, entities from other planets, which are not human, may still be 
persons39 What makes an entity a person is the capacity to be self-conscious, to be 
rational and to be agents capable o f moral responsibility (Engelhardt 1996 p i38) In 
light o f this, Engelhardt makes a distinction between the social and the strict sense of 
person On the one hand, person, in the strict sense, is a moral agent who is self- 
conscious, rational, self-determining and morally accountable 40 Normal human adults 
represent the best examples o f persons m the stnct philosophical sense On the other 
hand, person, m the social sense, is not a moral agent who is self-conscious, rational and 
morally accountable For example, foetuses, infants and the mentally retarded are not 
persons in the stnct sense o f the term Indeed, they cannot act as constituents o f a 
secular moral community (ibid pl36) Engelhardt wntes “ fetuses are not rational, 
self-conscious beings -  that is, given a stnct definition o f person, fetuses do not qualify 
as persons” (Engelhardt 1988 p i 73) However, foetuses, infants and the mentally 
retarded can be included in the social sense of the word, and thus are given some moral 
standing in society, which is mainly a result o f utilitarian and other consequential^ 
motives (Engelhardt 1996 p i47 and p i 50) 41 He writes
39 Ben A Rich (1997) places the moral weight o f personhood on consciousness He points to the 
important distinction between human biological life and human personal life He argues that there are 
many cases in which human personal life comes to an end long before human biological life There are 
also cases in which human biological life comes into existence long before personal life (p206, p2 10, 
p211 andp214)
0 Englehardt (1996) writes “What distinguishes persons is their capacity to be self-conscious, rational, 
and concerned with worthiness o f blame and praise The possibility of such entities grounds the 
possibility of the moral community” (p i38) Here, we can hear echoes o f Locke’s philosophical 
anthropology (see Engelhardt 1983 p i 85)
41 See also Engelhardt (1983b p207, 1973/74 p232)
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Since this sense of person [social sense of person] cannot be justified in terms of 
the basic grammar o f morality (1 e because such entities do not have intrinsic 
moral standing through being moral agents), one will need rather to justify a 
social sense o f person m terms of the usefulness o f the practice o f treating 
certain entities as if  they were persons (ibid p i 4 7 )42
As it can be seen, the social sense of the term “person” is certainly more 
inclusive than the strict sense Persons, in the social sense, have rights but no moral 
duties (Engelhardt 1988 p i 77) In the case o f the one-month-old infant there is no 
evidence that a person in a strict moral sense is present But, there is the possibility that 
it may develop Human beings who are now senile and demented were once persons in 
the strict sense, but now they qualify as persons in the social sense, whereas the 
permanently comatose no longer qualify as persons neither in the strict nor social sense 
because they cannot experience suffering and pam (Engelhardt 1996 pp 148-154)
2 3 8 The Concept of Person and Human Being
With the advent o f the modem vision of the concept o f person, as represented by 
Locke, Singer, Tooley and Engelhardt, there is both a break and continuity in the 
scholastic understanding of personhood Firstly, there is a break in the understanding of 
rationality and consciousness For Boethius, Aquinas and Lonergan, rationality is the 
defining nature o f the Homo sapiens species Human beings are rational and therefore 
intrinsically persons For Locke, Singer, Tooley and Engelhardt, it is the actual exercise 
of rationality together with the concept of self that constitutes a person Compared to the 
scholastic approach, the modem and contemporary concepts o f person accept that there
42 Engelhardt (1988) contends that “ one treats certain instances o f human life as persons for the good 
o f those individuals who are persons strictly” (pi 77)
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is a metaphysical and a moral divide between person and human being Secondly, there 
is continuity between both the scholastic and modem periods Both accept the 
possibility that not only human bemgs but also other entities can be persons This was 
accepted by early Christianity and was important for it in order to show logically and 
analogically how Jesus Christ could be a divme person with two natures, human and 
divme It suited their cause to make a distinction between person and human being For 
example, theologically God is a person but not a human being Jesus Christ is a divine 
person but not a human person So, the original philosophical distinction between 
human being and person was introduced not for health care ethical reasons but primarily 
for theological reasons It helped to resolve some of the issues facing the early Christian 
Church at that point and silence some of the “heresies” floating around But, it 
inadvertently opened a Pandora’s box Although the philosophical understanding of the 
concept o f person has a Christian origin43, the modem and contemporary interpretations 
of that concept have made it backfire on the Christian view that human beings belong to 
a higher ethical realm compared to animals
2 3 9 The Concept of Person A Static Morality of a Closed Society9
With the philosophical analysis of static and dynamic moralities and closed and 
open societies, the question arises as to whether the contemporary concepts o f person 
(as represented by Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt) reflect the static morality o f a closed 
society or the dynamic morality o f an open society The closed society’s static morality 
naturally views those outside its social boundary in a certain restricted way As
43 It was the search for a theological doctrine, which would adequately explain both the mystery of the 
trinity and the incarnation, that prompted the development o f the philosophical meaning of the concept of 
person As Clarke (1993) notes “But the most urgent pressure came from the Christian theologians to 
explicate more precisely the two central Christian doctrines of God as Triune (one God, with one divine 
nature possessed equally by the three ‘owners’ or persons), and the Incarnation (God become man m 
Jesus Christ, so that the human nature of Jesus is not a person on its own but is ‘owned5 by the Second 
Divine Person, the Son, who now possesses two natures, one divine, possessed from all eternity, the other 
human, taken on in time) Thus Christ is one Divine Person owning two natures, whereas God in himself
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maintained by the Russian writer Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn (1975) “Man has from the 
beginning been so constituted that his view of the world his motivations and scale of 
values, his actions and his intentions are all defined by his experience as an individual 
and as a member o f a group” (p562) It is part o f who we are that makes us form groups 
which set us apart from other groups and makes us exclude those who do not belong to 
our social realm The static morality justifies this exclusion and spurs us on to look out 
for the interests o f our social unit It seems quite natural for us to categorise people into 
groups and sub-groups Blacks are different to Whites, men are different to women and 
the Insh are different to the English We naturally set up boundaries between social 
groups Therefore, it could be argued that the closed society is at the root o f racism and 
other forms of discrimination, which exclude various participants from the moral and 
social realm because they are perceived not to belong to the social group For example, 
it could be argued that the Christian crusades’ abusive treatment o f non-Chnstian 
prisoners, the exploitation o f Latm American peoples by the Spanish conquistadors and 
the apartheid regime in South Africa, were all driven by a static morality of a closed 
society
Certainly with Tooley, Smger and Engelhardt, there is a move towards basing 
the concept o f person not on species membership but on certain traits and properties In 
this way, more entities have the potential to be included in the concept of person, which 
could point to the dynamic morality o f an open society The concept o f person becomes
r
a non-restnctive property because now animals that qualify as persons can be given the 
moral respect that was once given to human beings only At the same time, the concept 
of person becomes a restnctive property because not all human beings can qualify As it 
has been demonstrated, the static morality of a closed society has the social unit as its 
goal, whereas the dynamic morality of an open has all of humanity as its goal
is one divine nature owned by three distinct Persons” (p26) This shows that it is possible to be a person 
and not to be a human being at the same time
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Therefore, it is difficult to justify how the concept o f person could be an example o f a 
dynamic morality if it does not have all of humanity as its goal Additionally, the 
concept o f person tends to end up excluding many entities, not only those who belong to 
the human species, but also those who belong to the animal species Yet again, this 
seems to be more m keeping with the mechanics o f the static morality
With certain concepts o f person the case can be made that m general hospitals 
there are many human beings who are not persons So is it a misnomer to say that the 
person (or the colloquial plural “people”) is at the core of health care‘s This would not 
be the case according to Engelhardt’s analysis For him, medicine is primarily 
concerned with persons in the strict sense of moral agents In other words, patients are 
persons (in the strict sense) when they are able to discuss their problems with their 
physicians and come to agreements about treatment (Engelhardt 1996 p240) 
Nonetheless, he admits that the full consequences o f this have yet to be realised in 
health care policy (ibid p i40) If there are human beings in our hospitals, who do not 
qualify as persons, then we must face the question as to why continue treating them
Engelhardt’s distinction between the social and the strict sense o f person 
certainly widens the parameters o f the concept o f person In this way, it could be seen as 
an act earned out on behalf o f humanity and therefore creating an open society in health 
care ethics However, Engelhardt, himself, argues that we may include foetuses, infants 
and the mentally retarded m the social sense o f person for consequential or utilitanan 
motives (ibid pl47 and p i 50) For me, this does not appear to be an example of 
dynamic morality The problem with this is, as I see it, that the social sense of person 
may not have much of a moral position in one particular society compared to another 
One society might choose not to include infants in the social sense o f person, precisely 
because o f consequential or utilitanan considerations It might be seen to play against 
their interests For example, the argument could be posed that more money could be
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spent on real persons m general health care by diverting it from other health care 
services that do not treat persons m the strict sense O f course, other societies might 
decide to include infants in their understanding of personhood It might be useful to 
have infants m order to have a sufficient range o f potential blood and organ donors, for 
example The social sense of person may work very well withm a culture that is open to 
all human life but not in a culture where all human life has to be justified For those in 
one particular closed society, the social sense o f person may therefore not have much of 
a moral position
If we turn our attention to Singer’s concept o f person, it is clear that -  in a 
similar fashion to Engelhardt -  it invites critique because o f its implication for health 
care However, one could argue that Singer has had a dynamic experience o f the 
universal value o f all life -  whether human or animal -  which transcends the western 
sanctity o f life doctrine that was solely confined to human persons44 If this is correct, 
then Smger creates an open society m health care ethics, whereby the criteria of 
personhood is no longer based on species membership
However, I think that his dynamic experience of the universal value of all life, 
whether human or animal, ends up excluding a large number of human beings -  and 
animals too -  when codified in a definition o f personhood So, I think his view has a 
tendency to become more o f a closed rather than an open society’s approach to the 
concept o f person m health care ethics Perhaps, this is not Singer’s intention, but his 
codification lends itself to be, at least, misread
44 Some Christian ethicists and philosophers take issue with Singer’s interpretation o f the sanctity of life 
doctrine For example, Gordon Preece (2002) claims that “despite Singer's argument that Christianity has 
devalued animals, the doctrine of creation sees each part of creation as originally and intrinsically good 
(Gen 1), though it is after the creation of humanity that the whole creation is pronounced ‘very good’ 
(Gen 1 31) (p39, see also Wilson 2002 p i 19) Donal O ’Mathuna (1995) makes the case that “Genesis 
1 26-30 declares that being an image o f God confers a certain role on every human each is to be G od’s 
representative on earth It is therefore the responsibility of humans to act as God would have them act 
This includes dominion over the earth, but not that o f an absolute master” (p203) According to 
O ’Mathuna, it is because human beings are made m the image o f God that they have certain moral 
responsibilities towards their neighbour and to the rest o f God’s creation “When humans act as God
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With Tooley’s concept of person, newborn babies would certainly not be 
persons, in fact some animals may be nearer to full personhood than they are It may 
even turn out to be perfectly acceptable to kill infants since they only belong to the 
species Homo sapiens They have not yet developed a concept o f self and they have no 
explicit desire or interest to live Thus they have no right to life I think that most 
parents would find this morally repelling Certainly, Tooley’s understanding of the right 
to life seems to be of help when deciding whether or not to allow those who will be 
bom with some abnormality to live But it is difficult to claim that infanticide would be 
acceptable in an open society because it seems to go against the very grain of the 
dynamic morality 45
In the context of the creative revolution benefiting the world of health care, it 
would appear that the above contemporary concepts o f person risk becoming boundary 
concepts that are used to include only those who appear to be eligible for the creative 
feats o f humanity The concept o f person risks being used in ethical discussions to 
justify why certain individuals should reap the benefits o f the creative revolution and 
why particular individuals should not Undoubtedly, the distinction between human 
being and person m the literature on health care ethics provides a novel battleground 
that creates a moral insecurity for those who are not yet deemed to be persons or who 
are no longer deemed to be persons For example, it may now be clear that the embryo 
is not yet a person and is therefore not a subject o f nghts and moral responsibilities It 
has a lesser or no moral claim on us The embryo may belong to the biological species 
human bemg but not to the metaphysical and moral category o f person Thus, it has no 
intrinsic right to life We may choose to bestow a right to life on the embryo, but this 
has nothing to do with the fact that it is biologically human It may now be clear that the
would have them act they present an accurate image of him to the rest of creation and thus bring glory to 
him This is part o f the value and responsibility o f being an image o f God” (ib id )
45 This is not to imply that all closed societies would allow infanticide Due to its natural static morality, a 
closed society may be prompted to protect all its members, regardless of the fact that they are not persons
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patient in a PVS is no longer a person and is therefore not a subject of rights and moral 
responsibilities It has a lesser or no moral claim on us The patient in a PVS may 
belong to the biological species human being but not to the metaphysical and moral 
category o f person Thus, s/he has no intrinsic nght to life We may choose to bestow a 
right to life on the PVS patient, but this has nothing to do with the fact that it is 
biologically human
2 4 Conclusion -  Towards an Aesthetic and Instructive Presentation
As it has been shown, there is a plethora o f viewpoints regarding the concept of 
person Although Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt, for instance, put forward rather robust 
positions, they do not tend to proffer the same arguments completely The upshot o f this 
is that there is no really unifying concept o f person With Lonergan, the exercise of 
rational consciousness is an offspring, as it were, of the rational nature of Homo 
sapiens Thus, personhood is not something acquired but is a given With Tooley, 
Singer and Engelhardt following in the tradition o f Locke, there is a shift in the 
metaphysical and moral goal posts Self-consciousness and rational exercise o f thought 
become the prerequisite for personhood Therefore, personhood is something that is 
achieved Although they set out to have a more refined concept of person that is not 
based on species membership and is therefore potentially more inclusive, their concepts 
end up reflecting a static morality of a closed society rather than a dynamic morality of 
an open society
The positive effect of the contemporary concepts of person is that they allow 
those who were formerly excluded (1 e animals that show rational manifestations) to be 
included in the moral domain, and therefore they provide an antidote to the former 
“sanctity o f life” doctnne that, m effect, viewed animals as “second-class moral 
citizens” So, the concept o f person still has the potential to be inclusive rather than
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exclusive That is why I think we do not need to abandon the concept of person but we 
need to find a more open and dynamic concept that fits into a dynamic morality o f an 
open society
In conclusion, when speaking about the mysterious nature of art, Solzhenitsyn 
(1975) said “Who would dare to say that he has defined Art7 Or has enumerated all its 
aspects9’’ (p558) In a similar vein, I would venture to ask Who would dare to say that 
they have given a full definition of the concept o f person and have enumerated all its 
characteristics? Perhaps, it is this very reality that has led to such fecundity on this 
subject Even though concepts attempt to provide a window onto the enigma of 
personhood, I still believe that it is important to bear m mind that what we are dealing 
with is something that keeps escaping us In this sense the concept of person is a 
trajectory o f thought It is almost impossible to grasp and spell out the totality of 
personhood As indicated by Beauchamp (1999), “the concept o f person is simply not 
orderly, precise, or systematic m a way that supports one general philosophical theory to 
the exclusion of another” (p319) Nonetheless, as I have mentioned, concepts o f person 
inform our thinking, thus they are crucial in the face o f ideological thinking within the 
closed society’s mentality that is infiltrating our culture o f creativity in health care 
Therefore, I am convinced that, however difficult it may be, it is important to take some 
steps toward providing a more inclusive concept o f person
Finally, according to von Hagens (2002), the goal o f Korperwelten is the 
“aesthetic and instructive presentation o f the body’s interior” (p32) 46 In the following 
chapters, I attempt to move from a static to a dynamic concept o f person m order to 
provide a more inclusive concept To that end, I outline, what I describe as, an aesthetic 
and instructive presentation of the concept o f person
46 This is concretised not only by the exhibition itself but also by the numerous educational resource 
materials, including workbooks and videos
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3 1 Introduction -T he Sufi Parable
The Sufi “Parable o f the Blind Bom” recounts the story of a king in the north of 
India who orders his servants to gather together all the people bom blind living in that 
town When they are all assembled, he places an elephant in front o f them Then, he 
makes some of them touch the elephant’s head, others the ear, the tusk, the foot and the 
tail hair Afterwards the king asks them “What does an elephant look like?” Those who 
touched the head answer “It is like a pot”, those who touched the ear “It is like a 
woven basket”, those who touched the tusk “It is like a ploughshare”, those who 
touched the foot “It is like a pillow”, those who touched the tail hair “It is like a 
brush1” After hearing everyone’s reply they begin to argue among themselves about 
what the elephant is or is not like From a distance, the king looks upon them arguing 
and he begins to laugh11
The “blind bom” confuse parts o f the elephant for the elephant itself They 
cannot “see” that the overall reality o f what makes an elephant an elephant is much 
greater than its parts In their “blindness” they presume that the part o f the elephant they 
touched is the most important property that is intrinsic to what constitutes an elephant 
They cannot even agree on what the elephant looks like It is no wonder that the king 
laughs at them, as it is their very “blindness” that causes them to arrogantly uphold their 
positions against one another
I think that the message of the parable mirrors what is presently taking place in 
the investigation of what makes a person a person The concept of person is placed in 
front of us and there is a tendency to concentrate on certain aspects of it (e g exercise of 
rationality, a concept o f self, a sense of past, present and future) and to claim that it is 
this (or these) which constitute(s) a person By grasping parts o f the reality of
1 There are many variations of this story It originated in the Buddhist tradition and subsequently became 
very popular m the Islamic tradition Therefore, the parable has many interpretations concerning 
appearance and reality, which points to its richness I have interpreted it in this way, while at the same
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personhood and by presuming that it is the whole, we could be accused of acting like 
the “blind bom” Therefore, m order to avoid falling into the trap of “blindness”, I will 
make the case for the need to examine the concept of person from the perspective of an 
aesthetic presentation By aesthetic presentation, I understand an appreciation of the 
concept of person from the context of reality, which is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance
Firstly, I will consider the present context o f “blindness” by employing Charles 
Taylor’s critique of mechanism in the contraposition o f facts and meaning Secondly, I 
will use Bernard Lonergan’s analysis o f the three distinct worlds o f meaning interfaced 
with Taylor’s work on significance, language and human agency Although the two 
Canadian philosophers’ backgrounds are different -  Lonergan attempts to reach up to 
the mind of St Thomas Aqumas, whereas Taylor is influenced by Martin Heidegger and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein -  they offer a helpful guide through some of the confusion 
surrounding contemporary thinking on the person and they provide a context for me to 
delineate an aesthetic presentation of the concept of person As I will demonstrate, 
Taylor’s use o f the word “meaning” is at times more refined than Lonergan’s, whereas 
Lonergan’s analysis of our access to meaning is more systematic Finally, I will add a 
further dimension to this aesthetic presentation by examining the reality of dependency 
and vulnerability in the preparation for my definition of person
time I have tried to be respectful to the spirit o f its originating tradition See Backstein (1992) for one 
version o f the story
2 The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines “aesthetic” as “ a special appreciation o f what is 
beautiful ” (p206) In this chapter, I use the word “aesthetic” in a wider sense to refer to the world 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance as a preparation for my definition of the concept o f 
person
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3 2 The Disenchanted World 
3 2 1 Zellwald -  An Exhibition of Human Cells
Since the scientific revolution o f the seventeenth century, the pursuit to 
understand and to explain the functioning of human beings, o f other living organisms 
and of the world has accelerated Similar to the creative revolution m health care, the 
new discoveries, facilitated by science and technology, have helped in our quest to 
enhance our understanding of life, which has also brought numerous benefits for 
humanity Many of these achievements can be observed in the Deutsches Museum , 
which is situated m Munich, Germany Through its fifty exhibitions, covering a floor 
space of over 46,000m2, it testifies to and traces the histoncal development of science 
and technology, from hydraulic, locomotive and marine engineering to vanous 
scientific instruments, energy technology, telecommunications and so on
Interestingly, there is an exhibition devoted to pharmacy, which represents a new 
venture to include “life sciences” into a museum largely devoted to technical and 
mechanical enterprises The motto of the pharmacy exhibition is “Alles Leben ist 
Chemie”! (“All life is chemistry1”) (Deutsches Museum 2000 p7)3 It shows how life 
goes back to biochemical processes by demonstrating (a) how biochemical reactions 
take place in the body, (b) how interruptions o f these reactions can lead to health 
problems and (c) how chemically active substances o f medicine (l e medical products) 
can restore the body into balance (ibid p8) In this sense, the body is pictured as a scale 
When one part o f it is tipped and put off balance through “interruptions” caused by 
viruses or bacteria, it can be brought back into equilibrium by medical products which 
owe their natural source to herbs and plants
The focal point o f the pharmacy display m the museum is the Zellwald (“Cell 
Forest”), which shows, twenty-five times bigger than normal, seven out o f the two
3 Translated by Alan J Kearns
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hundred different specialised cell types of the human body4 This Zellwald explains that 
the cell is the basic umt o f life in which biochemical reactions occur It demonstrates the 
exchange and conversion of chemical substances, energy and information (via the 
nerves) as well as the advancing of genetic codes during cell division Here, it is 
possible to travel into a world that is out of reach to daily experience, but which exists a 
billion times larger when seen through a microscope For instance, it is possible to 
observe the vanous nerve cells, the body’s swift communication system, transmitting 
information from outside the body through vanous sensations as well as conveying 
orders from the bram to the rest of the body It is possible to examine storage cells, 
which we often struggle against, and see how they can become extremely enlarged 
when too much is stored In addition, the Zellwald illustrates the white blood cells 
defending the body from foreign matter and the red blood cells transporting oxygen 
from the lungs to the vanous bodily tissues
What struck me about the Zellwald was its maxim regarding cells “Alle Zellen 
sind gleich und dock verschiedenf” (“All cells are the same and yet dissimilar’”)5 To put 
it another way There is one vanety with numerous vanations (ibid p55) All cells in 
our bodies have, in pnnciple, the same basic structure consisting o f nucleus, 
mitochondna and other cellular organisers However, depending on their functions, their 
forms and sizes vary respectively Hence, the Zellwald acknowledges that the 
theoretical compartmentalizing o f cells is not always faithful to the cell itself On the 
other hand, the Zellwald places the understanding of the human body and its 
corresponding need for medicine m the context of technical and mechanical endeavours 
Perhaps, it is not mappropnate to examine “the body”, as opposed to “one’s own body” 
in this way A mechanistic perspective on the working o f the body can provide a helpful 
educational tool for both medical and health care professionals and also for the average
4 For an illustration o f the Zellwald, see appendix B p235
5 Translated by Alan J Kearns
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non-specialist when seeking an understanding of their body Yet, as I have mentioned m 
chapter two, for von Hagens -  in the context o f the Korperwelten -  no two bodies are 
completely the same 6 For that reason, von Hagens attempts to capture the intricacies 
and wonders o f the body through the technique of plastination as an educational tool in 
Korperwelten Furthermore, it could be argued that the human body is much more than 
a composition and collage of cells but has meaning and significance, a point argued by 
Leon R Kass (1985) when he says “ how the body works can only be learned by 
mechanistic analysis But what the body is and especially what it means can be grasped, 
if  at all, only by looking on it whole [sic], as we encounter it” (p24) It is claimed that 
there is an inappropriate tendency in medicine to treat the body like a machine As noted 
by David Le Breton (2003), “medicine thus becomes the science o f the sick body, not 
the sick human being But subtracting the person from the body, and seeing the latter as 
a mere machine, empties the body of meaning and value Without its symbolic 
dimension, all that remains o f the body is a complex of parts, a cluster of functions” 
(p47) In response, it could be suggested that the “sick body” is different to the “sick 
human being” Although a broken leg may cause many inconveniences to me, it does 
not question the very integrity o f my being “human” 7 Although, it might affect my 
sense o f self, if  I am a professional athlete, for example
3 2 2 The Person Forest -  A Mechanistic Treatment
Taking this example o f an exhibition from every day life, I began to wonder 
whether there were any links that could be made to the present state o f affairs regarding 
the treatment o f the concept o f person Certainly I think that at the moment the 
philosophical pendulum has swung towards an outlook that encourages a tendentious
6 See a summary of the work o f Korperwelten in chapter two pp54-55
7 There is the risk that this may lead to dualistic thinking concerning the body and the self
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intellectual habit o f treating the issue of the concept of person mechanistically8 The 
various concepts o f person -  that were examined m the previous chapter -  are almost 
like a forest of concepts As with the analysis o f cells in the Zellwald, the concept of 
person is analysed and broken up into vanous components and properties and various 
entities are judged as to whether they fit this concept or not Even if we could present a 
real exhibition on concepts o f person, like with the Zellwald, would it be 
philosophically authentic to divide the concept into properties and to display them by 
enlarging them twenty-five times bigger7 For instance, supposing in a guided tour of 
our “Person Forest” museum self-consciousness, as one of the key properties of 
possessing personhood, was emphasised and represented by showing an amplified 
example o f bram activity that was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG), would 
there not be a danger o f falling into the snare o f the “blind bom”7 In other words, 
perhaps this would encourage us to think that the reality o f personhood corresponds to 
the inspection o f properties shown in our “Person Forest” exhibition From this, we 
might ask ourselves, why there is a tendency to itemize the person by vanous 
descnptive properties -  that follow from a concept o f person -  and to declare those 
properties to be intrinsic to what constitutes a person7 Could we be accused of acting 
like the “blind bom”7
As well as that, even if  we agree on the exercise o f rationality and the display of 
self-consciousness as the key which unlocks personhood, surely the Zellwald's maxim 
also seems to apply here There is one vanety with numerous vanations|9
8 One exemplar of this mechanistic thinking is the work o f Richard Dawkins (1989), although he speaks 
mamly about human beings In his introduction to The Selfish Gene he proposes the argument that human 
beings, and all other animals, are in fact machines shaped by genes (p2)
9 Perhaps the state o f pre-or un-consciousness is a variation o f consciousness (Strawson 1964)
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3 2 3 The Roots of Mechanism
I think that Charles Taylor’s magnum opus, Sources o f  the S e lf helps to shed 
light on the issue o f approaching the concept o f the person m a mechanistic way when 
tracing the various sources o f the self and morality throughout history (Taylor 1989 p3) 
He uses the word “disenchantment”, coined by Max Weber, m the sense of the loss of 
experience of the cosmos as having a meaningful order, direction and focal point The 
world no longer holds intrinsic meaning that is to be discovered and according to which 
we can attune our lives (ibid p i 7) In view of this, Taylor attempts to untangle the 
disenchantment by tracing its roots to the philosophical climate of the time of the 
seventeenth century scientific revolution, which was mainly inspired by Rene 
Descartes In his assiduous quest for certainty m the face o f doubt, Descartes was deeply 
influenced by the reflexive inward turn of St Augustine and his emphasis on the inner 
self through reflection and autobiographical expression (see St Augustine 1961) But, 
Descartes and his empiricist enthusiasts took the Augustmian model and turned it into 
something radically different when they sought to understand the universe 
mechanistically This steered a disengagement o f the person, thus releasing him/her 
from subjective error For instance, Descartes’ Discourse on Method (1999) encourages 
us to dismantle problems into parts until no further division is possible In his Treatise 
on Man (1972), he applies the same method of compartmentalization to the human body 
when he examines the body like a machine 10
The upshot o f this new enlightened philosophical pursuit o f absolute certainty, 
freed from any subject-related bias, promoted a bifurcation between the world o f facts, 
which can be proven -  to some extent11 -  from the world o f meaning, which cannot be 
proven m the same way but can only be pointed to by philosophy, poetry, literature and
10 Grant Duncan (2000), however, makes the argument that Descartes concedes the human body to be a 
creation o f God and therefore more complex than any man-made machine (p492)
11 It is open to question to what extent is the world o f facts provable, especially when we examine the 
debates between the anti-realist, naive-reahsts and cntical-realists
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aesthetics, for example The world is no longer understood to be enchanted with 
meaning but is enthralled by neutral facts to be scientifically observed This 
disenchanted world has a threefold effect
Firstly, the “person” is disengaged from both the natural and the social worlds 
In other words, persons are no longer participants immersed in reality but only have the 
ability to examine reality as an object from the point o f view of an external impartial
1 9spectator This emerges from the dualism encouraged by Descartes’ philosophy, where 
the person’s mind and body are understood to be separate entities This separation 
between the mind and the body persuades people to study their own body as an object 
Although dualism’s influence on the contemporary world is not as robust as it was, the 
pursuit o f objectivity and neutrality when understanding human life has become more 
and more prevalent (Taylor 1989 pp 144-145)13
Secondly, the “punctual view” of the self has also evolved from this 
disenchanted world This is a view of the self that is free and rational to treat itself and 
the world mstrumentally14 Humanity’s quest to understand nature is no longer 
connected with an aspiration to be attuned to the inbuilt moral order but to manipulate 
nature for its own purposes This punctual view of the self continues today in the 
incredible weight that instrumental reason has on social policy, on politics and on 
medicine (ibid p i 73) With this punctual view of the self, human reason takes on a key 
role in the mechanistic outlook on the world and the person and subsequently becomes 
central in offering a definition of personhood (ib id) 15 It is precisely m the execution of
12 In contrast to this position, one of Voegehn’s central theses is that human existence is a partnership in 
the community o f being, which is a quatemanan structure comprising o f God and man, world and society 
(Voegelm 1956 p i)
13 Although Cartesian dualism may have lost ground, mechanism seems to have become more and more 
credible, according to Taylor’s research (Taylor 1993 p324) Also see Christopher Kirwan’s (2001) 
analysis o f dualism and mechamsm (pi 31)
14 Taylor (1989) traces this punctual self to Locke’s work on the person (pp 159-176)
15 Taylor (1989) states that “ the modem conception o f reason is procedural What we are called on to 
do is not to become contemplators of order, but rather to construct a picture o f things following the 
canons o f rational thinking” (p i 68)
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instrumental reason that the person gams his/her dignity Reason is primarily 
understood as the epicentre o f control and mstrumentalization, which persons can utilise 
m order to manipulate nature (Kirwan 2001 p i 02) In this way, the person him/herself 
becomes “master” o f this instrumental manipulation Taylor (1970) is quite critical of 
this instrumental outlook on reason and argues that our civilization ought to be “ 
indicted for its narrow vision of reason, which is reduced to the intelligent calculation of 
means to ensure the end of production” (p63) Reason is not understood in the Platonic 
sense as that faculty which helps us to illuminate reality and connects us to a moral 
order, symbolised by the Good, i e the Agathon (Plato 1987 pp316-325, BkVI 514- 
521) Consequently, in the act of knowing we do not grasp the ideal form of the really 
real, because there is none Knowing things rather means grasping how things are put 
together into various classes (Taylor 1985a p225)
Thirdly, Taylor upholds the view that the logical social consequence of 
instrumental reason in this disenchanted world is an “atomistic” understanding of 
society that is justified in terms of individual purposes He explains atomism as the “ 
condition in which everyone defines his or her purposes in individual terms and only 
cleaves to society on instrumental grounds ” (Taylor 1989 pp413) 16 Ultimately, then, 
the more we learn to treat things in a rationalistic fashion, the more we are inclined to 
accept the perceived corresponding view of how things “really” operate (Taylor 1993 
p321) Following the example o f mechanistic clarification and the corresponding view 
of the disengaged, punctual person living m an atomistic society, the concept of person 
is no longer understood within the context o f meaningful reality but in the context o f a 
mechanistic structure
The world of health care has not escaped from this disenchanted world This is 
an issue acknowledged by David Le Breton (2003) when he explores the question of
16 It could be argued that, from a Bergsoman perspective, this “atomistic” stance poses a threat to the 
static cohesion of society
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personal identity m the context of the aftermath experience of receiving an organ 
transplant (pp41-49) As maintained by Le Breton, “it is not true, as a mechanistic view 
of the human body would suggest, that taking an organ from a dead person and 
transplanting it to a living person, is a psychologically neutral exercise” (ibid pp41- 
4 2 )17 For those who receive a new kidney it is not simply like fixing a part o f their 
body A striking example o f this is o f a young man who, after suffering for some time 
from renal failure, received a new kidney after it became available on the death o f a 
donor due to a road accident Two years after the transplant, the young recipient still did 
not want to know something about the identity o f the donor and the circumstances o f his 
death He said “One can’t forget it It’s an odd feeling I know he didn’t mean to 
die I sometimes wonder if  his parents know his kidney’s still alive” (ibid p44) He still 
feels partly responsible for the death o f the donor His feelings o f guilt confirm that the 
experience of transplantation and the after-effects are shot through with meaning The 
person is not like a machine in need of a spare part Consequently, transplantations do 
not take place in a vacuum but m a context immersed in meaning Equally, as it will be 
shown, the concept o f person is not situated m a void but in a context of meaningful 
reality In view o f this, it is important to reflect on what we mean by “meaning” and by 
“meaningful reality” It is to Lonergan’s work that I will now turn in order to elucidate 
the meaning o f “meaning”
17 Le Breton is convinced that “ the heart is not a pump, the kidneys are not a purifying plant, and the 
lungs are not a pair o f bellows If they were, human bemgs would indeed be machines, with 
interchangeable parts, and transplants would raise no psychological or ethical problems, beforehand or 
afterwards -  would be as morally neutral as changing the wheels in a broken clock The corporeal 
element that becomes part o f the recipient’s substance is not neutral it is charged with values and 
fantasies ” (Le Breton 2003 p47)
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3 3 The Meaning of “Meaning” 
3 3 1 The World of Meaning
In the disenchanted world what is often bypassed, or perhaps forgotten, is that 
there is not only the world o f immediate experience but also the world mediated and
1 ft
constituted by meaning Sometimes, the argument is put forward that there is no 
difference between reality and meaning Meaning is reality However, Lonergan (1988) 
argues that the distinction between the two (reality and meaning) is valuable because 
people engage in various acts that mediate and create meaning when they experience, 
understand, affirm and deliberate about what is real (p232) Our access to the world o f 
meaning is to be found in conscious acts, l e through the very dynamism of intentional 
consciousness, as shown in the performance of the cogmtional structure of 
consciousness, when we know and evaluate The source o f meaning is to be found in 
intended contents, l e what is reached through experience (l e the data), through 
understanding (l e intelligibility), through judging (i e truth), through deciding (i e 
value) (Lonergan 1972 p 7 3 )19 Accordingly, Lonergan presents a critical realist account 
o f meaning by distinguishing between the world o f immediate experience, the world 
mediated by meaning and the world constituted by meaning, which I will now explain
3 3 2 The World of Immediacy
The “first world” is what Lonergan names the world of immediacy, the world of 
immediate concrete experience It is the infant’s world that is expenenced by touch, by 
what can be grasped and sucked and by what can be seen and heard For the infant, this 
world is no bigger than the nursery It is also the world o f immediate expenence to 
which adults return, for example, when enjoying the sun with their heads empty of
18 From time immemorial, the question regarding the meaning of “reality” has had a pivotal place in the 
history o f philosophy Juxtaposed with this has been the question concerning the meaning o f “meaning” 
(see Cassidy 2004)
19 For an outline o f cogmtional structure, see chapter two pp65-69
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thoughts Here, meaning is confined to the world of experience, to the world of pleasure 
and pain, to the world o f hunger and thirst As Lonergan notes, “ it is the world of 
immediate expenence, o f given as given, o f image and affect without any perceptible 
intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice 
(Lonergan 1988 pp224-225) In other words, there is no complete cognitional activity 
There is expenence, but no understanding and judging So, what is “expenenced” is 
also what is “meant” In the case o f infants, Lonergan states
When first heanng and speech develop, they are directed to present objects, and 
so meaning initially is confined to a world of immediacy, to a world no bigger 
than the nursery, and seemingly no better known because it is not merely 
expenenced but also meant Then, to all appearances, it is quite correct to say 
that reality comes first and meaning is quite secondary (ibid p232)
3 3 3 The World Mediated by Meaning
In the world o f immediate expenence, it would appear that reality comes first 
and meaning is quite secondary (ibid ) Notwithstanding this, there is a reversal o f roles 
-  as the infant develops for example -  vis-a-vis reality and meaning, which leads to the 
“second world”, 1 e the world mediated by meaning This world begins as an 
enlargement of the world o f immediacy In other words, the infant expenences the 
world beyond the nursery, which is facilitated by pictures, stones, language and other 
channels o f meaning As Lonergan explains
So we come to live, not as the infant in a world o f immediate expenence, but in 
a far vaster world that is brought to us through the memones o f other men, 
through the common sense of the community, through the pages o f literature,
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through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through 
the expenence o f saints, through the mediations o f philosophers and theologians 
(ibid P23 3 )20
In this world, language does not only bnng into focus what is present to the 
infant, but also what is past and what is still to come It makes present what is absent 
and bnngs into the infant’s honzon what is beyond him/her As well as that, the infant 
begins to discover the difference between what is fact and what is merely fiction, 
between what is just a story and what really and truly is the case This leads to the 
second aspect This world mediated by meaning is not the total o f immediate 
expenences We are naturally compelled to ask questions and search for answers in 
order to discover for ourselves what is true and real and not merely hearsay As 
indicated by the act o f self-appropnation descnbed in the previous chapter, the human 
intellect follows its own dynamic process towards understanding and judging through a 
process o f wonder, inquiry and questioning, with vanous spontaneous persistent 
questions that naturally a n se 21 These questions include “What is it9” (expenencing), 
“Why is it7” (understanding), and “Is it so7” (judging) Thus, this world conveyed 
through meaning cannot be grasped by expenence alone but only by the combination of 
expenence, understanding and judgment (ibid p225) In this way, meaning is an “act” 
that goes beyond what is expenenced What is “meant” in the act o f mediating meaning 
is not only “expenenced” but also “understood” and “affirmed” (ibid p233 and 
Lonergan 1990a p77)
20 The Deutsches Museum is one example o f this It gives us access to the achievements of the past, and 
m effect, the accomplishments of the past are immortalised
21 See chapter two pp65-67
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3 3 4 The World Constituted by Meaning
Finally, there is the world constituted by meaning Here, we reach the fourth 
level of intentional consciousness where we decide what actions ought to be done 
Through deliberation and choosing we confer particular actions, institutions, symbols 
and cultures with specific meanings As Lonergan (1990a) puts it “Just as language is 
constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures 
have meanings as intrinsic components” (p78) Languages, art, literature, poetry and 
belief systems involve acts o f bequeathing meaning For instance, the meaning of a 
golden wedding ring does not lie m the quality o f the metal but in its symbolic value 
representing a loving bond and commitment between a man and a woman The meaning 
of the exclusive relationship is acknowledged by society either through a religious nte 
or state event or even both Of course, the ring can (partly) lose its meaning when there 
is a breakdown in the relationship Then, it no longer represents the loving union 
between the couple, although they may be still acknowledged as lawfully mamed in the 
eyes o f the religious community and/or in the eyes of the state A court o f law is also 
constituted by meaning -  a meaning that cannot be detected by the type of building in 
which justice is pronounced The meaning underpinning a country’s constitution cannot 
be measured or calculated Yet, it provides a milieu o f meaningful order for the lives of 
its citizens, although it may be changed or reinterpreted and constituted with new 
meaning, which can often be either transparent or opaque
In this world where meaning is bestowed, emotions play a considerable part 
Although in Insight (1978) Lonergan confines feelings to the first level of cogmtional 
consciousness, there is a shift of emphasis in his later work, especially in Method in 
Theology (1990a) In this work, feelings have a more prominent place when it is 
acknowledged that they orient us in a dynamic way in this world shaped by meaning 
Feelings help us to “apprehend” values “Intermediate between judgements of fact and
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judgements o f value lie the apprehensions of value Such apprehensions are given m 
feelings” (ibid p37) Thus, feelings establish the existential honzon within which our 
constituting judgements o f value, deliberations, choices and deeds take place Instead of 
seeking answers to questions such as “What is it7” and “Is it true9” there is a new set of 
questions in preparation for moral deliberation and action, including “Is it 
worthwhile9”, “What am I to do about it9”, “What must be done to make my world a 
more valuable place9”, which intend a different array of answers A judgement o f fact, 
which is achieved on the third level o f cogmtional performance, is an affirmation of 
what is understood, whereas a judgement o f value is an affirmation of a value In other 
words, we judge whether a particular action is or is not w orthy22 The judgement of 
value is concerned with what is truly meaningful and worthy o f action
It is through the act o f knowing that I constitute myself as a knower within the 
world mediated by meaning It is through the act o f evaluating, that I constitute myself 
as a moral subject and a moral agent performing actions motivated by value within the 
world constituted by meaning We constantly constitute ourselves and our world 
through moral choices and actions As Lonergan puts it, “ the development of 
knowledge and the development o f moral feeling lead to the existential discovery, the 
discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between 
courses o f action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an 
unauthentic one” (ibid p38) Therefore, this affirmation of value is intrinsic to the 
world constituted by meaning
The world mediated by meaning points to the fact that the world has meaning 
that is capable o f being expenenced, understood and judged respectively It can 
therefore be communicated and interpreted through language The world constituted by
22 See Doorley’s (1996) analysis o f feeling (p74) For Doorley, there is a difference in mtentionahty 
regarding a judgment of fact and a judgement of value He writes, “the intention o f a question for 
reflection is reality The intention o f a question for deliberation is value whether such value exists or not ”
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meaning and motivated by value, points to the fact that the world is capable of being 
valued In some current epistemological and moral debates, for instance, the very act of 
mediating meaning is placed m doubt in the search for absolute certainty freed from any 
subjective errors As well as that, the world constituted by meaning regarding moral 
values is seen as our projection onto a world that has no basis m reality itself The 
perennial debate between the moral realists and anti-realists reflects this problem 23 
Conversely, if we follow Lonergan’s cntical realist approach to meaning, it would 
appear that m our interaction with reality, we are involved m acts o f mediating and 
constituting meaning -  a perspective from which we cannot simply escape from in a 
quest for neutral, value free facts about the world and the person
To summarise Lonergan’s thought, our first contact with the world is through the 
world o f immediate experience This is later mediated by meaning, whereby our contact 
to the world is extended and enriched Furthermore, this world is also shaped by 
meaning and stirred by value Following from this, as it shall be explained later, an 
aesthetic concept of person does neither rely merely on the world o f immediacy nor on 
the world mediated by meaning, but must be placed in the context o f the world 
constituted by meaning and motivated by value However, Lonergan’s dual use o f the 
word “meaning” -  that which is mediated and constituted -  can at times appear a little 
indistinct and therefore difficult to grasp Thus, in order to throw light on his work and 
to provide another avenue towards an aesthetic presentation o f the concept o f person, I 
will turn to Taylor’s work on significance, language and human agency I think that 
Taylor is more refined than Lonergan in his use o f the term “meaning” He tends to use 
the word “meaning” for the meaning that is mediated (for example, meaning that is
However, Doorley quickly avoids the charge of subjectivism by arguing that although discovery of value 
is subject dependent, the content o f value is not (ibid pp74-75)
23 The moral realists are committed to the view that moral knowledge is grounded in moral facts and 
properties, which are independent of people’s beliefs and attitudes concerning what is morally nght and 
wrong In contrast to this approach, the moral anti-realists argue that moral claims do not really make 
assertions about objective facts but rather they express the agent’s attitudes or feelings They argue that
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mediated through language) and uses the words “significance” and “import” instead to 
describe the meaning that is constituted. This can be observed in his examination o f the 
representative and significance views of consciousness, to which I now turn.
3.4 Significance, Human Agency and Language
3.4.1 The Representative and Significance View of Consciousness
Firstly, Taylor acknowledges the contemporary understandings o f the concept of 
person. He states that the person is defined as a thinking, feeling, deciding and relating 
being with moral status, who is a bearer of rights (Taylor 1985a p97). Indeed, at the 
backbone of his/her moral status are certain capacities. The person is a being who has a 
sense of self, a notion of the future and the past, and who can make choices. However, 
Taylor is more nuance that Tooley, for example, in that he believes that a person must 
be the kind of being who possesses these capacities, at least, however damaged those 
capacities may be in practice (ibid. p97 and p i 03).24
Secondly, Taylor argues that the various contemporary concepts of person place 
emphasis on the representative perspective o f consciousness. This representative 
perspective purports consciousness to be a faculty that enables us to form inner 
representations of objects; to represent different life plans, to consider different options 
and to envisage different possibilities (ibid. p i04 and Taylor 1985b p261).25 It stresses 
the person’s capability o f strategic planning and herein lies the striking superiority of 
persons compared to non-persons. The person can frame a representation o f something, 
which is there independently o f his/her depiction of it (Taylor 1985a p i 04). So, a person
moral statements can neither be true nor false because there are no moral facts or true moral claims which 
exist independently o f the agent. See also Taylor’s (2000) study for more information about this debate.
24 For an outline o f Michael Tooley’s philosophy of the person, see chapter two pp71-74.
25 As maintained by Taylor’s (1975) investigation, this stance is rooted in the seventeenth-century 
epistemological view of the person. Namely, the person is a being with consciousness, and consciousness 
is understood to be a power that represents objects in the act o f knowing (p8).
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is a being with consciousness and consciousness is understood to be a faculty that 
makes representations o f things
One consequence of this is that the representative view of consciousness ignores 
the fact that persons are agents who are constituted by significances and who constitute 
expenences with significance Taylor calls this the significance view of consciousness 
This is the work of consciousness, not in the sense o f representing objects, but rather in 
the sense of forming and being formed by expenences, which have significance In 
other words, persons are agents who have certain ends towards which they are inclined 
and which contnbute to their sense of meaning (Taylor 1985b p218)26 This viewpoint 
places emphasis on the person being an agent with mtnnsic purposes S/he has certain 
ends towards which s/he is inclined and which contnbute to his/her sense of meaning In 
other words, persons are beings who have particular purposes that have special 
significance for them Thus, the significance view focuses on the nature of human 
agency27 What is crucial about agents is that things do matter to them, i e they can 
attnbute purposes, desires, as well as aversions to objects It gives them a perspective to 
understand the world and themselves In this way, consciousness, from the significance 
aspect, enables persons to have an articulated view of themselves and of their world 
when it presents issues o f concern that seem to be unique to them as persons 
Interestingly, Taylor writes that “consciousness -  perhaps we might better here say 
language -  is as it were the medium within which they [human concerns] first anse as 
concerns for us The medium here is in some way inseparable from the content, which 
is why our self-understanding m this domain is constitutive o f what we feel” (Taylor
26 Taylor (1985a) acknowledges that “this alternative conception of meaning that I now want to look at is 
the one that comes to us through Herder and Humboldt, in different ways also through Hamann, and has 
been taken up in our day by Heidegger and others I could call it the ‘Romantic’ theory, or family of 
theories, I could call it ‘expressive,5 which is a term I have used elsewhere But maybe the best policy is 
to avoid any descriptive mode of reference, and call it simply the triple-H theory” (pp255-256)
27 Here we can observe the influences of Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Taylor’s work According to 
Charles Guignon (1990), Taylor’s reading of Wittgenstein and Heidegger is in line with the overall 
direction of their thought (pp649-672)
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1985a pl03) In this sense, consciousness-cum-language is constitutive o f these matters 
o f significance In other words, the very structure o f our thinking and the words we use 
to express our thinking shape the way we value the world Thus, we are made for 
significance I think that this is well illustrated in Paul Auster’s (1989) thought- 
provokmg novel Moon Palace -  albeit perhaps not a deliberate reference to Taylor’s 
work -  when the mam character Marco Stanley Fogg realises that “the world enters us 
through our eyes, but we cannot make sense o f it until it descends into our mouths” 
(pl 24)
3 4 2 Self-Interpreting Animals
Taylor elucidates this significance view of consciousness by explaining that 
when persons establish the significance of X they do not determine a neutral fact about 
it For instance, when they attempt to describe their emotions, persons try to make sense 
of the situation They experience the situation as not having a neutral property but as 
having a particular significance for them Taylor describes this non-neutral property as 
an import, l e something m the situation, which persons identify as being important to 
their desires or purposes, aspirations or feelings Something that makes them feel the 
way that they do (Taylor 1985a p48) An import is “ a way in which something can 
be relevant or o f importance to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings o f a 
subject, or otherwise put, a property o f something whereby it is a matter o f non- 
mdifference to a subject” (ib id) Imports include the feeling o f shame, dignity, guilt, 
pnde, admiration, contempt, moral obligation, remorse, unworthiness, self-hatred and, 
perhaps, self-acceptance (ibid p59) When persons identify the import of a situation 
they pick out something m the situation that provides the basis for their feelings (ibid 
p49) Imports are subject-referring because they refer uniquely to persons, incorporating 
a sense o f what is important for them However, this does not necessanly imply that the
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relation between the emotion and the import is one o f simple equivalence (see ibid 
p50) For instance, I can feel ashamed, even though I clearly understand that the feeling 
is unfounded Conversely, it is not the case that there is no relation between the emotion 
and the import at all As Taylor explains, “ it is that experiencing the emotion is 
experiencing our situation as bearing a certain import, where this is compatible in some 
cases with recognizing that the situation does not bear this import, and withholding 
intellectual assent from the judgement that it does” (ib id ) Thus, persons feel compelled 
to explain to themselves why they are affected by the situation and whether their 
feelings have any justification or a rational basis When persons articulate a subject- 
referring import, their emotions partly change Their emotions are partly transformed by 
their language As Taylor puts it, “Verstehen is a Seinsmodus” (“Understanding is a 
mode o f being”) (ibid p72) 28 Persons are deeply engaged with their lives That is why 
articulation o f the emotion(s) is extremely important for them
Following on from this, Taylor highlights the fact that the human person is a 
self-interpreting animal (ibid p45) 29 Persons are partly constituted by self- 
mterpretation, that is, by their expenence and interpretation o f the imports which have 
an affect on them (ibid p72) 30 Language characterises what they feel and, at the same 
time, it attempts to be loyal to that very feeling Persons choose words and expressions 
that most accurately descnbe their emotions Consequently, emotion is mdivisibly 
connected to speech and vice versa Feelings are partly constituted by meaning 
articulated through speech and this articulation, in turn, can shape the meaning of the 
feeling, i e they are formed by the language in which they are disclosed To put it 
another way, our becoming more aware of what we feel alters what we feel Taylor 
clanfies this by giving the example of the feeling of guilt We can overcome some
28 Translated by Alan J Kearns
29 Taylor (1985a) acknowledges his source to be Martin Heidegger (p45)
30 Taylor (1985a) writes that “ human life is never without interpreted feeling, the interpretation is 
constitutive o f the feeling” (p63)
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confused or inchoate feeling of guilt when we talk about it and realise, perhaps, that it is 
unfounded Thus, we begin to feel different about it The quality o f the feeling o f guilt 
can change and it may disappear altogether If it remains, it does not have the same hold 
on us as before In this way, understanding the emotion enables us to transform the 
emotion As well as that, each person can acquire and develop an extensive word 
power, and accordingly his/her understanding and experience of his/her emotions can 
change and become more refined This does not imply that people simply change 
because their ideas about themselves change However, when we articulate the feeling 
of affection such as “I love you” or “I am jealous”, this articulation does not only 
express the emotion but also partly forms the emotion (ibid p71) I think that another 
example which demonstrates this is the expenence of sickness that is often articulated 
by the term “common cold” We can change the significance o f how this affects us 
personally by using various speech acts such as “I have a terrible cold’” compared to “I 
have a cold” The intensifying adjective “terrible” amplifies the negative expenence of 
having a cold The act of interpreting an emotion is not an optional extra but is an 
indispensable component of our existence32
Ontologically, the human person is a self-interpreting animal because this 
articulation-cum-mterpretation flows from his/her very being Therefore, the act o f self- 
interpreting shows that there can be no “pure” empirical access to human reality, which 
is not clothed m an interpretative framework Human reality is an interpreted reality 
whereby the world has normative and evaluative aspects (Hallamaa 1994 p243)
31 In this case, the representative theory of consciousness cannot apply because we cannot represent the 
emotion o f guilt in the same way as an object (Taylor 1985a plO l and p270) Taylor claims that “ when 
we come to articulate a feeling in a new way, it frequently is true to say that the feeling also changes It 
is just that one change is essentially linked to the other, because self-understanding is constitutive o f 
feeling” (Taylor 1985a p270) Lonergan (1990) also acknowledges that emotions, although primarily 
spontaneous reactions, can be clarified, endorsed or controlled when they are articulated He says that “ 
once they [feelings] have arisen, they may be reinforced by advertence and approval, and they may be 
curtailed by disapproval and distraction” (p32)
32 This is not to imply that all emotion is sensory In his analysis o f the apprehension of value by feelmg, 
Lonergan places emotion on the fourth level rather than on the first level o f consciousness
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Emotions only have imports for agents who aspire to dignity and who aspire to 
be accepted in society. The import “shameful” would have no meaning in a world in 
which there were no beings that could experience it. In other words, the experience and 
articulation of an emotion can reflect the moral situation. A feeling cannot be one of 
remorse unless there is a sense of having done wrong.33 For that reason, some 
understanding of what is morally right and wrong is built into the experience of 
remorse. For that reason, it is not possible for persons to have an impartial awareness of 
what is morally good or true. For instance, remorse presupposes that persons can apply 
the terms “right” and “wrong”; shame requires that persons can apply terms “worthy” 
and “unworthy”. In this way persons use a vocabulary of worth (Taylor 1985a p24).34 
The feelings o f guilt, shame and remorse encompass an articulation, implying an 
interpretation, which may demand further articulation. As with the feeling of guilt, the 
feeling of remorse may dissipate if  we come to see that it is tenuous or it may be 
modified depending on how we come to understand it (ibid. p63).35 Nonetheless, this is 
not to suggest that people are always aware o f what is remorse and what is shameful.36 
The quality o f awareness depends on the attunement o f their affective awareness, which 
brings us to the next part in Taylor’s philosophical anthropology: The ability to evaluate 
desires.
33 As has been already shown, for Bergson this is the static morality o f the closed society. See chapter one 
?4p 3 7 "4 2 -
4 Taylor (1985a) acknowledges that where there is articulacy there is the possibility of a plurality of 
visions. It follows from this, o f course, that people with very different cultural vocabularies have quite 
different kinds o f feelings, aspirations, sensibilities, experience different moral and other demands, and so 
on (p271). However, the interpretative framework from which we operate is universal. Taylor (1988) 
writes: “I believe that what we are as human agents is profoundly interpretation-dependent, that human 
beings in different cultures can be radically diverse, in keeping with their fundamentally different self- 
understandings. But I think that a constant is to be found in the shape o f the questions that all cultures 
must address” (p299). This proffers a possible answer to the objection that if moral realism was true, then 
there would be no plurality o f ethics.
35 As maintained by Arne Johan Vetlesen (1994), self-interpreting animals are “ ... beings partly 
constituted by the way that being is interpreted by that being itse lf’ ( p i72).
36 As Taylor (1985a) notes: “I may be lamentably insensitive to it” (p53).
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3.4.3 The Act of Strong Evaluation
As contended by Taylor, persons do not only articulate and interpret emotions 
but they evaluate them as well. With this, he distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” 
acts o f evaluation (ibid. p i6). With the former (i.e. weak evaluation), persons are 
concerned with the outcome of their actions; with the latter (i.e. strong evaluation), 
persons are concerned with the moral worth of their motivation to act. For instance, in 
the weak evaluation scenario, I may choose a holiday in the south o f France and forego 
buying a new BMW, not because there is something more worthy about a relaxing 
holiday in France than being able to have a luxury car, but because I have more desire 
for it (ibid. p i 7). With weak evaluation, one desired alternative is set-aside on the 
grounds o f its contingent incompatibility with a more desired one. Taylor rues the fact 
that this weak evaluation is employed by our “rationalist” society when it turns practical 
reflection into calculation (ibid).
Strong evaluation, on the other side of the coin, takes a different route. Here, 
there is the recognition of goods that have intrinsic worth, i.e. goods that are not valued 
insofar as they are objects of choice or desire but that are valued because they are ends 
towards which we ought to seek (Taylor 1985b p266).38 I may choose to refrain from 
committing some cowardly act, although very tempted to do so, not because the act at 
this moment would make any other desired act impossible, as a holiday would make a 
new car unfeasible, but rather because the act itself is cowardly. Therefore, emphasis is 
placed on the moral worth of the motivation itself and not on its contingent
37 As Taylor (1989) remarks, there is an “ ...essential link between identity and a kind o f orientation. To 
know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or 
bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and 
secondary” (p28).
38 Taylor (1985b) acknowledges that he is influenced by Harry Frankfurt’s analysis o f second-order 
desires (pp65-66). Frankfurt (1971) describes strong evaluation as “second-order” evaluation. In 
Frankfurt’s analysis, evaluation entails possessing second-order desires whereby we evaluate our first- 
order desires, i.e. we evaluate our primary desires as being morally good or bad. Frankfurt maintains that 
“someone has a desire o f the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when 
he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations o f the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires
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compatibility with other options In the act o f strong evaluation, the language of 
evaluative distinctions is used by which different desires are descnbed as either being 
good or bad, moral or immoral (Taylor 1985a p l9  and p65) On this basis, qualitative 
discriminations between desires and goals, between what is good and dishonourable can 
be made
3 4 4 Language and Public Space
As it can be seen, language has a vital role to play in Taylor’s analysis of the 
concept of person as a self-interpreting agent39 He illustrates that persons cannot avoid 
using language when they think about their lives, their relationships and when they 
make various life plans What Taylor’s examination shows is “to study persons is to 
study beings who only exist m, or are partly constituted by, a certain language” (Taylor 
1989 pp34-35) 40 According to Taylor, language facilitates those human emotions It 
makes it possible for emotions to be experienced more deeply and to be expressed As a 
result, Taylor points to two major approaches to the study of language Firstly, the 
designative approach that contends that words have meaning by virtue of their pointing 
to what they designate Secondly, the expressive approach maintains that language 
expresses thought and perception (Taylor 1985a p218) In the designate approach we 
relate the sentence about the object it designates, whereas in the expressive approach we 
relate the sentence to the thought it expresses (ibid pp218-219) For example, from the
‘second-order volitions’ or ‘volitions of the second order ’ Now it is having second-order volitions, and 
not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person” (plO)
39 The question o f meaning not only penetrates the enterprise of philosophy but also the study of 
language Taylor (1985a) states that “ the twentieth-century concern for language is a concern about 
meaning” (p216) Allott (2001) claims that “although the role o f language in the formation o f human 
reality was an obsessive subject o f study m the twentieth century, the general problem of the nature and 
origin o f language is as old as philosophy, and as crucial as ever in humanity’s never-ending search for 
self-awareness The human world is a world of words Nouns and names rule our minds We live and die 
for words” (p66)
40 In Taylor’s (1985a) eyes, “ language is no longer merely the external clothing of thought, nor a 
simple instrument which ought in principle to be fully in our control and oversight It is more like a 
medium m which we are plunged, and which we cannot fully plumb The difficulty is compounded in that 
it is not just the medium in virtue o f which we can describe the world, but also that in virtue of which we 
are capable of the human emotions and o f standing in specifically human relations to each other” (p235)
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designate perspective, the sentence “The book is on the table” answers the question, 
“Where is the book7” From the expressive perspective, the sentence “The book is on the 
table” answers the more anxious question “Where have I left that book7” Therefore, the 
statement “The book is on the table” does not only designate a book and a table in 
relation but it also expresses my perception that the book is on the table (ibid ) The 
designative and expressive theories are not mutually exclusive, but rather they answer 
different questions (ibid p220) As Taylor notes, “expressions make our feelings 
manifest, they put us in the presence of people’s feelings” (ibid p219) The view that 
feelings are partly transformed to some extent by the act o f self-interpretation is rooted 
in this expressive theory of language As it has been shown, if  we express our feelings, 
we give them a reflective dimension that realises and partly transforms them (ibid 
p233)
Taylor’s study demonstrates that language has been traditionally understood to 
be a tool for designating and communicating information about objects In contrast to 
this, according to Taylor, we should appreciate language as a medium through which 
“public space” is exposed Language enables us to place the phenomena that surround 
us into focus and into perspective (ibid p264) Taylor clarifies this by giving the 
example of a crammed full bus If I get onto a crowded bus on a hot day and say to a 
fellow-passenger, “Hot, isn’t it9”, my statement is neither a communication of 
information nor is it a question Instead, it expresses that expenence which is shared 
between us The hotness o f the day that is intensified by the uncomfortable condition of 
standing in a bus (ibid p259) The expression fosters a kind of rapport between us by 
pointing to the existential space that is shared between us and in which we stand 
(Guignon 1993 p662) This is one of the ways language enables us to put things into 
public space When I express something, the matter in question is no longer confined to 
me, or to my private world, but it is made public and becomes an issue for all o f us
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Accordingly, it provides the medium through which some of our most important 
concerns can be discussed openly (Taylor 1985a p260)41 The designative view fails to 
take this into account
In the mechanistic view of reality, as with human reason, language is 
mstrumentalised and subsequently has an effect on how the world and the person are 
understood Language is now understood to be an instrument of control by which ideas 
and things of the world are grouped together into different classes of designations (ibid 
p224) Words have meaning insofar as they designate something Consequently, 
language is seen as an instrument of control in gaming knowledge of the world through 
an objective scientific process In order to be objective, language must be totally 
transparent and devoid o f any “mystery” (ibid p226)42 With expressivism, language is 
not envisaged to be a collection of words but rather the capacity to express and therefore 
to realise that which is expressed43 In concrete terms, persons can express experiences 
that are endowed with significance and, by virtue o f this expression, they can partly 
constitute experiences with new significance Thus, in this way, what is expressed is 
realised For example, the expression, “I love you” -  if  it is really meant -  does not only
41 That is why, for Taylor (1989), the “se lf’ exists in, what he describes as the “web o f interlocution”, 
because when we express something we do not only place it into focus for clarification, but we take it 
from our private world and we place it into public space, thereby creating a community o f common 
understanding (p36) As Wittgenstein once remarked, ‘ to imagine a language means to imagine a form of 
life” (cited in Taylor 1985a p281)
42 By “mystery”, Taylor (1985a) means the fact that human beings are the only language animals who 
create music, art, dance and other symbolic activities (p248) Taylor acknowledges Herder’s On the 
Origin o f  Language as one of the principal texts that established expressivism Taylor points out that, 
according to Herder, it is Condillac who presupposes „das ganze Ding Sprache schon vor der ersten Seite 
seines Buches erfunden “ [The whole thing language has already been invented before the first page of his 
book ] His explanation amounts to saying ,,es enstanden [sic] Worte, well Worte da waren, ehe sie da 
waren“ [There words came into existence, because there were words before they were there] (ibid p227) 
Translated by Alan J Kearns
43 Conversely, not only does language learning presuppose a general capacity, but this capacity 
presupposes the possession of a language, placed within the language community In fact Taylor (1985a) 
contends that “ language as a whole is presupposed in any one o f its parts ” In other words, language 
must cohere with the established convention o f the language community so that it can be communicated 
and understood (p230) Taylor also states, “what then does language come to be on this view? A pattern 
of activity, by which we express/realize a certain way of being in the world, that of reflective awareness, 
but a pattern which can only be deployed against a background which we can never fully dominate, and 
yet a background that we are never fully dominated by, because we are constantly reshaping it” (p232) 
Personally, I think that it is correct that we do not invent the capacity for language But we constantly 
develop, invent, remvent, the content o f a particular language
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express the experience that is constituted with the significance of affection but it may 
place the experience onto a new level.
3.4.5 Against Speciesism
The objection is raised that this connection between human agency, significance 
and language is a type of speciesism. Are only human language animals capable of 
feeling shameful and undignified? In response to this objection, Taylor (1985a) makes 
the argument that it is a community of conversation, whether potentially or actually, 
which enables persons to express feelings partly shaped by language (p69). Secondly, 
human language animals have an array o f significances that have no counterpart in 
animals (Taylor 1985b p263). For instance, shame is one import that is not shared by 
animals. This is not because human language animals possess greater self-awareness 
compared to animals but rather that the feeling o f shame is something that is felt as a 
“standard” and only humans possess this feeling (ibid. p264). By naming something as 
shameful, we universalise it, to some extent, so that others can recognise their emotion 
as an instance of shame. Thus, it becomes a standard (ibid.). As we have seen, language 
helps us to put our feelings and thoughts into focus. Now, it is exactly this articulated 
focusing that enables us to be conscious of certain standards. Moreover, the essence of 
the act o f strong evaluation is grounded in the ability to be sensitive to certain standards, 
which are markedly human. Our sense of self is the sense of where we stand in relation 
to these standards. But, in order to be open to these standards we have to have language 
(Taylor 1985a p262).44 Therefore, the expressive function o f language is threefold: (1) it 
articulates the import and makes it explicit; (2) it places the matter (e.g. shame) out in
44 However, this is not to imply that individuals are always aware o f themselves evaluating certain goods 
as morally good or reprehensible. For Taylor, strongly evaluated goods can have an affective influence on 
human behaviour regardless of whether or not they are made explicit through articulation. See Ruth 
Abbey’s (2000) commentary on this issue (pp9-54). For her, there is a tension “ ...between Taylor’s 
concession that individuals can be moved by moral judgements that they are not fully aware o f and his
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the open, in public space and becomes a standard and (3) it discriminates between what 
is fundamental to human concerns, and hence opens us to these concerns (ibid p263) 
Thus, we can recognise an instance of shame and acknowledge it to be a human 
concern
Animals do follow standards as well, but in a weaker sense Taylor gives the 
example o f his cat that refuses to eat fishmeal that is below a certain quality (ibid 
p261) In this sense, Taylor’s cat has a certain standard However, it is misleading to say 
that the cat itself is aware o f the standard of the fishmeal as a standard “Below quality”, 
for example, is an expression that is employed to place the situation into focus Thus, 
animals are agents in a weak sense because they are not aware o f standards as standards 
(ibid p i 02)
Like human beings, animals have strong original purposes -  things that do 
matter to them In this sense, it can be said that animals have purposes that are intrinsic 
to the nature o f their very being It is this, from the point o f view of agency, which 
distinguishes both humans and animals from machines There are things that do matter 
to persons and to animals but not to computers, for instance In this way, both humans 
and animals are agents Yet, human beings are different to animals in their mode of 
agency Human beings have qualitatively different concerns that are not shared by 
animals There are certain matters of significance for human beings, which are 
especially human, and have no counterpart m animals Those include pride, shame, 
moral goodness, evil, dignity, the sense of worth, friendship and the vanous human 
forms of love
Compared to humans and animals, machines are not directed to strong original 
purposes However, humans attribute different purposes to different machines (ibid
claim that one o f the ways in which the capacity for strong evaluation distinguishes humans from animals 
is by according them some responsibility for who they are” (p21)
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p i 04) 45 As Bergson’s work shows, human beings invent and develop new technologies 
to fulfil their needs, which drives the creative revolution in health care
For Taylor, human purposes have an ontological dimension They flow from our 
very humanity Therefore, what distinguishes humans from animals and machines, 
cannot merely be intelligence -  animals can perform activities which are intelligent and 
machines can perform pre-programmed tasks that are intelligent But the very being of 
humans provides a source o f unique purposes that finds no parallel in the animal 
kingdom and in the world o f technology 46
To summarise Taylor’s thought, some of our emotions involve import 
ascriptions, i e matters o f significance Some of these emotions are subject referring, 
l e only human linguistic animals have them These feelings are constituted by our 
articulations because the articulations are de facto  interpretations Consequently, 
language is essential because it enables persons to articulate their feelings and to make 
them clearer and more refined From this viewpoint, language captures and partly 
constitutes emotion Persons interpret their emotions at the same time as they 
experience them Thus, the person is a self-interpreting anim al47
3 5 The Concept of Person within an Aesthetic Presentation 
3 5 1 Towards an Aesthetic Presentation
Having presented Lonergan’s and Taylor’s work regarding the meaning of 
“meaning” and the person’s capacity to access reality communicated and shaped by 
meaning, I am now m a position to interface their philosophies m order to provide a
45 However, Abbey (2000) points out that Taylor would accept the fact that technology can shape our 
purposes But she qualifies this by stating that “the difference is that, no matter what historical influences 
shape them, humans are the originators of purposes for themselves in a way that machines are not” (p63)
46 For Taylor, only human agents can be moral beings on whom moral obligations can be placed An 
animal can take the place o f a moral addressee and, thus, be given some moral standing, although it is not 
a moral agent
47 For a picture-view of Taylor’s philosophy of the person, see appendix C p236
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context for an aesthetic presentation of the concept of person the recaptunng of the 
concept of person in the context of meaningful reality
Although they approach the issue o f meaning from different perspectives -  
Lonergan from the point o f view of intentional analysis and Taylor from the point o f 
view of agency and language -  their work points to universal aspects from which a 
concept o f person can be developed On the one hand, Lonergan places the access to 
reality mediated by meaning on the first three levels o f intentional consciousness vis-a- 
vis experience, understanding, judging, as formulated by his cogmtional theory This is 
consciousness from the representative view, which enables us to form inner 
representation of objects On the other hand, when Lonergan speaks about reality 
constituted by meaning, he is speaking about the affective apprehension of values 
through feeling that is evaluated by the workings o f the fourth level o f intentional 
consciousness This enables us to deliberate, choose and act morally We have seen that 
Taylor uses the terms significance and import to describe this meaning that is 
constituted Thus, this is consciousness from the aspect o f significance Taylor, like 
Lonergan, also acknowledges the central aspect that emotions have for agents when 
detecting an import in a situation The language we employ to articulate and to interpret 
emotion, which in turn shapes this emotion and the agent experiencing it, constitutes the 
import
For Lonergan, the person is open to meaning, not only by way o f immediate 
experience, not only by way of mediated meaning but also by way of meaning that is 
constituted For Taylor, the person is open to meaning not only by way of pre- 
articulated expenence, not only by way of representative consciousness but also by way 
of the significance view of consciousness 48 Persons are not only interpreters of 
experiences, but by virtue o f interpreting, they themselves become partly interpreted As
48 Taylor (1985a) states “ We experience our pre-articulate emotion as perplexing, as raising a question 
And this is an experience that no non-language animal can have” (p74)
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it has been stated, the person articulates what s/he feels by using words and expressions, 
and, yet at the same time, his/her language attempts to be loyal to those feelings These 
articulations do not only interpret the emotion but partly constitute it as well This 
articulation-cum-mterpretation pours forth from the very being o f the person
From this aesthetic presentation of the concept of person -  the concept of person 
in the context of reality mediated by meaning and constituted by significance -  it can be 
said that the person is a self-interpreting animal immersed in meaningful reality The 
person interacts with reality by constituting experiences and by being constituted by the 
same experiences The person takes part in strong evaluation whereby s/he identifies the 
import of those expenences that have intrinsic worth by employing language of 
evaluative distinctions and standards that are unique to him/her including dignity, 
shame and guilt Therefore, from the perspective of an aesthetic presentation of the 
concept o f person, being a person is not grounded solely on the capacity to construct 
and intend reality as an object in the exercise o f rational consciousness, but being a 
person is to be involved in reality that is meaningful The concept o f person is an 
interpretive reality (both mediated and constituted) It is not a value-free concept and 
cannot be analysed in a vacuum
If the “first world” of immediate experience where “experience” equals 
“meaning” is only accepted, then it could be misleading to think that the person is only 
a biological entity that has various biochemical processes enabling it to function If we 
believe that what is real is mediated via rational consciousness, then we could be given 
the wrong impression that it is this very capacity for the exercise o f rational 
consciousness -  that enables persons to mediate meaning -  for example, which makes a 
person a person In this view, the person is the sum o f his/her parts, 1 e in possession of 
consciousness, a concept o f self and a sense o f time However, if  one accepts the first 
two worlds together with the capacity to constitute and be constituted by meaning, then
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one can see that the person is not only engaged in acts o f meaning but also in acts of 
constituting and being constituted by significance Here, one can appreciate that the 
person is an agent who is open to particular significances, which are uniquely human, 
and which are self-constitutmg
Before moving on to provide a definition of the concept o f person, I would like 
to add a further dimension to this aesthetic presentation What is often forgotten is that 
persons are not only independent but they are also dependent and vulnerable beings 
The Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) reminds us that it is to others that 
we owe our survival This awareness o f our dependency on others for survival is 
heightened when we are struck by illness and/or injury Then we become dependent on 
others for protection and sustenance in a very real sense In this case, we also become 
vulnerable because we are automatically placed at risk to others, who may choose not 
sustain and protect but to debilitate and harm us 49 Dependency can expose us to the nsk 
o f being harmed by others, especially if we cannot defend or protect ourselves
Our dependency and vulnerability is most explicit in childhood and in old age 
(MacIntyre 1999 p i)  Yet, m our contemporary fast-moving world, it is difficult to 
accept the conditions o f dependency and vulnerability Indeed, this is most clearly 
witnessed by the language that is employed to descnbe the condition o f disability that 
symbolises the most intense forms of dependency and vulnerability There is a tendency 
to use the language of “them” as opposed to “us” when speaking of disability (ibid p2) 
For MacIntyre, this kind of discourse demonstrates that those with disabilities belong to 
a class separate from us We do not see disability as a reflection o f ourselves when we 
were dependent and vulnerable as children or when we become dependent and 
vulnerable in old age (ibid) With this thought, MacIntyre reminds us that there are 
periods in our lives when we find ourselves to be extremely dependent and vulnerable
49 Derek Sellman (2005) argues that “vulnerability is part o f the human condition ” (p3) Indeed, it is a 
“self-evident truth” (ib id )
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and, thus, we are “disabled” in different ways and in different degrees (ibid p73) He 
wntes, “ there is a scale of disability on which we all find ourselves Disability is a 
matter of more or less, both in respect of degree of disability and in respect of the time 
periods in which we are disabled And at different periods of our lives we find 
ourselves, often unpredictably, at very different points on that scale” (ibid) For 
MacIntyre, human beings are dependent and vulnerable animals However, it is this 
very dependency and vulnerability that we find hard to accept in present-day society
3 5 2 A Definition of Person
From this aesthetic presentation o f the concept o f person, I am now in the 
position to outline what I think ought to be included in a definition o f the concept of 
person For me, the person is a s e l f  interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living 
within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance Firstly, this 
implies that the person interprets his/her expenences and is shaped by those 
interpretations This act o f interpretation is rational because it is the result o f the 
person’s cogmtional activity, which does not only seek to understand the expenence but 
also judges whether the understanding is correct For instance, when s/he expenences an 
emotion and understands it to be an expenence o f shame, s/he can rationally judge 
whether the feeling is justified or not Furthermore, s/he has the capacity to decide what 
ought to be done about this expenence Secondly, the person is dependent S/he cannot 
rely totally on him/herself but needs others in order to survive This dependency takes 
many forms and demonstrates the vulnerability o f human reality From the beginning of 
life to the early young adult years, and even beyond it, the person is dependent on 
his/her parents or guardians The person is dependent on others for work and income 
The person is dependent on the environment A Person needs water, food and oxygen in 
order to survive S/he shares this dependency on the environment with others Thirdly,
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the person lives within a world mediated by meaning The person is a language animal 
Persons communicate through verbal language and other non-verbal linguistic symbols 
and signs Finally, persons inhabit the world constituted by significance Persons 
constitute experiences with significance Through self-interpreting persons shape the 
significance o f their lives and give meamngful shape to cultures, languages and 
religions
My definition o f person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal 
living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance could 
be understood as a working definition The individual does not necessanly have to 
activate all aspects o f the definition completely in order to be deemed to be a person 
Indeed, some individuals may only display shades o f the ascription at any given time 
For example, there may be times when the individual is not engaged in self-interpreting 
but is still a dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance The importance o f this will be further analysed 
and spelt out in the next chapter
3 6 Conclusion -  The Need for an Instructive Presentation
The Sufi “Parable o f the Blind Bom” urges us not to reduce reality to a number 
o f parts In the case o f the elephant, it is neither the trunk nor the tail that makes the 
elephant In a similar fashion, in the investigation o f the concept o f person, there is a 
risk o f concentrating on certain traits and properties and calling that personhood In 
light o f this, I have argued for an aesthetic presentation, which does not restrict the 
concept o f person to certain traits but situates it in the context o f our access to 
meaningful reality I have demonstrated that human reality is an interpreted reality 
How we understand ourselves and our world is quintessential to our self-identity and, 
therefore, to our existence Since this self-interpretation has an impact on our actions,
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we cannot examine the concept o f person from the impartial neutral standpoint o f a 
spectator This is the weakness o f a mechanistic quest for absolute certainty freed from 
possible subjective miscalculations Self-interpretation is an ongoing, never-ending 
activity on the part of the person Even the changes in the concept of person -  from the 
scholastic to the modem and contemporary views -  demonstrate that the understanding 
o f personhood does not take place in a vacuum The way one talks about personhood 
constitutes the significance o f personhood An articulation implies an interpretation 
The Sufi parable reminds us that the reality o f meaning and significance cannot be fully 
grasped or broken down into various categones
In chapter two the question was raised as to whether the contemporary concepts 
of person (as represented by Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt) reflect the static morality 
o f a closed society or the dynamic morality of an open society My concept of person as 
a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated 
by meaning and constituted by significance also faces the same question Does my 
concept o f person mirror the static morality of a closed society7 Does my concept of 
person nsk falling into the trap of Sufi blindness7 Can the so-called non-persons or 
those on the peripheral of personhood (e g embryos, infants and PVS patients) be 
included in my concept of person? In the next chapter, I tackle those questions in the 
context of, what I describe as, an instructive presentation of the concept o f person
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4. An Instructive Presentation 
of the Concept of Person
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4 1 Introduction -  The Little Prince & A “Grumpy Old Woman”
Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s timeless story o f The Little Prince demonstrates, 
among other things, how the world is seen from the eyes o f a child and from the eyes of 
a grown-up For instance, when he was a child he showed his drawing of a “boa 
constrictor” having swallowed an elephant to a grown-up He was initially womed that 
the grown-up would be frightened by his picture However, his fear was surprisingly 
relieved when the grown-up asked him why anyone should be frightened by his drawing 
of a hat (Samt-Exupery 1999 ppS-ô)1 When he tried a second time to improve on his 
sketch by drawing an elephant inside the “boa constrictor”, the grown-up advised him to 
study more useful subjects of “consequence” such as geography, history, arithmetic and 
grammar and not to waste his time drawing pictures As a child, Saint-Exupery operated 
out of a world mediated by meaning through pictures but grown-ups found it difficult to 
understand his world It would seem that the grown-ups restricted their reality to the 
mediation of meaning via academic studies that have “consequences” As Saint- 
Exupéry explains
Grown-ups love figures When you tell them that you have made a new friend, 
they never ask you any questions about essential matters They never say to you, 
‘What does his voice sound like7 Does he collect butterflies7’ Instead, they 
demand ‘How old is he7 How many brothers has he7’ Only from these 
figures do they think they have learned anything about him (ibid ppl5-16)
One of the stones Saint-Exupery recounts from his encounter with the Little 
Pnnce is about the time when the Pnnce met a fox and discovered the importance o f 
“taming” The fox explains to the Little Pnnce that unless he, the fox, is tamed by the 
Little Pnnce, he will be just like all the other hundred o f thousands o f foxes in the
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world In the same way, although the Little Prince has met plenty o f roses on earth, his 
own rose, which stands upon his small planet, asteroid B-612, is still unique and 
precious to him The fox helps him to understand that it is because of “taming” that this 
one rose causes him to be concerned for its welfare while he is away 
Addressing a bed of roses, the Little Prince says
To be sure, an ordinary passer-by would think that my rose looked just like you 
But m herself alone she is more important than all the hundreds of you other 
roses because it is she that I have watered, because it is she that I have put 
under the glass globe, because it is she that I have sheltered behind the screen 
because it is she that I have listened to, when she grumbled, or boasted, or even 
sometimes when she said nothing Because she is my rose (ibid p68)
From this, the Little Prince shares with Samt-Exupery the fox’s secret about 
“taming” “It is only with the heart that one can see nghtly, what is essential is invisible 
to the eye” (ibid) Furthermore, the Little Prince realises that “the thing that is 
important is the thing that is not seen ” (ibid p82) This is a reality that cannot be 
proven but can only be, to some extent, pointed to It is a reality that is constituted by 
significance Although, the rose has a particular significance for the Little Prince, the 
expenence of “taming” (1  e forming relationships and being constituted by them) is a 
universal expenence
The story of The Little Prince tells us that the reality constituted by significance, 
the reality o f the aesthetic, seems invisible to the eye and can only be expenenced by 
the heart The following story of a “Grumpy Old Woman” also captures this idea, 1 e 
that the world constituted by significance -  the heart o f the aesthetic reality -  is not 
always visible to the human eye
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“What do you see, you nurses, what do you see7
What do you think when you look at me - a grumpy old woman who isn’t very 
wise7 An old woman who is unpredictable with a dreamy look Who can’t eat 
properly anymore and who doesn’t answer if  you say m a loud voice ‘Try it at 
least’ ’ The one who doesn’t seem to see what you do for her Who is constantly 
losing a stocking or a shoe Who allows you, without protesting, to do what you 
want to her, to bath, to feed -  simply that the long day just passes by 
Is this what you think when you see me7
Then open your eyes because you haven’t looked properly I tell you who I am 
when I sit here so quietly, when I get up because you ask me to and when I eat 
because you want me to
I am a small girl o f ten years of age with a father and mother, with brothers and 
sisters, who love each other I am a girl o f sixteen dreaming of Prince Charming 
I am a young woman of twenty, a bride -  my heart is beating loudly when I 
think back about the vows exchanged A mother at twenty-five when I have my 
own children who need me in order to have a happy home At thirty I see my 
children growing up, they are warm-heartedly linked to each other 
At forty, I see my sons leaving home but my husband makes sure that I am not 
sad At fifty, there are again small children around me, who I can enjoy with my 
beloved husband But then it gets dark around me, my husband is dead and I 
shudder when I think about the future And the young people live their own lives 
and I thmk back to the nice years and my love
Now I am an old woman Nature is cruel and gets its kick out o f turning old 
people into fools The body decays, grace and vitality disappear, where my heart 
used to beat there is a stone now And yet a young girl keeps living m this old 
body and from time to time my strained heart begins to swell in my chest when I
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think back to the joy and to the pain and when I love again and live my life once 
more All the years, way too little and way too fast, but I know very well that 
nothing is long lasting So open your eyes, you nurses, and don’t see a grumpy 
old woman, look properly -  see M E1” (Lobbecke 1999 PP88-89)1
4 2 Self-Interpreters & “Other-Focused” Interpreters
In the last chapter we have seen, from the perspective o f an aesthetic 
presentation o f the concept o f person, that persons are self-interpreting animals 
immersed in a world mediated by meaning and constituted by significance The act of 
self-mterpretmg, which partly constitutes persons through language, attempts not to 
miss the meaning of an emotion “Verstehen is a Seinsmodus” (“Understanding is a 
mode of being”) (Taylor 1985a p72)2 Language captures and partly constitutes the 
experience T S  Eliot (1979) echoes this conviction when he writes
We had the experience but missed the meaning,
And approach to the meaning restores the experience (p34)
The above story of a “Grumpy Old Woman” does not only demonstrate that 
persons interpret the meaning o f their lives but that they also inexorably interpret their 
immediate surroundings, the society m which they live and the people who closely 
encircle them In this sense, persons are not only self-interpreters but also “other- 
focused” interpreters in a world mediated by meaning and constituted by significance 
The particular pomtedness of this “other-focused” interpretation is exemplified when we 
encounter other persons We automatically attempt to understand and interpret them in 
the light of our own experiences We also evaluate the quality and moral direction of
1 Translated and adapted by Alan J Kearns
2 Translated by Alan J Kearns See chapter three p i 10
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their lives Not only that we, too, are part of their “other-focused” interpretation We 
become objects o f external “other-focused” interpretations
The “grumpy old woman” provides a very personal interpretation of her life By 
recounting the important stepping-stones in her life she offers a justification of herself 
and a nposte to her inner interlocutors -  who represent her nurses She reveals how she 
is not a grumpy old woman but m fact a person with a veritable life story Clearly, her 
interpretation should take precedent over the external “other-focused” interpretations 
afforded by family-members, nurses, doctors and the wider society Although, her 
interpretation may not be completely accurate or unbiased from an objective 
perspective, it is still a significant narrative for her
The nurses, too, engage in an “other-focused” interpretation o f the woman’s life 
from several vistas, but chiefly from the viewpoint o f professional health carers working 
within the social context o f a hospital I am sure if  the nurses were given the opportunity 
to write their understanding o f the lady’s situation it would be quite different to her 
story Possibly they would narrate other aspects including, for example, that she is one 
o f many patients or clients in their ward and that they have various personnel, time and 
financial constraints Perhaps, they would claim that the old woman has misinterpreted 
how they actually perceive her As with the case o f the old woman, their external 
“other-focused” interpretation might not be completely accurate or unbiased but would 
be significant all the same
If we study once more the original understanding o f the term “person” as a mask 
in terms of dramatic performance, it seems to be close to the activities o f self- 
interpretation and “other-focused” interpretation The mask of the “character” is not 
only interpreted by the actor when s/he takes on a role but is also interpreted by the 
spectators who watch the show Normally, there is a conventional interpretation o f the 
character For instance, if  an actor plays Hamlet, his interpretation o f the part would not
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generally include playing him with an American accent Nonetheless, alongside the 
established version, there is room for a wide range of interpretations from the actor, the 
director and the audience In view of the fact that there can be numerous interpretations 
of a mask worn -  or a character -  the person’s self-interpretation and “other-focused” 
interpretation could also fall into the trap o f the “blind bom” in the Sufi sto ry3 In light 
o f this, are we left with the question as to whether our very blindness is rooted in our 
acts o f interpretation7 Although they might be blind interpretations, as I will show, they 
are significant all the same
4 3 The Definition of Person An Act of Blindness?
As it has been shown, the contemporary interpretations about what constitutes a 
person have led both to an expansion and a contraction of the moral realm It has led to 
an expansion insofar as those who were erstwhile excluded -  such as nonhuman animals
-  can now be included It has led to a contraction insofar as those who were formerly 
included -  human beings without self-consciousness and/or rational exercise o f thought
-  can now be excluded The descnptive account o f the concept o f person with its 
baroque properties has led to a prescriptive account o f moral obligations4 My definition 
of person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that 
is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance is an attempt to reduce the 
myopia o f traits and properties that are culled for both metaphysical and moral 
personhood in the current discussion 5
The question arises as to whether all aspects o f this definition have to be 
actualised in order to be a person Evidently, there are problems in asserting that we 
need to exercise all these aspects to achieve personhood
3 The Sufi “Parable o f the Blind Bom ” is described in chapter three p90
4 See chapter two pp70-82
5 A mind map of the definition is provided in the appendix D p242
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Regarding the act of self-interpretation, it can be argued that there are times in a 
person’s life when s/he is not actively engaged in self-interpretation Many people seem 
to go through life without reflecting on their experiences and evaluating them and 
therefore doing exactly what Eliot (1979) rebuked Having the experience but missing 
the meaning (p34) Furthermore, there are also many times when people interpret their 
experiences and emotions incorrectly Perhaps, the “grumpy old woman” is in fact 
grumpy Nonetheless, acts of self-interpretation are rational although they may be 
misguided or simply incorrect We cannot escape from the fact that we belong to the 
species Homo sapiens -  even though this has no moral relevance for some 
philosophers 6 The Homo sapiens species is characterised by rationality, the exercise of 
which can take many forms For example, traditionally it was accepted that people’s 
intelligences were fixed and that learning took place in sequential steps, 1 e from simple 
to complex forms of understanding It is now accepted that learning does not only 
involve conscious receptivity o f knowledge but also unconscious receptivity o f the 
environment m which learning takes place The educationalist Howard Gardner (1993) 
argues that there is not merely one type o f intelligence but that there is a multiplicity of 
intelligences Mathematical, linguistic, aesthetic, musical, bodily-kinesethetic, spatial, 
interpersonal and mtrapersonal
Persons experience dependency and vulnerability in various degrees It is clear 
that wars, ideologies, political and economic crises, environmental and ecological 
disasters plague the human reality and make people dependent on a defence force and 
vulnerable to attack
Persons live in a world mediated by meaning, which takes different forms 
Persons are immersed m a world o f meaning mediated through common sense, 
literature, science, philosophy and so on However, there may be times when the person
6 See chapter two pp74-78
132
chooses to live in his/her own world or chooses not to accept the mediated world 
outside -  sometimes this is not by choice, e g for those who suffer from intellectual and 
emotional disorders There are people who can speak many languages and who have a 
more developed linguistic capacity than others in our society But could it really be said 
that they have more personhood than others7 There are those who cannot engage in 
verbal linguistic communication but who can still communicate with various forms of 
non-verbal linguistic means, for instance, through sign language
The person also lives in a world that is constituted by significance S/he has 
certain significances towards which s/he naturally tends, although some might never be 
evaluated and constituted For instance, how is it that those who commit terrorist attacks 
appear not to feel any kind of human remorse7 There can be a number of reasons for 
this They may feel they have done their work for a superior cause Thus, although they 
have no feelings of remorse, they have feelings of pnde in what they see as their heroic 
act o f justice As Taylor reminds us, we do not only interpret our emotions but we 
ethically evaluate them as well Clearly, some persons are more attuned to this than 
others So if  we take the case o f “normal” persons, there are various degrees of self- 
mterpretation, dependency and vulnerability If we apply the motto o f the Zellwald (1 e 
“all cells are the same and yet dissimilar’”), we can claim that all persons are the same 
and yet dissimilar because each person has his or her unique sense o f how they live in a 
world that is mediated by meaning and is constituted by significance 7
Even if  I accept that there are variations in how people exercise all aspects o f the 
definition o f person, can I still escape completely from acting like the “blind bom”7 Am 
I pointing to properties and traits of personhood like the “blind bom” or am I just 
expanding more properties and traits7 In other words, is my definition in danger of
7 For a description of the Zellwald see chapter three pp92-94
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concentrating on one part o f the elephant and forgetting about the whole elephant9 This 
becomes all the more important when I apply the definition to groups on the periphery
Does an embryo fit into the concept o f person as a s e l f  interpreting-dependent- 
vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance? On the level o f immediate expenence, the embryo is open to various 
biological and physiological processes By the end of six weeks into pregnancy, the 
vital functions of the embryo are already in place There are rudimentary eyes and ears, 
a bram, a beating heart, a bloodstream, a digestive system, a liver and kidneys 
(Kitzinger 1997 p69) Thus, it could be argued that the embryo is open to immediate 
expenence on a biological level O f course, it could be also contended that the embryo 
is also open to the immediate expenence o f the outside environment For instance, when 
the mother talks to the life growing within her or plays music to it (see Deliege and 
Sloboda 1996, Hepper 1991)
The embryo starts out as a mass o f cells belonging to the human species From 
the point o f view of representative consciousness and from the world o f facts, this 
collection of cells might not be deemed to be a person On the level of reality mediated 
by meaning, the embryo is not engaged in mediation of meaning Still, the later foetus 
becomes an intended object when we try to make sense of his/her stages of 
development
The embryo does not display any signs o f rationality in its early days It has an 
ambiguous position because it belongs to the species Homo sapiens, which is generally 
defined by rationality For some philosophers, this membership has some moral 
relevance (see Wamock 1987 plO)
The embryo is immersed in a world constituted by significance Not only does 
the embryo have certain significances towards which it is inclined -  if  it successfully 
develops -  but also the significance of its life is partly constituted and ethically
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evaluated by the mother, father and health care people, for exam ple8 Although, it may
not participate in self-interpretation and therefore in the constituting o f meaning, it takes
part m our reality o f constituting significance We can constitute the embryo’s
significance and the embryo can constitute ours
The embryo is certainly dependent on its mother for nutntion, hydration and
other acts of nurture including biological and psychological ones The embryo is also
dependent on the expertise o f the health care practitioner and on the social milieu for its
protection In the IVF process, part o f the significance o f the embryo depends on
whether it can be successfully implanted However, it is debatable as to whether the
embryo actually experiences this dependency in a subjective sense The life of the
embryo is vulnerable Its life is prone to biological and genetic hazards including
chromosomal abnormalities The embryo’s stem cells could be used for research The
embryo could be frozen or discarded However, it is questionable as to whether the
embryo actually experiences vulnerability or whether it is a mere object o f vulnerability
According to Clarke and Dnever (1983), vulnerability is “ the subjective perspective
of the individual ” (p210, cited in Sellman 2005 p7) People are vulnerable when they
perceive themselves to be vulnerable Following this line o f thought, the embryo is not
vulnerable because the embryo does not perceive itself to be vulnerable Sellman (2005)
takes issue with the claim made by Clarke and Dnever and argues that people can still
be vulnerable without necessanly perceiving themselves to be vulnerable (p6) To take
an example, the people who went to work in the World Trade Centre on the 11th of
September 2001, did not perceive themselves to be vulnerable to any kind of terronst
attack Yet, in retrospect, they were objectively vulnerable to attack Therefore, I think it
8 On a related front, MacIntyre (1999) maintains that parents o f children who are severely disabled do not 
only affect the lives o f the children but the children affect the lives of parents too As well as that, through 
their never-ending work as parents, they provide a model of parenting, not only for other parents m 
similar situations but also for parents whose children are not disabled As indicated by MacIntyre “the 
parents o f children who are in fact severely disabled do of course sometimes need to be heroic They 
have undertaken one o f the most demanding kinds o f work that there is But it is the parents o f the 
seriously disabled who are the paradigms o f good motherhood and fatherhood as such, who provide the 
model for and the key to the work of all parents” (p91)
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can be reasonably claimed that the embryo can be vulnerable although it may not be 
aware of its own vulnerability
The embryo is immersed in a world o f the mother and father, the world o f the 
health care institution that is mediated by meaning It depends on how they understand 
the “life” within the womb, its stage of development, 1 e is it a cluster or a blob of cells, 
is it at one stage o f human life or is it a potential person7 The embryo is not capable of 
communication, although many parents engage m some form of communication by 
talking, by playing music and by singing to the life within the womb (see Hepper 1991) 
From the perspective of an aesthetic presentation, the embryo may be included 
m the concept o f person because it has the potential to develop its latent capacity for 
self-interpretation, expenences o f dependency and vulnerability and to participate more 
fully in the world mediated by meaning and constituted by significance
This, o f course, points to the potentiality debate and occasions a discussion 
Daunting as it may be, the idea o f an embryo having the potential to become a person or 
to develop its personhood ments the greatest attention To take an example, Joel 
Feinberg (1984) puts forward a very persuasive argument against the potentiality line of 
reasoning He begins by giving a provocative example
In 1930, when he was six years old, Jimmy Carter didn’t know it, but he was a 
potential president o f the United States That gave him no claim then, not even a 
very weak claim, to give commands to the U S Army and Navy Franklin D 
Roosvelt m 1930 was only two years away from the presidency, so he was a 
potential president m a much stronger way (the potentiality was much less 
remote) than was young Jimmy Nevertheless he was not actually president, and 
he had no more o f a claim to the prerogatives o f the office than did Carter 
(ppl47-148)
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Applying this analogy logically to the case o f an embryo, although it has the 
potential to become a person, it does not necessarily imply that it is a person and, 
therefore, ought to be morally treated as a person -  although we might decide to morally 
treat it as if  it were a person m the case o f Engelhardt’s social sense of person9 
However, as Engelhardt himself points out, if  X is a potential Y, then logically put, it is 
clear that X is not yet a Y (Engelhardt 1996 p i 42) Therefore, we ought not to confuse 
the present state of the embryo with its potential future state What Feinburg and others, 
including Engelhardt, emphasise is this hiatus between present and future states in the 
potentiality debate, which unduly furnishes the potential state of the embryo with the 
same value as the (actual) state of personhood When we claim that the embryo is a 
person because it has the potential to be rational in the future, we blur the present with 
the future condition o f the embryo and inappropriately displace the value of the future 
actuality (Engelhardt 1973/74 p228) Thus, if  embryos are potential persons, it follows 
that they are not yet persons Consequently, Engelhardt chooses to speak about the 
embryo as having a probability o f developing into a person (Engelhardt 1996 pi 42)
On the reverse side o f the com, there are schools o f thought that claim that 
potentiality has more significance than probability For Massimo Reichlin (1997), the 
very fact that an embryo actually has the potential to become a person has significance 
(p i2) Using the work of Aristotle, Reichlin makes a distinction between active and 
passive potentiality The former refers to the being’s inherent capacity to autonomously 
develop itself, whereas the latter refers to the capacity to undergo modifications from 
external agents (ibid p4) An active potentiality signifies what is inherently active, 
whereas passive potentiality denotes what is dependent on external tnggers An embryo 
has an active potentiality to develop -  given, o f course, a benign environment -  whereas 
the ovum and sperm have a passive potentiality They need an external cause to bring
9 For an outlme of Engelhardt’s distinction between the social and strict sense of personhood, see chapter 
two pp78-81
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about fertilization In this way, the sperm and the ovum are not even potential embryos 
because they do not contain active potentiality, 1 e the potential to become an embryo is 
not an intrinsically active potentiality withm the gametes (ibid p i 3)
This argument about active and passive potentiality has not managed to 
convince opponents o f the potentiality dispute For instance, Michael Lockwood (1988) 
argues that m so far as a fertilised human ovum in vitro has an active potential to 
develop into a person, so do the contents o f the petn dish pnor to fertilisation If X has 
an active potentiality to become Y, and Y has an active potentiality to become Z, then it 
must follow that X also has an active potentiality to become Z (p i9 7 )10 To put it 
simply, it can be claimed that the gametes have also an active potentiality and this is 
where the plausibility o f the argument from potentiality breaks down The apposite 
question we ought to ask ourselves, according to Lockwood, is whether there now exists 
any individual for whom the development o f this embryo into a person would constitute 
a direct benefit (ibid p 2 0 0 )11
Reichhn would probably answer Lockwood’s utilitarian question by claiming 
that the argument from potentiality can only be appreciated withm the area o f ontology, 
almost certainly Aristotelian The potentiality o f a being is concerned with the very 
ontological quality o f that being, not with some empirical future state (Reichhn 1997 
pi 1) Therefore, when the embryo develops into a foetus -  and into a baby and so on -  
and acquires new capacities, it develops and completes the nature it already has 
possessed (ibid p i 2) However, Reichhn admits that even if  we accept this argument, it 
does not necessanly imply that there ought to be no difference in the way we should
10 Following a similar line of thought, Singer and Wells (1984) argue that “everything that can be said 
about the potential o f the embryo can also be said about the potential o f the egg and sperm when separate 
but considered jointly” (p91)
11 Commenting on Lockwood, R M Hare (1988) argues that “The embryo still had the potential, and 
this potential, it might be argued, imposed on them a duty at least to consider the interest o f the person 
whom they could brmg into existence It was in Lockwood’s interest that they should implant the 
embryo that turned into him, although he did not at that time exist” (p217)
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show moral respect to a fully developed human adult person and to a human embryo 
(ibid p23)
For some philosophers, the fly m the ointment o f the potentiality debate is that 
every potentiality is an actuality per se For instance, the person’s potentiality to cross 
the road is itself an actuality that a flower does not possess (Joyce 1988 p202) A 
woman’s potentiality to give birth to a baby is an actuality that a man does not have, 
although she may never become pregnant
These arguments have some merits when examined from a scientific 
perspective The embryo has all the genetic information -  the DNA -  needed in order to 
become the person it will likely become, given the right environment As Le Fanu 
(1999) puts it
The single-cell conceptus, immediately after fertilization, contains within its 
nucleus this trillion times miniaturised forty-three Webster volumes’ worth of 
genetic information, which over the next few months will replicate itself billions 
of times Somehow the genes ‘know’ how to instruct the individual cells, first, to 
form the basic structure o f the foetus with a back and front, head and limbs, and 
then to instruct the cells to fulfil the specialized functions o f a nerve or a muscle 
or a liver cell, and then to instruct the specialised cells to grow through 
childhood and adolescence to adulthood and, m this process, to link up and 
interact with each other to form the functioning organs o f the brain, the heart and 
the liver (p279)
If we accept this premise in the form of a higher mathematical formula, it can be 
logically concluded that the answer is contained m the formula, although the working 
out of details has to be done In this sense, the actuality is contained in the potentiality
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or the potentiality is contained in the actuality The potentiality argument is indeed beset 
with problems Thus, the very least we can say is that the embryo has the potential to 
develop into a person, but the amount o f moral worth that ought to be given to it cannot 
be settled easily Following my definition o f the concept o f person as a self- 
interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance, an embryo has the potential to develop these 
capacities The moral worth that will be given to the embryo will depend on our worlds 
of mediated meaning and constituted value
Perhaps the next question to naturally arise is whether or not an infant is a s e l f  
interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance Firstly, does the infant engage in self- 
interpretation7 If we return to the infant’s first world o f immediate experience, it could 
be claimed that his/her interpretation is his/her experience The experience is the 
interpretation Still, the infant belongs to a greater range o f external “other-focused” 
interpretations and evaluations made by his/her parents, grandparents and the extended 
family and community If we again follow Engelhardt, the infant is not a person in the 
strict sense o f the word, but s/he could belong to the social sense o f person In view of 
this, it can be argued that because the infant belongs to our interpretation of what a 
person is, s/he can have, at least, a social standing as a person But, as it has been said, 
the infant’s self-interpretation is also his/her experience, so the infant is not just part of 
our mediated and constituted world of meaning but has an active role in the world of 
immediate experience, although the infant has not yet acquired the ability to 
differentiate meaning and experience through cogmtional performance 12 To be precise, 
although the infant has not yet developed his/her act o f self-interpretation, it does not 
imply that s/he is not engaged, to some extent, with the world o f meaning It is clear that
12 See chapter two pp66-67 for Lonergan’s outline o f cogmtional structure and chapter three ppl00-106 
for the corresponding three worlds o f meaning
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at this stage in the development o f a child they are like a “linguistic sponge” that can 
soak up words at accelerated rates day after day (see Chomsky 1988) It is a well-
r '
established fact that children learn languages quicker than adults They have initial 
problems with grammatical structures o f sentences, but clearly they already have the 
linguistic ability to develop their inherent linguistic capabilities
Is the infant rational7 The infant has not, as o f yet, developed complete 
cognitional performance but this does not necessarily imply that s/he is not rational 
His/her rationality is clearly developing The same can be said about all normal human 
adults Rationality is generally not stagnant but developmental
The infant is certainly dependent on his/her parents, which make him/her 
vulnerable The infant may not be aware o f this dependency and vulnerability as an 
expenence of dependency and vulnerability but s/he experiences both nonetheless So 
we can claim that the infant has the potential to develop more as a self-interpreting- 
dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance
Does a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) fit into the concept of 
person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance? Apart from certain biological 
processes, it is debatable to what extent patients in a PVS are susceptible to immediate 
expenence, although it has been reported that some do recover to partial awareness 13
Obviously, the PVS patient may not be deeply engaged in his or her life On the 
level of reality mediated by meaning, the patient in a PVS is not engaged in the 
mediation of meaning Still, they may become an intended object when we try to make 
sense of his/her condition and levels o f awareness
13 Keith Andrews (1993) points to a study o f 30 patients in PVS Five of them recovered awareness and 
two recovered to a level where they could not only communicate but read and write He points out that 
“the first sign of awareness recorded was usually eye tracking Some experts regard this as a reflex 
pattern, and it is therefore debatable whether this is a true sign of awareness The more useful sign of 
responding to commands occurred between four and 12 months after brain damage” ( p i599)
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The patient in a PVS has lost the capacity to engage in self-interpretation This 
may continue in the legal sense of a living will or an advance directive There are some 
difficulties with this because there may be a change in the self-interpretation from the 
time s/he made the will to the time of the PVS 14 However, up to the point of the PVS, 
the patient’s life has been marked by a number o f self-understandings in the form of 
past history, dreams and aspirations
The PVS patient is immersed in a world constituted by significance Although, 
s/he may not actively participate in self-interpretation and therefore constituting 
meaning, s/he still takes part m our reality o f constituting significance We constitute 
their significance and they constitute ours For instance, the health care practitioner’s 
ethical response, in the form of care, can contribute to determining the significance of 
the lives of such PVS patients (although, health care professionals may never know the 
full extent of this) PVS patients, m turn, can also affect the significance of the health 
care worker’s life to some ex ten t15
The PVS patient is also the object o f numerous external “other-focused” 
interpretations and evaluations, which still continue long after his/her self- 
mterpretation/evaluation has ceased Like with the story of the “grumpy old woman” we 
are reminded to see the “ME” in the patient m a PVS But is there any “ME” left9 This 
is not particularly clear to us (see Andrews 1993)
14 The ethical quandary that emerges from this is whether the patient X 1 at time Y has the same desires as 
patient X2 at time Z7 In other words, will the person have the same desires when they are no longer 
rational and conscious7 In this case, although they made their advance directives when they were fully 
competent and autonomous, at the time that the advance directive should come into play, they may have 
different wishes and desires In this way, although they are treated as autonomous individuals in lieu o f 
the advance directive, if we follow their directives their own past act o f autonomy might interfere with 
theu present desire
On the flip side of the com, if  doctors decide to forego the patient’s wishes as expressed in the 
advance directive, they will clearly be violating the autonomy o f patient X 1 at time Y but not necessarily 
patient X2 at time Z In fact, they may be honouring the patient X2 new wishes Take the case of a person 
who writes a living will stating that if  she becomes mentally incapacitated, then her life should be 
terminated because she thinks her life will be without dignity Let us suppose that she develops 
Alzheimer’s Now that she is in that condition, she cannot comprehend why she once held such a view or 
why she issued an advanced directive (Davis 2002 p i 32) In this example, there is a gap between patient 
X 1 and patient X2
15 An experience acknowledged by Susan S Phillips and Patricia Benner (1994 pix)
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As it has been observed, the person interacts with reality, articulating and 
interpreting it and thereby constituting meaning through various language-symbols 
Language, in turn, shapes the significance o f what the person experiences I think a 
similar argument can be made if we study how terms such as “human being” and 
“person” are used when making difficult ethical decisions in health care Although, 
there is a philosophical distinction, among others, between person and human being, 
such terminology m speech acts can affect the significance of a patient’s (or a potential 
patient’s) life, from the perspective o f their relatives and from the perspective of the 
hospital staff So, the feeling of compassion for a patient m a PVS, for instance, 
provides access to the import, to use Taylor’s word, o f the situation, e g suffering This, 
in turn, may lay a moral claim on us to respond by providing appropriate care 
However, when we begin to articulate this experience and use terms such as human 
being and person in contraposition to each other, then our feelings begin to change and 
to take on a new meaning The moral demand of the situation therefore changes For 
instance, with the statement “people in PVS are no longer persons”, we may no longer 
expenence the import of a person in need but experience someone who has less o f a 
moral standing and less of a moral call on us 16 This could lead to a closed society’s 
approach in health care by excluding those who are not deemed to possess moral 
standing, 1 e those who are not persons
However, the objection could be raised that PVS patients are no different to 
objects, which have particular significances for us For example, my piano is clearly not 
engaged m self-interpretation but is still precious to me Therefore, what is the 
difference between the piano and the PVS patient since both can be objects of our 
interpretations7 A possible answer could be -  if  we go back to Taylor’s thought -  that
16 Patricia Benner (1994) believes that living m a meaningful world is the ground for perceptions and 
provides concerns and direction for persons She writes “caring means that people, interpersonal 
concerns and things matter Carmg shapes language and makes questions and issues visible for public 
debate” (P44)
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because the PVS patient is a human being, s/he has strong original significances that are 
ontologically -  and therefore qualitatively -  different to a piano or any object or any 
animal, although s/he can no longer interpret such significances or (partly) re-define 
him/herself m relation to those significances As Taylor (1985c) argues, “consciousness 
in the characteristically human form can be seen as what we attain when we come to 
formulate the significance of things for us But things matter to us prior to this 
formulation So ongmal purpose can not be confused with consciousness” (p i00) 
Although, it might appear that Taylor is jettisoning the essential work of consciousness 
by arguing that significance is somehow ontologically prior, he accepts that it is 
consciousness which enables us to be open at a deeper level to human significances and 
to constitute them (ibid pp 104-105)
There can be no doubt that the patient in a PVS is heavily dependent on his/her 
family, friends and on nurses and doctors Furthermore, his/her reality has become 
extremely vulnerable to the economic demands of the market place -  especially if  there 
is a scarcity o f hospital beds His/her bed could be used more “productively” for other 
patients who have a better chance of recovery Thus, the significance of his/her 
condition is partly constituted and evaluated by his/her family and by the health care 
community Like in the case o f the embryo, the expenence of vulnerability and 
dependency may be more objective than subjective
If we turn our attention to the animal world, we might ask ourselves whether a 
chimpanzee is a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality 
that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance? On the face o f it, one 
could conceivably argue that some animals -  such as chimpanzees -  do qualify under 
this definition For instance, the higher apes seem to take part in some form of self- 
mterpretation 17 They express signs o f rationality They have some form of linguistic
17 See Singer (1994) example o f a community o f chimpanzees living m Arnhem Zoo, near Amsterdam 
(ppl 59-161)
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communication They are dependent and they are at times -  even more so than humans 
-  vulnerable to research and experimentation They take part in a world o f mediated 
meaning -  in so far as we understand the animal world -  and are constituted by 
significance the significance that they have for us, for example Then again, we have to 
ask ourselves whether animals constitute their own significances in self-interpretation7 
Following Taylor, it is only humans who have this ability because they can use 
various standards including “shame,” “dignity,” “moral obligation,” etc 18 One major 
problem is the difficulty o f accessing the animal world that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance At least it can be claimed that their world is constituted by 
the significance o f instinctual survival Furthermore, Wolfgang Kohler’s (1931) study 
of chimpanzees shows that animals demonstrate diverse and wide-ranging expressions 
similar to that o f human beings, for instance, rage, terror, despair, grief, desire, 
playfulness and pleasure (pp305-306) Still, it is disputed how much chimpanzees really 
understand these expressions and emotions 19 Nevertheless, one could also argue that 
some animals, in general, take part m our “other-focused” interpretation and evaluation 
People talk to their pets and talk about them For some, their animals have a moral 
worth that in some way belongs to what Engelhardt understands as the social sense of 
person Yet, generally we tend not to call animals “persons” -  not even in the social 
sense But some people’s feelings towards animals are not altogether different from 
their feelings towards human beings who are not stnctly persons either, following the 
cntena of Tooley, Smger and Engelhardt What I mean by this is that, normally, we 
would not be inclined to hurt a baby or promote infanticide Why7 What moral claim 
does a baby have over us7 We might find it difficult to understand this question because 
of our moral sensibilities When pressed, we might claim that although the baby is not
18 See chapter three p l08
19 Augros and Stanciu (1988) contend that “it is one thing to recognize that an animal hears, sees, 
remembers, imagines, and has emotions, another to understand what it sees, what its perceptual world is 
like The theoretical capacity of the sense organs themselves does not define an animal’s world, but rather 
the interpretation o f perceptions by the animal on the basis o f instinct and previous experience” (p57)
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fully a person, s/he still experiences sentience, so s/he should not have to expenence 
pain Likewise, why should we not torture cats7 Clearly, it could be argued that it is also 
a subject o f sentience, although not a person, and therefore, in normal circumstances, it 
would go against our moral sensibilities to torture it O f course, on the other side o f the 
ledger, some people like Singer believe that the higher animals have the necessary 
characteristics to qualify as persons m the stnct sense of the word
I think that animals have an ambiguous position They do not fully meet the 
criteria o f person from the perspective o f my definition but they do have a role as 
“persons” for some people in their world constituted by significance For example, from 
my expenence, if  you ask nurses whether animals are persons, many will probably say 
no, but they will talk about their pets as if  they were persons However, some would 
argue that the same could be said for embryos, infants and patients m a PVS They are 
not persons but we still talk about them as if they were -  but we just would not call 
them “persons”
Or would we7 From examining whether the above groups fit my concept of 
person, it would appear that my definition is in danger o f becoming another blind 
member of the importunate commentary on personhood Perhaps I have inadvertently 
left the aesthetic world and have entered the world o f facts
4 4 Towards an Instructive Presentation 
4 4 1 Escaping from Blindness -  Simple Acts and Complex Structures
There is a need to understand the significance o f being a person inhabiting a 
world o f immediacy, a world mediated by meaning and constituted by significance, in 
order to calm such questions about who qualifies as a person and to begin to escape 
from acting like the “bom blind” I find that Bergson’s philosophy provides an 
instructive tool for helping to grasp this aesthetic presentation of person in the face of
146
blindness His magnum opus, Creative Evolution (1998), presents a vibrant and deeply 
philosophical interpretation o f evolution that reaches its acme m a metaphysical vision 
His work is chiefly concerned with demolishing certain aspects o f Darwinian, neo-
70Lamarckian and Spencerian theones o f evolution It is, however, Bergson’s 
explanation o f simple acts and complex structures that is helpful for this specific part of 
the study I find his example of the eye particularly instructive
There are two striking aspects to the working of the human eye Its complexity 
in terms of structure and its simplicity in terms of function On the one hand, the organ 
is mfimtively complex The eye consists o f various interrelated complex parts including 
the sclerotic, the cornea and the retina (Bergson 1998 p88) Each element has its own 
particular intncacy and task On the other hand, the very act o f seeing is one simple and 
undivided act We just open our eyes and see In spite o f this, if  there was a sudden 
vanation in any one part o f the complexity o f the eye, it would not be capable of 
functioning properly as a whole Therefore, if there is a change in any part o f the 
structure o f the eye it must be accompanied by the appropnate changes in the rest o f the 
structure
A mechanistic explanation o f the eye will give details o f the precise workings of 
each of its parts, but it will be unable to explain how all the components work together 
in one unified and straightforward act o f v ision21 This simplicity o f vision belongs to 
the eye itself, whereas the mechanistic complexity o f the eye belongs to our 
understanding of the inner working of the eye Although we can use concepts and 
language-symbols to explain its internal structure, we cannot intellectually penetrate the 
simple act o f seeing and therefore we must treat it cautiously The act o f opening our
20 Bergson’s (1998) masterpiece work on evolution is far too vast for me to summarise in any 
comprehensive way here without domg a grave injustice to it One thing to note is that Darwin argues that 
it is the accidental variations of species that makes them compete with one another for the survival o f  the 
fittest For Bergson, what lies behind these variations towards higher levels o f complications is an elan 
vital (vital impulse) He says that “this impetus, sustained nght along the lines o f evolution among which 
it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least o f those that are regularly passed on, that 
accumulate and create new species (p87)
21 I analysis the mechanistic approach in general m chapter three pp92-99
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eyes and seeing is experienced by us as one simple and indivisible action It is only 
when this action is scrutinised from the standpoint o f an impartial observer that it 
appears extremely complex This is where, what Bergson calls, the mechanistic and 
finalistic theories break down Mechanism looks at the mechanics that set the eye in 
motion and finalism looks at the goal o f the mechanics, 1 e the production o f sight Both 
are incapable o f explaining how the act o f seeing belongs to the reality of the eye, or 
how this simple act o f vision defines what the eye is (ibid pp90-91) As it has been 
pointed out in chapter three, mechanism attempts to achieve objectively neutral 
knowledge from an independent standpoint, which goes against the gram of current 
quantum mechanics As Physicist John Wheeler (1977) observes “what philosophy 
suggested in times past, the central feature o f quantum mechanics tells us today with 
impressive force In some strange sense this is a participatory universe” rather than a 
mechanistic universe (pp5-6)
The act o f vision is more than just the mutual coordination o f the component 
cells of the eye If  we asked someone what it was like to see and s/he told us about the 
inner workings of the eye, we would feel a little short-changed In other words, no 
matter how you explain the mechanism of the eye, it can never be a substitute for the 
expenence of seeing
Such simple acts and complex mechanisms can also be applied to human 
consciousness When we become conscious of ourselves, do we expenence 
consciousness as being one or manifold7 For instance, when we sit still we find an array 
o f various voices and concerns arising in our consciousness, especially about things we 
have put on the “long finger” When we attempt to answer all voices and concerns we 
find that, at best, we can only deal with one thing at a time We are, therefore, “ a 
unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one ” (Bergson 1998 p258) Yet, unity 
and multiplicity are categones that we use to understand the inner complexity of
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consciousness, but consciousness itself is one simple act, which cannot be captured by 
categories “It is true that no image can reproduce exactly the original feeling I have of 
the flow of my own conscious life” (Bergson 1999 p27) 22 Lonergan’s cognitional 
analysis demonstrates that, within human consciousness, dynamic interrelated 
operations are at work in the knowing process Human consciousness consists of a set of 
interrelated intentional operations, which include experiencing, understanding and 
judging However, we are not normally aware o f such intentional operations Indeed, 
Lonergan’s Insight (1978) is an invitation to resolve various mathematical problems in 
order to attain self-appropnation, 1 e to become aware of the different operations in 
human consciousness
4 4 2 Intellectual Sympathy
The tendency to employ mechanistic categories to vision or to consciousness is, 
according to Bergson (1998), due to the fact that we use the “manufacturing” as 
opposed to “organizational” methods to explain composite structures behind simple 
actions (p92) The manufacturing model creates complexity where there is simplicity, 
whereas to organise is to move from the simple to the complex This simple and 
complex approach to the phenomenon that surrounds us is the progeny of two chief 
directions in consciousness The intellect and intuition The heart o f the distinction 
between intellect and intuition is made explicit m Bergson’s An Introduction to 
Metaphysics (1999) Under the auspices of the intellectual way o f knowing we approach 
objects from an external perspective and we utilise language-symbols m order to 
articulate our findings, as we have witnessed with the mechanistic account o f the eye 
The intellect complicates, however, what is simple (ibid p24) The knowledge 
ascertained is relative in the sense that it depends on the point o f view of the observer
22 Luhmann captures a similar thought when he claims that the world we perceive is “verletzt” 
(“wounded”) by distinctions (Luhmann 1992 pp 119-137, cited in Rossbach 1996 p249)
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and on the language-symbols used to articulate his or her observations The intuitive 
way of knowing approaches objects by way of engaging with them We “enter into” the 
object and we identify ourselves with it by a kind of “intellectual sympathy” (ibid 
pp23-24) This intellectual sympathy is, what Bergson calls, intuition The purely 
intellectual way is the method of science, whereas the intuitive way is the method of 
metaphysics, according to Bergson
For the purpose o f this work I will refrain, as far as possible, from using the term 
“intuition” and instead use “intellectual sympathy” because of the philosophical 
baggage attached to mtuitiomsm m the history of twentieth century ethical discourse23 
Intellectual sympathy is an act or rather a series o f acts o f direct participation in the 
immediacy of experience (ibid p i2) It yields cognition of reality that is different to 
concepts derived from the intellect The reality expenenced by intellectual sympathy 
does not fit nicely into intellectual concepts Concepts are the result o f “the scientific 
study o f the object m its relations to other objects”, whereas intellectual sympathy is the 
“metaphysical investigation o f what is essential and unique m the object” (ibid pp28- 
29) Therefore, we need other circumlocutory symbols to express what is unique and 
essential to each object (ibid p28) For that reason, Bergson is in favour o f using “fluid 
representations” together with metaphors (ibid p30)
Intellectual sympathy provides a passport into the original experience It fathoms 
the inner nature o f living reality By comparison, the intellect tends to falsify the living 
reality by translating it into static concepts An analysis o f living reality is a 
“translation” A representation of reality from various successive points o f view that is 
developed into concepts and language-symbols Concepts abstract and generalise They 
represent a specific property of the object This representation helps us to compare the
23 The word “mtuitiomsm” is often associated with the work o f G E Moore, H A Prichard, W D Ross 
and H Sidgwick In general, the mtuitiomsts argue that moral claims have simple properties that cannot 
be defined Intuitionism argues that a) “good" is indefinable, b) there are, however, objective moral truths, 
and c) such moral truths are self-evident to the mind See Mary W am ock’s (1966) discussion about 
mtuitiomsm Bergson (2002) himself, also had some hesitation using the word “intuition” (p30)
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object with similar properties o f other objects For instance, when we analyse an object, 
we can compare our new concept o f that object with old concepts we already possess 
for other objects (ibid p24) In this way, an analysis complicates what is simple in 
reality It infinitively multiplies the number o f perspectives from which to examine an 
object In spite o f this, the concepts that are used in analysis retain part o f the reality of 
the object examined The common properties analysed are shared by other objects, 
which helps us to illuminate what is unknown by comparison with the already known 
When we compare concepts with other concepts, we point towards what is shared 
between the objects Consequently, we could easily become convinced that by setting 
concepts beside concepts we can reconstruct the whole o f the object with its parts For 
example, we might think that if  we can place the concepts o f the various aspects of an 
elephant side-by-side we will get a perfect representation o f an elephant Yet we have 
not the faintest idea what it feels like to be an elephant, which is, to the elephant, a 
simple act
Once it is abstracted from the originating object, the concept can transcend the 
object and it can begin to include other objects that have similar properties But, as 
Bergson claims “ the different concepts that we form of the properties of a thing 
mscnbe round it so many circles, each much too large and none of them fitting it 
exactly” (ibid p29) So when we analyse the word “person”, we abstract certain 
properties from it and generalise them into a concept of person The new circle(s) of the 
concept of person mcrease(s) and begin(s) to include many other life forms -  such as 
animals -  or many other properties such as rationality but none o f them seems to fit 
exactly As Bergson notes “A representation taken from a certain point of view, a 
translation made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect in comparison with 
the object o f which a view has been taken, or which the symbols seek to express the 
original and not its translation, is perfect, by being perfectly what it is” (ibid p23) The
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object’s inner nature can only be reached through intellectual sympathy, everything else 
falls within the scope of analysis For Bergson, the illusory nature o f this kind of 
intellectual analysis arises from its inability to capture what is unique to each living 
object
Intellectual sympathy reminds us of the fact that we cannot get out of our skins 
We are not impartial spectators, as a mechanistic view of the world would hold 
Bergson gives the example o f an artist’s impression of the city o f Pans, to illustrate his 
line of reasoning (ibid pp32-33) An artist can attempt to capture an experience of this 
effervescent city by an external and schematic representation Accordingly, we can have 
an infinite number o f representations of Pans because the expenence is capable of 
crystallizing into many representations Still, we can never move from this 
representation to the initial pulsating expenence that the artist had of the Pansian Latin 
Quarters In other words, the painting is no substitute for the vital expenence Although, 
we can move from our own personal expenence o f Pans to a painting, we cannot move 
from a painting to an expenence of Pans We can only move from intellectual sympathy 
to analysis, but not vice versa to capture the ongmating expenence Conceptual analysis 
seeks the very heart o f the expenence of Pans, but by translating it into concepts, we 
move away from that very expenence
4 4.3 The Power of Concepts9
The latter part o f the twentieth century is celebrated for the rapid transition from 
the mdustnal age to the knowledge age (see Cardwell 1994) In this knowledge era there 
are “ no limits to the numbers o f ideas we can generate, and the ways we can weave 
them together into not only products and services, but visions o f the possible” (Savage 
1999 p215) We seek knowledge for particular ends The discipline of philosophy gives 
us the intellectual apparatus to cntically examine and reflect on life, death and ethical
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issues In some intellectual circles, this is not done for the sake of love o f wisdom but 
for the sake of a practical goal In the circle o f health care, Edwards (2001) admits that 
most nurses who become interested m philosophy do so m the hope that there will be 
some eventual benefit for nursing practice (p i8) Perhaps that is why concept analysis 
seems more practical and goal-onentated than intellectual sympathy As Bergson (1999) 
comments “To try to fit a concept on an object is simply to ask what we can do with the 
object, and what it can do for us” (p39) Possibly, this is one o f the reasons for the 
ebullience and ubiquity of concept analysis m nursing However, this has faced some 
critical inspection in recent years by philosophers working within the health care sector 
John Paley (1996), for instance, is especially cntical o f analysing concepts in 
anticipation o f theories For him, this places the cart before the horse (p572)
For Paley, the work of concept clarification is to elucidate the meaning of a 
word in an attempt to say something interesting about the word (ib id) Then again, the 
preciosity o f concept clarification is foredoomed because when we etch away at 
concepts through analysis, we discover that they have interminable meanings This 
testifies that we can never achieve an unambiguous meaning of a term (ib id ) Paley 
makes the argument that the meaning of a word is made specific when it becomes part 
o f a specific theory Theories determine the meaning of a term (ibid p577) A word that 
means one thing m the context of theory A can mean something different in the context 
of theory B, and the difference can be more or less subtle Theories are word-structures, 
and the place assigned to any word within the structure is that which gives the word its 
meaning Concept analysis, in nursing, leaps into the turmoil of the intermmability of 
concepts, without consideration of theory The lurking entrapment of murky concepts 
blocks our thinking According to Paley, it is wrong to claim that concepts are the 
“building blocks” from which theones can be assembled Concepts are not like bricks, 
they are rather like niches They are lacunas within theory The only way to clanfy a
153
concept is to explicitly adopt a theory that determines what its niche will be (ib id ) The 
prerequisite for concept analysis, m order to put off the shackles of ambiguity, is 
therefore theory If we pepper concepts with theones we will get out of the chaos -  at 
least for a while A stepwise approach is to begin first with theory, because we can only 
ratify our concepts within theory24
Paley gives the example o f the nurse “expert” and argues that the concept of 
“expert” is less ambiguous within Benner’s theory o f nursing (see Benner 1984) But 
what about the concept o f “good” Do we have to place this into some theory before we 
can brush off any ambiguity7 Can the concept o f “person” be understood outside a 
theory of person7 Does Paley make theory a sort o f aviary for concepts7 The 
epiphenomenon of Paley’s depiction of the interface between concept and theory for 
ethics is the diminished task o f metaethics25 I do not think it is necessary to have a 
diremption between theory and concepts But, are concepts so paralysed without theory7 
If we return to Bergson, the question arises as to whether Paley (and metaethics) 
does go far enough According to Gallagher’s (1970) analysis o f Bergson, the “ 
knowledge through concepts is always a knowledge of the already-made, whereas 
intuition [intellectual sympathy], being a direct contact with, or vision of, the inner flow 
of things, is a knowledge of the being-made” (p35) Concepts are like a net that attempts 
to capture living reality primarily in order to utilise that reality and not necessarily to 
attain internal (metaphysical) knowledge of it
The question arises as to whether the artist’s representation o f Pans can evoke 
the original moment when a person entered the primary, vivacious, experience of Pans 
Is it not possible for some representations to be more efficacious than others, l e can 
some representations enable the person to enter into the creative impulse o f the
24 Paley (1996) believes that there can be no conceptual clarification without theoretical commitment 
(p577)
2 In general, metaethics is understood as the study of ethical concepts, either from an epistemological or 
a metaphysical perspective (Deigh 1995 p247)
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engendering experience9 Certainly, a plain map of Pans will not, but what about 
Monet’s depiction o f Pans7 Bergson does not draw the line between the affectivity of 
one representation compared to another But, clearly some representations are better 
than others at resurrecting the novel impulse o f the onginal expenence If we take the 
example o f Ruth Baja Williams’ (2001) autobiographical novel Detour Berlin, it seems 
to capture the vital current of Berlin much more than an ordinance survey map could 
ever do If we then spend some time in Berlin, the creative cunent passed on by 
Williams to us via Detour Berlin might be confirmed Although we cannot return to 
Williams’ onginal creative emotion, there is a residue o f it in her account o f the city 
But this may not always be the case Clearly a map of Germany will not be able to 
communicate the vanous vital aspects of German culture and life m the same way as a 
novel But, after having spent some time there, when I look at a map of Germany it can 
spark my memory and I can re-expenence many fond memones This is because I bnng 
my intuitive memory to the map Then again, with a certain amount o f research I can 
learn about the majestic Zugspitze, Germany’s highest mountain, by gleaning as much 
information as I possibly can But it will never capture the personal witness o f the 
mountain’s Olympian splendour and its cornucopia o f views of the Bavanan Alps The 
overflowing nature of the onginatmg expenence of the mountain is pulled down by the 
inert, common coinage, of the wntten word in the world mediated by meaning Some 
metaphors and images o f the mountain may provide an aperture to the nchness o f the 
expenence while cliche words will disarm it by desiccating the expenence
Nevertheless, we live in the world o f matter, o f meaning that is mediated We 
live m the world and not out o f it Therefore, Bergson concedes that concepts will have 
to be employed in the communication of knowledge In short, we possess the faculty of 
intellectual sympathy but we must live productively in the world and for that reason the 
utility of the intellect has more o f a standing in a world o f mediated meaning
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Bergson (2002) admits that comparisons and metaphors are more helpful than 
abstract concepts because they tend to suggest what cannot be expressed (pp 118-120) 
As he earlier maintains, “ many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders 
o f things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise 
point where there is a certain intuition to be seized” (Bergson 1999 pp27-28) This is 
because expenence is like a flowing nver The current o f the expenence can pass from 
the source through many tnbutanes to our parallel nver But the nver moves on 
Therefore, Williams’ depiction of Berlin is an expenence that has long moved on So, 
although, my nver may connect with her stream through the tnbutary of a personal 
story, the intuitive expenence that I grasp will not be the pnstme onginal Yet, it might 
relight some of the spark from the still warm ashes of the expenence 26
For instance, if I look at the picture of the man with a dog collar in the Abu 
Ghraib pnson in Iraq, I can enter into the expenence o f shock and indignation (see 
Wikipedia 2005) In this case, it can be an occasion where I enter into the flowing 
stream of the expenence But the onginating expenence has long passed away The man 
and the woman in the picture have moved on and changed The picture is more affective 
than abstract concepts, it can still instigate a response, yet it is not as perfect as the 
engendering life expenence
The human intellect represents the ever-changing reality in a set o f abstract and 
static concepts, which can be controlled and influenced The intellect finds itself at 
home with what is static Paradoxically, it will seek to represent the living of the 
flowing reality in abstract concepts that, in turn, will demobilise the experience o f that 
very reality The intellect abstracts stability and regulanty from what is unstable and 
irregular and gives order to the stream of reality The ever-recumng novelty o f reality is 
a perturbation to the order o f the intellect In order to compensate for this upset, the
26 As Bergson (1986) poetically describes “But let us stir the ashes, we shall find some of them still 
warm, and at length the sparks will kindle into flame, the fire may blaze up again ” (p50)
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intellect seeks to understand what is new by comparing it to what is old We place old 
concepts onto new experiences I communicate my expenence of the Zugspitze by using 
ready-made concepts, which are convenient for me Nonetheless, it can be frustrating 
because the old concepts cannot cope with what is a novel expenence If I was a poet or 
an artist, I could escape from my frustration by wntmg or by painting But, I do not 
possess these skills I can only use concepts or music Now, clearly a piece of music 
will capture the flow of the expenence of the Zugspitze more profoundly than the 
concept of its height -  2963 meters As Bergson (2000) wntes “reduced to this form, 
bottled as it were the moment it comes from the spnng, the onginal intuition will then 
become superlatively insipid and uninteresting it will be banal in the extreme” (p i20)
If we follow this line of reasoning, we can begin to understand why the “blind 
bom” are blind The intellect segregates and detaches elements o f reality and narrows 
our lenses so that we can concentrate on what is o f interest to us “ we put on blinders, 
that we look neither to the nght, nor to the left nor behind us, but straight ahead in the 
direction we have to go” (ibid pl37) 27 But, the artist and the poet seem to be able to 
penetrate reality and thereby see more than those who only deal in concepts Although 
they appear to live “less” in reality compared to the practical person who deals in 
concepts, they tend to see “more” of this flowing reality For Bergson, the job o f the 
philosopher is to capture this reality that is debarred from our functional vista 
Therefore, philosophers try to do what the artists and poets do What would happen if 
we placed a philosopher or an artist amongst the “blind bom”7 Could they grasp what 
the elephant really is7
27 According to Rossbach (1996), when attempting to remove a blind spot, another blind spot can 
inadvertently be created (pp250-251)
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4 4 4 The “Current”
Compared to intellectual analysis, intellectual sympathy helps us to grasp the 
immediacy of the experience “There is a reality that is external and yet given 
immediately to the m ind ’ (Bergson 1999 p49) Bergson admits that intellectual 
sympathy does violence to our usual way of thinking We have to reverse the direction 
of the way we habitually think This does not imply that we discard the world mediated 
by meaning -  we need it In order to penetrate reality through intellectual sympathy we 
need to have confidence m the world mediated by meaning In this way, intellectual 
sympathy may not negate the nebulosity of personhood but it may provide a portal into 
an inclusive concept o f person even if  it remains a partially opened door
If we apply the same apparatus o f understanding the eye to an understanding of 
the person, we observe that there is also a complexity to the inner workings of the 
person As we have seen, this complexity is set out by various definitions and 
properties But the act o f being a person is simple Persons are persons So, in order to 
reach an aesthetic presentation o f the person, we need to focus on the simple act of 
personhood through intellectual sympathy rather than through intellectual analysis, 
which can miss the forest for the trees
The incarnate meaning o f a person -  in the sense of the articulated and written 
meaning of a person’s life -  can be understood by concepts and language-symbols in 
the world mediated by meaning and constituted by significance Nevertheless, really 
“knowing” a particular person can only be obtained by experiencing that person through 
intellectual sympathy m the world o f immediate experience This is the living meaning 
that resides in each person It is true that in everyday life, we know what persons are As 
Howsepian (2000) maintains, what could be more familiar to us than persons (p l5 )9 It 
is almost like there is a deep-seated “current” between persons We know what persons 
are because our “current” reacts to the “charges” o f the other person and therefore we
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can acknowledge the “current” o f the other person As maintained by Augros and 
Stanciu (1988) “ we ourselves are the key to understanding life and living things” 
(p83) We, as persons, are the key to understanding other persons Perhaps this is 
because o f the “current” that reacts to our “charges” can be expenenced with 
intellectual sympathy O f course, as soon as I begin to conceptualise it with the words 
“current” and “intellectual sympathy”, I lose the engendenng expenence and begin to 
hypothesise with concepts
With intellectual sympathy, there is a return to the world o f immediate 
expenence, where reality is not intended as an object but is simply “meant” Through 
intellectual sympathy, we can “connect” with another person and grasp the significance 
o f a living person We can have an immediate expenence of persons in the world 
constituted by significance It is an expenence that can be entered into and apprehended 
by intellectual sympathy We call them “persons” in our world o f significance In the 
world o f mediated meaning we attempt to express the significance o f persons As soon 
as we grasp their significance we use language-symbols to articulate their significance 
for us, thereby their significance is partly constituted by our language Thus, in order to 
communicate the significance o f personhood we articulate it and make it meaningful in 
the world mediated by meaning through the concept of person From this it can sweep 
into our world of immediate immediacy For instance, depending on the language- 
symbols available at the time and how they partly constitute the expenence, they can 
gradually impinge on the onginal “current” in the immediate expenence Therefore, it 
can be argued that the vanous concepts o f person, for example, have a constituting role 
in the moral life They constitute a particular meaning o f what it is to be a person If we 
follow Lonergan’s thought, it could be contended that this meaning permeates from the 
fourth level (1 e deliberating and choosing value) down to the other vanous levels (1 e 
judging, understanding and expenencing) It takes on a constituting role in our acts of
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moral deliberation, whereby we decide how persons and non-persons alike ought to be 
morally valued and treated It affects our judgment, whereby we judge certain people to 
be persons It shapes our understanding, whereby we understand certain properties to be 
essential to personhood Finally, it attempts to shape our experience o f what is a person 
and what is not Thus, the concept o f person has a constituting role Changes in the 
meaning of this concept can have an affect on how we treat persons and non-persons 
Therefore, we begin to use the counter language-symbol o f “non-person” to distinguish 
those who do not belong to the onginal “current” In this world we can articulate the 
significance or non-significance o f non-persons In time, this can permeate the onginal 
current and so we now only connect with certain beings that are deemed to be 
“persons”
Language partly shapes the significance of the expenence, as we have seen in 
the last chapter There are words that have more significance for us than others For 
instance, the word “dignity” generally has more significance than the word “gear
29stick” , and yet it is more difficult to define and pin down what we mean by dignity 
compared to what we mean by gear stick Dignity is more “fluid” than gear stick 
Nonetheless, in the world o f immediacy, the dignity o f the person is something that we 
can recognise without having to articulate it first It is part o f the “current” that connects 
us with others O f course, this “current” can be blocked by prejudices and ideologies in 
the context o f the closed society because the closed society also inhabits the world 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance Yet, dignity is nearer to our 
intuitive sense although we find it difficult to mtellectualise it with concepts, whereas 
gear stick is further from our intuitive sense, although we find it easier to mtellectualise 
it with concepts As this demonstrates, the world o f mediated meaning is more complex 
than the world o f immediacy
28 See chapter three pp 108-111
29 Although it could be maintained that a gear stick has much more significance for the motorist
160
4 4 5 Intellectual Sympathy and the Closed & Open Societies
If we apply the above framework to the closed and open societies, it can be 
argued that the closed society, spurred on by the static morality, will decide who is to be 
deemed a person and how they are to be morally treated The closed society will use 
language-symbols in the world mediated by meaning to outline who belongs to the 
social pale and who does not On the level o f immediate experience, the “current” 
between persons will be confined to members o f the social group in the closed society 
So intellectual sympathy can be refined according to the needs of the closed society 
This experience can then permeate the various levels m cogmtional consciousness from 
experiencing, understanding and judging to deliberating and choosing It shapes our 
experience o f what is a person and what is not It affects our understanding of what it is 
to be a person It impinges on our judgment, whereby we judge certain people to be 
persons It takes on a constituting role in our acts o f moral deliberation, whereby we 
decide how persons and non-persons alike ought to be morally valued and treated
The open society, spurred on by the dynamic morality, will have a more 
inclusive approach to who is deemed to be a person It will use language-symbols in the 
world mediated by meaning to delineate its universal embrace On the level of 
immediate experience, the “current” between persons will go beyond the social pale to 
reach out to all o f humanity This experience can then permeate the other levels m 
cogmtional consciousness from deliberating and choosing, down to judging, 
understanding and experiencing It takes on a constituting role m our acts of moral 
deliberation concerning how persons ought to be morally valued and treated in an open 
society It impinges on our judgment concerning those human beings who were once 
not deemed to be persons It therefore changes our understanding of what it is to be a 
person Finally, it affects our experience of what is to be a person
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Although the “current” felt between persons in a closed society will be naturally 
strong because of its genetic force, the “current” felt between persons outside the closed 
society might provide the initial foundation for an experience o f dynamic morality 
Indeed, it could be argued that the dynamic morality, that gives expression to an 
inclusive concept of person, finds its spark in the experience o f living persons -  as 
opposed to abstract concepts -  connecting with each other in immediate concrete 
experiences It is such experiences of “connecting” with those who do not belong to our 
closed society that inspires a dynamic emotion A dynamic emotion that moves great 
moral personalities in history who, through their embodied message, attract others to 
live within an open society
t
4 5 Conclusion -  Intellectual Sympathy An Instructive Presentation
As I have shown, through the “blindness” o f intellectual analysis, my concept of 
person as a s e l f  interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance risks reflecting another static 
morality of a closed society, especially when it is used as another benchmark for 
deciding who belongs, and who does not belong, m the moral realm However, by way 
of intellectual sympathy, my concept might escape “blindness” and mirror a dynamic 
concept o f an open society It is through intellectual sympathy that we can recognise 
another as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance It is through intellectual 
sympathy that we can enter into the experience o f the “current” that flows from one 
person to another By relocating the concept o f person within the world o f significance 
and by entering into its original engendenng experience through intellectual sympathy 
in the world of immediate experience, my definition of person as a s e l f  interpreting-
30 See chapter five pp 171-176
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dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance might point us in the direction of the dynamic morality of an 
open society By having universal humanity as its aim, my concept o f person will reflect 
a dynamic rather than a static morality
It could be claimed that intellectual sympathy is inherently simple But when we 
engage in self-interpretation and “outward-focused” interpretation, this simplicity 
becomes lost Persons are self-interpreters and it is this very fact that turns the simple 
act o f being a person into a complex operation But, the different concepts of person 
cannot seem to capture this simple act
As it has been shown, a concept m general places a limit on something that is a 
trajectory of thought The aesthetic presentation of the concept o f person, codified in a 
definition, only affords small pockets of light onto the full reality o f personhood 
Therefore, I believe that the aesthetic presentation of the concept o f person can only be 
grasped through intellectual sympathy in the world o f immediacy As I have said, 
intellectual sympathy points to the “current” that helps us to recognise the “charges” of 
another human being’s personhood m immediate experience When we attempt to 
crystallise this in a definition, we automatically move from a simple act to a complex 
structure We move from the world of immediate immediacy to the world of mediated 
meaning However, intellectual sympathy provides an instructive presentation towards 
the aesthetic presentation of the concept of person and helps to prevent it becoming 
another static concept o f a closed society
The question that is now faced is whether the aesthetic and instructive 
presentation o f person can help with ethical problems created by the creative revolution 
in health care, especially with difficult and controversial cases Firstly, regarding 
whether the embryo is a person, the potential mother may experience a “current” 
between herself and the embryo she is carrying There will be recognition of its
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humanness, of its potential personhood, or indeed its actual personhood, which may 
cause her to act in support o f it and to nurture it Evidently, this “current” may have 
different vibrations Some will experience the embryo as a threat or as something 
foreign to the body, while some will experience the embryo as being the centre o f their 
lives
Secondly, regarding patients in PVS, the “current” between PVS patients and us 
can be confused Some people do not find it easy to accept that the PVS patient is no 
longer a person Some do not find it easy to stop administering artificial nutntion and 
hydration They feel that the patient in a PVS is there and is not there at the same time 
They will not want to prolong the “suffering” of the PVS patient or the low quality of 
life But when it comes to lettmg go and letting the individual die, it is not an easy 
moral decision
The definition o f person as a s e l f  interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal 
living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance 
demonstrates that there can be aspects o f the aesthetic presentation o f personhood 
shared by those hard cases Whether it be levels o f self-interpretation, dependency, 
vulnerability or whether it be the very fact that they enter or leave a world that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance
In the general health care setting, persons constitute the significance of each 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic action through understanding, interpreting and 
evaluating Clearly, if  treatment is seen as aggressive rather than remedial, many other 
factors would need to be taken into account m this self-interpretation and evaluation the 
patient’s personal and medical history, family views, professional health care and 
medical advice If the patient (or a representative o f the patient) comes to a decision that 
is m conflict with the established ethical ethos o f the hospital -  that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance -  their self-interpretation may need to be
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revisited or they may simply choose another hospital O f course, their interpretations 
may be objectively incorrect, but still significant The health care institution, too, might 
have to re-examine its own time-honoured ethos This is why as many aspects as 
possible concerning various interpretations (might) need to be taken into consideration 
before deciding on what action is to be taken m the face o f difficult ethical situations In 
those situations where the patient cannot make a decision or engage in self- 
mterpretation the family and the health carers will have a major role m the ongoing 
interpretation/evaluation o f the patient’s condition in the face of treatment and palliative 
care
With such hard cases, there are no straightforward answers m the aesthetic and 
instructive presentation of the concept o f person Yet, m the wake o f the static morality 
of a closed society and the vanous ideological forces that try to limit the benefits of the 
creative revolution to a selected group, it may be wise not to accept such yes/no­
answers, especially when we have the potential to fall outside the closed society’s 
membership
Some health care professionals, especially nurses, seem to be more open to this 
aesthetic and instructive world Taylor (1994) contends that nurses are more sensitive to 
the compartmentalisation of persons compared to others m the health care profession 
(pp 174-187) I think that being aware o f its importance m a reflective manner will help 
them to face the challenges o f new moral questions and new ideological thinking of the 
closed society penetrating our world
In the next chapter, I examine one practical implication o f the aesthetic and 
instructive presentation of the concept of person I demonstrate how the concept of 
person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance experienced in the world of
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immediate experience may prevent the new European Charter o f Patients’ Rights from 
becoming a static code of a closed society
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5. The Implications of the Concept 
of Person for the European Charter 
of Patients’ Rights
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5 1 Introduction
This chapter does not aim at settling the perennial debate concerning whether 
rights m general have any substantial philosophical or ethical foundations Instead, this 
section of the dissertation offers a review of the recent European Charter of Patients’ 
Rights m the light of the thematic focus of the dissertation, 1 e the concept o f person 1 
My primary goal here is to draw attention to the potential static morality o f such a 
charter by highlighting the fact that the rights outlined can be logically denied to some 
human beings because they do not fit the various contemporary criteria o f personhood 
In this way, the Charter is an example o f how the concept o f person can be used in the 
context of a closed society to exclude certain entities Initially, this may seem surprising 
because it is often taken for granted that a charter o f nghts seeks to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive A nghts-based approach in health care seeks to protect the most 
vulnerable in society by giving them a platform to voice their protest against any form 
of injustice earned out against them In light o f this, I will make the case that general 
“inalienable nghts” m health care may find their source m the dynamic morality but that 
particular charters o f nghts may be more rooted in the static morality of a closed 
society One possible route to counteract this tendency is to utilise a more inclusive 
definition of person such as the one that I have outlined in chapter three, i e a s e l f  
interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance
5 2 The Local and the Global 
5 2 1 No Longer Moral Strangers
On the fateful day of December 26th, 2004 the earth’s axis literally trembled 
when two tectonic plates met and spawned a seaquake causing an omnivorous tsunami
1 The various rights o f the Charter are outlined in appendix E pp242-243
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that towered over and beleaguered the inhabitants o f Thailand, Indonesia, Sn Lanka and 
other surrounding countries in South East Asia The voracious tsunami unhinged a swirl 
o f events that brought extensive devastation of homes coupled with the dissolution of 
livelihoods The tsunami led to an almost biblical-like humanitarian disaster, of 
proportions never witnessed before in the history of the modem world
In retrospect, such a seismic catastrophe bears witness to the natural 
vulnerability of the world m which we live However, like the impact o f the enormous 
tidal wave, the alacnty of the humanitarian response from the rest of the world to the 
plight and the frantic outcry o f those who lost their families and homes in the disaster- 
stricken region was unprecedented There was an extensive flowering of collective 
sympathy to the human crisis that seemed to pervade every society around the world 
Through the medium of television, the calamity, which took place thousands upon 
thousands of kilometres away, was brought into our living rooms This, in turn, 
produced an extraordinary new wave o f global sympathy, which vented itself in aid 
relief and m a dazzling array of financial donations from people around the world 2 This 
global act of sympathy accumulated in an untrammelled response o f solidarity
Reflecting on the tragedy and on the badly needed road to reconstruction, the 
Bntish Chancellor o f the Exchequer, Gordon Brown (2005) made the pertinent point 
that although people from around the developed world were separated from the disaster 
by geography, they were brought together by a mutual purpose to help and to care It 
could be argued that the tsunami and the worldwide sympathetic response threw off the 
shackles of the various closed societies in our contemporary w orld3 Although Brown 
may not have been thinking of Bergson’s philosophy, his remarks seemed to reflect the
2 For example, on 14 March 2005, BBC News reported that Germany gave $1 lbn, the EU - $628m, 
Japan-$500m, France-$115m (BBC News 2005b) On 18 March 2005, Patsy McGarry, from The Irish 
Times, reported that Ireland gave almost €75m (McGarry 2005)
3 An examination o f open and closed societies can be found in chapter one pp37-45
169
desire for a dynamic morality o f an open society A morality that embraces all of 
humanity (Bergson 1986 p267) To quote in toto from Brown
When I delivered the CAFOD lecture a few weeks ago about the economic, 
social and moral case for us now seeing people we have never met and may 
never meet in other continents not as strangers but as neighbours, I argued that 
what impelled us to action where there is need was not just enlightened self 
interest that recognises and acts upon our interdependence - our dependence 
each upon the other for our sustenance and our secunty - but, even more 
important, a belief in something bigger than ourselves our shared moral sense 
that moves human beings even m the most comfortable places to sympathy and 
solidarity with fellow human beings even in far away places in distress And the 
worldwide demonstration in the last few days not just o f sympathy but of 
support shows that even if  we are strangers, separated and dispersed by 
geography, even if  diverse because of race, even if  differentiated by wealth and 
income, even if  divided by partisan beliefs and ideology - even as we are 
different diverse and often divided - we are not and we cannot be moral 
strangers (Brown 2005)
Personally, I think that the cardinal example o f the tsunami and its resulting 
global sympathetic response and world-wide climate of solidarity that reached beyond 
geographical, political and religious borders, reflects the fact that there is something 
new m this (almost) universal response to help people we do not know This experience 
of common concern bnngs us together, from being “moral strangers” to becoming 
“moral friends” or at least “moral acquaintances” 4 Although we might be working from
4 See Engelhardt’s analysis o f “moral strangers” in chapter two pp78-79
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different belief systems and theories o f ethics, there is a common goal that can bind us, 
1 e human solidarity, m time of crisis
5 2 2 The Two Sources Revisited
As we have already seen in chapter one, Bergson refers to two sources of 
morality the static and dynam ic5 This bifurcation engenders two fundamentally 
different kinds of human social organisation the closed (or what we might today call 
the local) and the open (or what we might today call the global) As we have seen, static 
morality has its genesis in societal instinct, which is enforced and guided by social 
pressure Nature installs m us a compulsive and an obligatory force that compels us to 
conform to the needs o f society The moral fabric o f dynamic morality, on the other 
hand, is attractive and inspirational rather than naturally compulsive In other words, we 
have the choice of following it m an active rather than m a passive sense Therefore, the 
moral weight o f dynamic morality does not lie in compulsion but in an appeal
The adhesive closed society has society as its aim It is anchored in social 
cohesion The moral landscape o f the open society has humanity as its aim The static is 
a morality o f obligation, the dynamic is a morality o f universal love The closed society 
is not capable o f precipitating a umversal feeling of solidarity It is beyond its concern 
of maintaining local social cohesion The dynamic morality then is an anomaly It 
represents a departure from the norm of the closed society by breaking the held 
orthodoxy o f moral beliefs
The question then is how do we reach beyond the tunnel vision o f the closed 
society Firstly, the open (global) society could be described as that which is beyond the 
ultimate circumference o f a group of concentnc circles The individual is at the centre 
of these concentnc circles From the individual to the open society, there are numerous
5 See chapter one p37
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circles representing various groups to which s/he belongs, for example, his or her 
family, friends, colleagues, community and/or nation However, for Bergson, the 
transition from the closed society o f the local to the open society o f the global is not one 
of degree but of kind It involves a new way of seeing the world
The dynamic morality o f an open society signifies a new kind of solidarity It is 
no longer a local group-based solidarity but a universal-based solidarity This universal 
solidarity has another source compared to the static morality Its source is dynamic The 
static morality is automatic in nature, whereas the dynamic morality is a vital order 
created by ingenious individuals (Emmet 1933/1934 p232) The static morality is the 
work of nature, dynamic morality is the work of the moral creativity of individuals For 
Bergson, it is the life and work of exceptional people who incarnate dynamic morality 
He wntes, “in all times there have arisen exceptional men, incarnating this morality 
Before the saints o f Christianity, mankind had known the sages o f Greece, the prophets 
of Israel, the Arahants of Buddhism, and others besides” (Bergson 1986 p34) Their 
great examples of chanty, for example, inspire other people to imitate them They are 
“moral creators” in Bergson’s words, who give witness to a new social and moral 
atmosphere They issue an invitation to the rest o f humanity to live within an 
environment in which life can be more worth living (ibid p80) Such individuals do not 
merely articulate a new code of morality They live a life that is in someway different 
and they embody a new way of acting morally “ the bearers o f open morality are not 
necessanly teaching a new code of rules or pnnciples, they are sensitive to life in new 
kinds of ways, and others may catch their inspiration ” (Emmet 1933/1934 p236)6
6 It would appear that we seem to remember people better than their ideas O f course, it is often the case 
that it is their ideas that make people famous The following expenence may put this into concrete terms 
Recently, I was watching a documentary on BBC 2 ’s Horizon (20 January 2005) about the life and work 
o f Albert Einstein A friend, who was watching it with me at the time, made the comment that most 
people know that Albert Einstein is a very famous scientific thinker but only a few know his theories I 
think that it can be accepted that most people will have heard o f Einstein and not necessarily know in 
great detail his theory o f relativity
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I think that it is reasonable to accept that charismatic people can revolutionise 
people’s world-views and life-styles The exceptional moral nature of individuals 
creates a moral revolution and imbues others in society to follow this new dynamic 
moral vitality Socrates is a prime example o f someone who, as far as we know, has 
never written about his ideas and yet has inspired many people and has had a major 
influence on the history of philosophy His life and death enthused Plato to write in his 
name in order to awaken Athenian society from moral corruption Plato finds it difficult 
to come to terms with the fact that a society can condemn a man simply because he tells 
an unwanted truth Consequently, Plato takes over the struggle, begun by Socrates, to 
awaken society from corruption Plato is inspired to continue the work of Socrates 
Socrates exemplifies an outstanding individual, who introduces others to a new 
emotion They, in turn, are enamoured by this new emotion that has significant moral 
consequences because it goes beyond the accepted and unquestioned social norms
Bergson (1986) compares the experience of being caught up in this new emotion 
to listening to a musical symphony He writes, “when music weeps, all humanity, all 
nature, weeps with it” (p40) The symphony does not simply produce a feeling in us but 
introduces us to the feelings of the score “as passers-by are forced into a street dance” 
(ib id) We are attracted by the emotion stirred within us because we are introduced to 
something totally new a morality that has a universal dimension But, this is not a 
passive reaction on our part It is an active and willing response We are enthralled by 
the dynamic morality it is appealing Bergson notes, “ if  the atmosphere o f the 
emotion is there, if  I have breathed it in, if  it has entered my being, I shall act in 
accordance with it, uplifted by it, not from constraint or necessity, but by virtue of an 
inclination which I should not want to resist” (ibid p48) 7 In a similar vein, people are 
caught up in the new moral atmosphere, they breathe it in not because they are forced to
7 Justin Oakley (1992) argues that “emotions occupy a fundamental place in our moral lives” (p38)
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do so but because they are attracted to it To take a simple example, traditionally many 
people entered the professions o f teaching and nursing because people already working 
in those professions attracted them Indeed, the work of Florence Nightingale inspired 
many individuals to follow her example o f dedication to the sick and needy and her 
desire to reform hospital sanitation
There is a creative emotion with such individuals A dynamism that inspires 
others to follow suit As it has been said, the emotion is new in that it goes beyond the 
feeling of social obligation and breaks through social compulsion to take in the whole of 
humanity One cannot really judge whether the new emotion inspired by Socrates, for 
instance, is the same as that of other exceptional individuals who break down the walls 
of the closed society by their experience o f love for universal humanity, 1 e humanity 
that is beyond the immediate local pale But, it can be said that the common 
denominator is a creative emotion that lies at the heart o f the dynamic morality, just as 
creative emotion is the soul of art and invention
This kind of dynamic fresh emotion is not produced by an intellectual 
representation, although it is translated into ideas through the work of the intellect For 
example, we use concepts, some old and others new, to express our horror at the 
tsunami The concept o f “chanty” is already a well-established concept that can 
encapsulate, to some extent, our response to a cnsis Yet, the word “tsunami”, although 
not an entirely new word, acquires a new emotional response 8 Certainly, it is a word 
that was not particularly known by many people -  apart from earthquake specialists 
But now it enters our common currency of discourse with a significant meaning and 
affectivity
Yet, what is different about this new feeling of sympathy and solidanty in the 
case of the South East Asian adversity is that the recent outpounng of generosity is not
8 “Tsunami” is a technical term that is made up o f two Japanese words Tsu meaning “port” and nami 
meaning “wave” The term only came into general use m the English language in the 1960s (Murr et al 
2005 p28)
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instigated by a person but by a natural disaster, which nonetheless depicts the 
vulnerability o f our shared humanity The tsunami, rather than one individual, provides 
a portal into an emotion of (universal) sympathy and solidarity for people outside our 
immediate society The emotional appeal o f the tsunami invites us not to remain 
impartial spectators but to be emotionally involved m the tragedy It is, however, a half­
opened door through which we can decide to enter or not Like the musical symphony, 
we are introduced to the emotion, but we are still free to choose to listen to it and to be 
enraptured
As it has been stated, intellectual sympathy is an act, or rather a senes of acts, 
that enable(s) us to have direct participation in the immediacy of experience where 
reality is not intended as an object but is simply “meant” 9 With the tsunami there seems 
to be an immediate experience o f persons m desperate need Although the tragedy is 
communicated via the world o f mediated meaning, we do not need to know the South 
East Asian peoples’ language (1 e their world of mediated meaning) nor their culture 
(1 e their world of significance) to enter into the immediacy of their serious situation 
Indeed, the communication of their tragedy is made possible by the fact that those who 
have witnessed their plight first-hand, have entered into their catastrophe through 
intellectual sympathy and have used language-symbols to articulate the significance of 
their plight Not only did the medium of television provide us with the immediate 
experience o f the tsunami m a visual way, it was also accompanied by a script that 
reflected the meaning and significance o f the experience The vanous pictures that were 
screened on our televisions were more affective in prompting an immediate response 
than any abstract concept
In the last analysis, perhaps it was the “current” between persons living in 
vanous parts o f the globe -  enabled by the expenence of intellectual sympathy -  that
9 See chapter four ppl46-152
175
led to an experience of a dynamic morality reaching out in chanty to those outside our 
borders, thereby creating an open society 10
5 2 3 From Closed Justice to Open Justice
Bergson fleshes out his understanding of open and closed societies with an 
example o f the transfiguration o f justice from a static morality to a dynamic morality 
(ibid pp75-81) He argues that, from time immemonal, justice has been an obligatory 
requirement within the social unit Justice denves its force from the social pressure 
imposed on the individuals that make up society However, withm the context of the 
dynamic morality o f an open society, justice takes on a new meaning that transcends the 
obligatory character demanded by the closed social unit The transition from closed 
justice to open justice is not that o f a step-by-step nature (nor by default) but by a 
radical transfiguration Yet, the new expenence o f universal open justice is not given a 
new concept but is codified by using the same well-worn word (ibid p79) Open justice 
is therefore not a relic o f closed justice The old concept is laced with a new moral 
emotion The meaning of the word appears to be the same, but is fundamentally 
different Bergson admits that this radical transformation is not easily discemable We 
are inclined to think that open justice is a mere progression and renovation of closed 
justice We might be inclined to think that open justice has its seeds m closed justice 
However, he argues that “ things assume this form only m retrospect, the changes 
were qualitative and not quantitative, they defied all anticipation” (ibid p267) Closed 
justice is confined to the immediate social group and their needs However, there is an 
expenence o f the “impetus o f love” for humanity beyond the social pale, which 
universalises justice and gives it a new moral impetus, thus creating open justice (ibid
10 For an explanation on the “current” between persons, see chapter four ppl58-160 The emotion that 
was inspired by the tsunami must be distinguished from that which inspired the atrocities in Rwanda in 
the 1990s An emotion that leads to human rather than social solidarity and which has humanity rather 
than society as its aim, can be an example o f a dynamic morality A hysteria that leads to the destruction 
of countless millions o f people cannot be an example of a dynamic morality
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p96) The new universal and open justice could not be achieved by merely expanding 
the social group to include those outside its fence Such an idea is anathema to the 
closed society
The qualitative change m the meaning of the word “justice” can be witnessed, to 
some extent, when we examine how its parameters widen to include those not 
recognised by society’s civil law in the history of rights There is a qualitative change in 
the meaning and application of the word “justice” within the context o f the discovery of 
natural rights and their moral force that is grounded m natural law With the 5th century 
tragedians, there is the emerging view that the justice promulgated in the laws of society 
may not be entirely fair The Greek playwright Sophocles tells the story about Creon -  
the new ruler o f the ancient Greek city o f Thebes -  who announces that the dead body 
of Eteocles will be honoured while the dead body of his brother Polyneices, who fought 
on the opposite side, will be disgraced Antigone, the sister o f the dead soldiers, feels 
that this action is unjust, although the civil law does not support her In defiance o f the 
law she decides to risk her own life by taking the body o f Polyneices m order to give 
her brother a decent burial With Antigone, we see that civil justice can be morally 
questionable As well as that, we have the seeds o f the belief that there is a higher 
justice that is above the law of society According to this higher justice, it is proper to 
give someone a decent bunal, even though he may have betrayed his king (see 
Sophocles 1994)
We can observe Sophocles’ embryonic notion of a higher justice developing 
within the context of the Greek Stoics’ idea o f the natural law (see Schneewind 1995 
p520) The Stoics, too, acknowledge the possibility that human laws might be unjust In 
the face o f this, the Stoics believe that a natural law exists that is above and beyond 
human law They root this law m their cosmogony, l e m their study of the universe 
For them, the universe has a rational structure that follows its own inbuilt rational
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laws 11 This natural law that governs the universe also governs human beings because 
they are rational beings Consequently, the natural law is articulated through human 
reason It is a universal law, although an unwritten law, according to which human 
beings should act The ensuing principles o f this law are not dependent on any particular 
culture but are grounded in the natural moral order o f humankind
With the Stoic’s idea of a natural law, there is an inkling o f open justice A 
dynamic morality that embraces all o f humanity and that is not based on one social 
custom or convention However, the Stoics do not manage to make a complete break 
with the closed society o f Greece and take a leap into universal open justice It would 
appear that the idea that there is a universal justice that applies to all of humanity does 
not seem to completely penetrate the walls of Greek society Even Plato, who had taken 
the right steps, never makes the complete leap For example, although he includes 
“man” in his theory of Ideas, this universal man does not seem to apply beyond Greek 
society nor does it influence social laws within Greek society The practice o f slavery 
continues and the idea that foreigners are barbarians remains (Bergson 1986 p77)
According to Bergson, the Greeks never managed to capture the moral 
imagination of the rest o f humanity in the same way that Christianity did do In 
Bergson’s eyes, it is Christianity that engenders the transition from closed justice to 
open justice For him, “humanity had to wait till Christianity for the idea of universal 
brotherhood, with its implication of equality of rights and the sanctity of the person, to 
become operative” (ibid p78) 12 With Christianity, justice in the context of natural 
rights is no longer confined to the Greek citizen or to the Stoic member, but to all of 
humanity The new Christian moral revolution drives a global ethical universal mission 
The Christian community adapts the idea of the natural law and makes the theological
11 For the Stoics, the universe is intelligible otherwise we could not begin to question its structure because 
it would simply be meaningless
12 Bergson is not alone in this view The Irish political scientist David Walsh (1999) also argues that it is 
within Christianity that the transcendent finality of each person is given its most total augmentation (p i 9)
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case that the natural law is part o f the eternal law of God According to the thirteen- 
century Christian theologian St Thomas Aquinas (1963), the basic precept of the natural 
law is that good should be done and evil should be avoided He writes
intelligent creatures are ranked under divine Providence the more nobly 
because they take part in Providence by their own providing for themselves and 
others Thus they join in and make their own the Eternal Reason through which 
they have their natural aptitudes for their due activity and purpose Now this 
sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures is what we call ‘natural law’ 
(Ia2ae, 91, 2)
The natural law highlights the fact that nghts are not arbitrarily conferred on the 
person but are natural to him or her Therefore, open (or natural) justice is not based on 
the person’s position m society Open justice is universally applicable Today, the 
Christian vision of the natural law, which is at the backbone of much of the thinking 
regarding human nghts, is not necessanly endorsed by people who champion such 
nghts As Roger Tngg (2005) notes, “moral campaigns are often couched in the 
language of human nghts At a time when natural law itself is often neglected ” 
(P39)
The transition from closed justice to open justice in the context o f the 
development o f nghts shows that only the great moral personalities bnng about this 
transfiguration by mspinng others to follow their lead Although, it could be argued that 
the Stoics and the classic Greek philosophers only had a shadowy notion o f open justice 
compared to the Chnstian enterpnse, they were still architects of a dynamic morality 
that provided the lenses through which to see justice in a new light
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As we have seen, emotion is at the root o f moral progress in the transition from 
the static to the dynamic It is an emotion that is creative and novel It is an emotion that 
enables the person to break free from the inner fences o f the closed society and to cross 
borders Indeed, it might require that individuals defy the closed society, especially if 
their moral codes and customs clash with the new universal morality In the context of 
moral perception influenced by society, Vetlesen (1994) argues that “ the task for 
individuals qua moral agents becomes that of resisting what their society prescribes in 
the fields of moral perception, judgment, and action It becomes their task -  and their 
irrevocably individual one at that -  to reject the upheld social moral codes rather than 
successfully internalise and go along with them” (p i92) It is often the case that the 
great moral figures in history lose their lives because they go against the norms of 
society For example, Socrates is forced to drink poison because he is charged with 
corrupting the youth with his new moral teaching concerning justice (see Plato 1993)
5 2 4 From Dynamic to Static Morality
Although there is an expansion with open justice promulgated with rights, such a
dynamic expenence can easily be dragged down into stale codes, declarations and
charters The work of the great visionaries of universal justice can get lost in static
codes o f conduct For instance, it is often claimed that Thomas Jefferson, one of the
founding fathers o f the United States, one o f the pnncipal authors o f the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and one of its original signers, represents par
excellence the American vision of liberty (see Holmes 2002) Yet, one can wonder
whether his ideals o f liberty are undermined in American politics today9 According to 
Noam Chomsky (1999) -  a well-known critic o f U S foreign policy -  the United States 
is one o f the greatest abusers o f human rights m the modem world He makes the 
argument that the great beacon of liberty does not uphold many of the provisions of the
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UN Declaration o f Human Rights (1948) For instance, Article 13 (2) o f the Declaration 
states “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own” (The UN 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948) Chomsky claims that this right has been 
passionately invoked every year on Human Rights Day on December 10th in America 
For example, people demonstrated and condemned the Soviet Union when it refused to 
allow Jews to leave the country However, Chomsky points to the fact that when the 
U S employs this aforementioned quotation o f the UN article it deliberately omits the 
following sentence “and to return to his country” (Chomsky 1999 p i 7) Chomsky 
contends that the significance of this redundant part of the sentence was outlined the day 
after the ratification o f the Declaration when the General Assembly passed Resolution 
194 affirming the nght of Palestinians to return home Thus, the Declaration has been 
undermined by a self-serving relativism that selects passages m order to continue the 
political status quo in Israel and Palestine and to use it as a weapon against its enemies -  
in this case the then Soviet Union (ibid p5) In this way, even in America, the UN 
Declaration remains an “optimistic vision” rather than a description o f “existing 
realities” (Annan 2003) The dynamic morality codified in the UN Declaration has not 
completely penetrated the political and social structures o f the modem world Perhaps, 
this is partly due to the fact that its dynamic source is pulled down into a code that 
becomes cliched and misused through acts o f self-servmg relativism
5 3 The EU Charter of Patients’ Rights 
5 3 1 The Rights Approach
Today, the ethical principles o f justice and human nghts are not foreign to us 
because we live in an age o f nghts (Bobbio 1996)13 The language of nghts is a kind of
13 It is generally accepted that the development o f rights in modem times can be divided into three 
separate generations The first generation focuses on civil and political rights such as the right to security, 
the right to property and the nght to political participation, which is at the heart o f both the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration o f the Rights o f Man and of the Citizen
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lingua franca  of contemporary ethics It could be contended that universal rights 
attempt to break down the bamers o f the various closed societies in our world in order 
to make way for the open society There can be no doubt that the historical unfolding of 
rights is quite complex In this history, a new addition has been recently added in the 
context of health care m Europe, 1 e the 2002 European Charter of Patients’ Rights, to 
which I will now turn 14
The new European Charter attempts to encourage health care systems across 
Europe to deliver a programme of care that is fully patient-centred, that upholds the 
autonomy of the patient, and that is, m the last analysis, driven to protect the 
vulnerability of the patient The Charter provides a platform for the voice o f patients 
and empowers them in the care for their health, beyond the encroaching influences of 
paternalism and the economic market forces that can restrict the delivery o f sound 
nursing care and medical intervention 15
It could be contended that the Charter is an offshoot of other ethical landmarks 
inspired by people after various historical atrocities that came to light when the Second 
World War was brought to a close Indeed many of the codes o f ethics in health care, 
including the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration o f  Helsinki find their seed in the 
first international military tribunal held at Nuremberg after the war (Cascais 1997 pplO- 
11) In Numberg’s Palace of Justice twenty-one leading officials were put on trial for 
cnmes against peace (Verbrechen gegen den Fneden), for war cnmes
(1789) The second generation o f rights concentrates on socio-economic rights including the right to 
welfare, the right to education, etc, and it lies at the core of the U N declaration The third generation of 
rights centre on more collective rights including rights to national self-determination, the right to clean 
environment, etc (see Freeman 2002 pp 14-31, pp32-42 and ppl 14-127)
14 This charter was put together by the Italian patients’ rights organisation, Cittadinanzattiva-Active 
Citizenship Network A legal, ethical and social review of the Charter is provided from the perspective o f 
the present Irish health care system (O ’Mathuna et al 2005)
15 Paternalism comes from the Latin pater , which means, “father” See Beauchamp’s and Childress’ 
analysis o f the term (Beauchamp and Childress 1994 pp271-284) In general, paternalism denotes a kind 
o f fatherly approach to patient care However, this father tactic is usually viewed as something that is 
quite negative, especially in light o f the appalling circumstances o f twentieth century medical research In 
contradistinction to paternalism, there has been a shift m emphasis m health care Instead of the health 
care professionals (especially the medical profession) taking on a fatherly role and knowing “what is 
best” for the patient, there is more o f a partnership between patients and nurses/doctors
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(.Kriegsverbrechen) and for cnmes against humanity ( Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschhchkeit) (Muller-Balhn 1995 pp9-12) Shortly after this tribunal the U N  
declaration was drawn up and a plethora o f various codes o f ethics came into existence 
In addition, various conventions on human rights took place, including the 1953 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
as well as the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The various codes and declarations are grounded m the belief in a universal moral order 
and in a universal humanity, possessing dignity and equal moral status
In the preamble to the European Charter o f Patient’s Rights, it is stated that the 
Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights is the bedrock and the mam point o f reference to 
the fourteen rights (European Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 p i) It also states that the 
rights set forth by the Charter are also connected to other international declarations 
made by the World Health Organisation (WHO) -  “The Declaration on the Promotion 
of Patients’ Rights in Europe” (1994) and the Council of Europe -  “The Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine” (1997) (ibid p3)
The present European Charter places us nght in the centre o f the patients’ often 
forgotten orbit It acknowledges that despite the various health systems within the 
European Union, the same rights among patients o f all nationalities are at risk (ibid p i) 
In this way, the Charter offers a bulwark against the perceived nsks that patients face in 
our hospitals 16 In view of this, the central goal of the Charter is twofold Firstly, to 
strengthen the protection of patients who find themselves in differing national 
circumstances and secondly, to work as an instrument for the harmonisation o f the 
various national health systems, m lieu o f free mobility among people throughout the 
Union (ib id )
16 The 2002 European Charter o f Patients’ Rights outlines fourteen rights that are presently at risk 
throughout Europe This catalogue o f rights includes, for example, the right to preventive measures, 
access, information, consent, free choice, innovation and compensation (European Charter o f Patients’ 
Rights 2002 p i)
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When looking at the Charter o f Rights, in the context o f the theme of the 
dissertation regarding the concept o f person, a number o f questions anse Does this 
charter reflect the static or the dynamic morality7 What are the implications o f the 
vanous concepts of person for this Charter9 Finally, what are the implications o f my 
definition o f person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a 
reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance for this Charter9
5 3 2 The Charter An Example of Static or Dynamic Morality9
At the outset it can be said that there is nothing tem bly new m cntiqumg a 
charter o f nghts Indeed, the nghts-based approach in moral philosophy has not always 
been fully accepted without cnticism For instance, Jeremy Bentham (2002) believes 
that “natural nghts is simple nonsense natural and imprescnptible nghts, rhetoncal 
nonsense, nonsense upon stilts” (p330) For him, the nature o f nghts goes against the 
gram of the utilitanan outlook of seeking to maximise the greatest amount of happiness 
for the greatest number o f people in society If one accepts this pnnciple, then there 
cannot be any impenetrable nghts To put it another way, a nght could and should be 
abolished if  it prevents society from achieving the greatest benefit for the greatest 
number o f people
If we move from the nineteenth century and am ve at today’s situation, we still 
meet some thinkers who are not very persuaded by the philosophical basis o f the 
modem nghts approach For example, m his cntique o f the contemporary state of moral 
discourse, the Scottish Anstotehan philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre equates nghts to a 
cheque that has no one to honour it For MacIntyre (1985), “ there are no such nghts, 
and belief in them is one with belief m witches and m unicorns” (p69) The reason for 
this is that nghts are the child o f the eighteenth century Enlightenment project that 
failed, according to MacIntyre, to provide a rational justification for morality What we
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are left with is a battle between two divergent schools o f thought, 1 e a battle between 
bureaucratic individualism (which vents itself through the language of rights) and 
bureaucratic organisation (which vents itself through the language of utility) (ibid p71) 
As it can be seen, the philosophical foundations o f nghts are a contentious 
subject among philosophers and ethicists alike In a similar vein to the above 
misgivings, I would like to offer a critique of the Charter from the perspective of the 
two sources o f morality as outlined by Bergson 17 On a surface level, the current 
European Charter o f Patients’ Rights seems to be a medley of both static and dynamic 
moralities This would be in keeping with Bergson’s thought as he maintains that 
exemplars of these moralities can no longer be separately found in a pure primitive 
state Following this, it could be argued that the Charter could be understood as an 
offshoot o f a dynamic source that seeks universal open justice for all of humanity and 
that is codified in other historic ethical landmarks and codes, for example, the UN 
Declaration o f Human Rights However, it could also be argued that the aspiration of 
universality echoed by the UN Declaration is at risk o f being pulled down by a charter 
of nghts because charters tend to be designed for specific groups of people rather than 
for universal humanity
This phenomenon of charters being designed for specific groups has been 
acknowledged and cntiqued before For instance, Thomas Paine (1970) points to the 
fact that charters tend to be statements o f pnvilege for particular groups in society 
Charters grant nghts to some and take nghts away from others He wntes, “it is a 
perversion of terms to say that a charter gives nghts It operates by a contrary effect -  
that of taking nghts away Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants, but charters, by 
annulling those nghts in the majonty, leave the nght, by exclusion, in the hands o f a 
few They do not give nghts to A, but they make a difference in favour o f A by
17 See chapter one pp37-45
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taking away the nght o f B, and consequently are instruments o f injustice” (pp300-301) 
In light o f Paine’s remarks, it could be argued that one of the obvious dangers o f a 
rights approach, codified in a charter, is that by giving patients particular rights, we risk 
curtailing, for instance, some of the general rights o f health care professionals This may 
drive a feeling of a “them and us” situation between patients demanding that their rights 
be upheld and the health care professionals feeling more and more defensive For 
example, the nghts to complain and to compensation may make some health care 
professionals more anxious about being open to potential litigation and some may feel 
inhibited by it
Although the European Charter of Patients’ Rights refers to universal codes o f 
ethics, it would appear that with it the boundaries of the closed society could be 
redrawn Patients instinctively generate a closed society because it is in their interest to 
put forward nghts that favour their cause In this way, it could be contended that the 
Charter has the society o f patients, rather than universal humanity, as its aim It is 
anchored in patients perceiving themselves to be “at nsk” m our health care institutions 
In this way, the static morality of the closed society (1 e the nghts o f patients) pulls 
down the dynamic morality (1 e the nghts o f universal humanity) o f the open society 
However, it could be contended that this Charter attempts to explicate the dynamic 
morality o f an open society In other words, it attempts to articulate what we consider to 
be important for any individual who engages in the health care service We live within 
the world o f mediated meaning Therefore, a charter o f nghts is one medium to express 
the dynamic morality o f an open society However, by codifying the dynamic morality 
into a charter or any kind of moral code, the intellect naturally pulls down the creative 
onginatmg impulse underpinning the dynamic moral aspirations Nevertheless, 
intellectual sympathy can enable us to recapture the onginal dynamic expenence that 
inspired people to wnte such codes for the cause of universal humanity
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With this present-day Charter o f Rights, we might be tempted to leave the open 
society and move to a concentric circle o f patients in society As I have said, static 
morality is automatic in nature It is not surprising then that patients, who form one 
group in society, would automatically want to protect themselves against any sort of 
poor health care In general, when a patient engages in the service o f a hospital, they 
automatically become “clients” They become involved in the life o f the hospital, with 
its regulations and goals Although the autonomy of the patient is often understood as a 
central goal in the delivery o f health care, patients often need to dispense a certain 
amount of control over their lives m the hospital setting (Lowental 1985 p 2 8 )18 
Therefore, patients will seek ways to protect themselves from poor access to health care 
and from poor quality health care
Solzhenitsyn’s (2000) novel Cancer Ward gives a moving example of the “them 
and us” created by the closed society phenomenon He tells the story of terminally ill 
patients awaiting death in a Russian hospital In fact, there are really two parallel worlds 
in this narrative The world o f the individual patient’s battle with cancer and the world 
of modem Russian society’s battle with communism In both scenarios, each group 
seeks to protect itself, whether it be through fighting a malignant cancer or through 
fighting a corrupt ideological regime in a virulent environment The two states o f affairs 
are tainted by a vision o f who belongs to the social circle and who does not This circle 
is sometimes transparent, but most of the time, inchoate The Soviet police consider 
those who are anti-establishment to be outside the parameters o f justice and, thus, are to 
be treated as criminals The nurses and the medical staff in the hospital ward carry out 
their work from the perspective that the people m their care are not autonomous human 
bemgs In the face o f this, the patients feel that their dignity is infringed by the nursing 
and medical staff Solzhenitsyn exemplifies this through the voice o f Kostoglotov In
18 Lowental (1985) argues that a “ patient’s best interest require that we disregard his self- 
determination” (p28) Health professionals “ must perform a painful change of dressings or a 
cystoscopy or a lumbar puncture, despite patients’ painful outcries or their pleading for mercy” (ibid)
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one scene, Kostoglotov struggles to uphold his right to dispose his life He questions the 
nurse on duty and the rest o f the medical world’s deportment towards him and others 
He makes an emotional appeal
You see, you start from a completely false position No sooner does a patient 
come to you than you begin to do all his thinking for him After that, the 
thinking’s done by your standing orders, your five-minute conferences, your 
programme, your plan and the honour of your medical department And once 
again I become a grain o f sand, just like I was in the camp Once again nothing 
depends on me (p86)
Kostoglotov’s remarks are very difficult to accept for the nurse, especially when 
he almost equates life within the hospital to life withm a Russian labour camp because 
in both contexts he feels reduced to a “gram of sand”
If we turn to the contemporary situation in our Irish hospitals and other health 
care institutions, certainly it is not the same as the one Kostoglotov describes Yet, the 
closed society phenomenon is still alive m different ways For instance, the hierarchical 
structure withm the health care professions sometimes lends itself to this natural “them 
and us” mentality between various departments and positions Between doctors and 
nurses, nurses and care attendants, care attendants and porters, for example
The idea of patients forming a closed society may therefore be understood and 
appreciated In the Irish context with its two-tier health care system consisting of public 
and pnvate funding, it is clear why patients might feel drawn together to form a group 
to protect themselves As a result of complex historical factors, the provision o f the 
public health service in the Irish State is operated by the government through the tax 
system that ensures that (public) health care is open to all members o f society The
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provision of the private health service is operated by (almost) private insurance 
companies through which people choose to reap some extra benefits that are not offered 
through the public system, e g pnvate rooms in hospital wards Some writers compare 
this twofold system o f health distribution to an apartheid administration, when those, 
who can financially afford it, skip the queue o f a surgical waiting list (Wren 2003 
p l4 3 ) 19 Access to proper health care facilities are often curtailed when budgetary 
forecasts do not deliver, and when there is a tug of war between other competing public 
services In light of this, it is understandable that patients would form a closed society to 
attain proper access to health care
5 3 3 Towards Individualism
The language utilised by the Charter also suggests an individualistic outlook 
regarding the provision of health care The Charter speaks about the “individual” rather 
than the person belonging to the European Union However, rights one, two, three, four 
and six speak about “every individual”20, which might suggest a more collective idea 
compared to rights five, seven to fourteen, which speak about “each individual” 21 
Nonetheless, the use of the word “individual” is the common denominator in all rights 
announced in the Charter (European Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 pp4-8)
Some rights set forth m the Charter may be unduly biased towards an 
individualist outlook, e g the nght to free choice, the right to personalised treatment and 
right to complain However, this might be self-defeating m the long-term One could 
argue, for example, that the nght to compensation undermines the feasibility o f the nght
19 However, in response to this comparison to apartheid, it could be argued that if  some people can skip 
the queue and undergo surgery for example, then clearly more “public” patients have the opportunity to 
move up the list and to be seen Then again, there are a finite number of operations on a given day 
Therefore skipping the queue might only shuffle the order
20 For example» the right to preventive measures states “Every individual has the right to a proper service 
in order to prevent illness” (European Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 p4)
21 For example, the right to respect o f patients’ time states “Each individual has the right to receive 
necessary treatment within a swift and predetermined period of time” (European Charter o f Patients’ 
Rights 2002 p6)
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of access If someone is left physically or mentally impaired due to hospital negligence, 
then clearly m terms of corrective justice, s/he ought to be compensated But can we 
claim that this is a moral right if  it leads to multiple litigation cases for all kinds of 
circumstances, which, in the end, bankrupt the health service7 There is this constant nsk 
that the hospitals will become nfe with litigation, especially if  the Charter is translated 
into a legal mandate Following the letter o f the Charter may have the potential to wall- 
off health professionals from the potential spirit o f the Charter through possible 
litigation
Rights are generally fuelled by an infringement on an individual’s liberty and 
are therefore used as “trump” in liberal democracies (see Dworkin 1984) Indeed, 
according to Jeremy Waldrom (1987), a theory of nghts is in essence an individualistic 
theory (pl85) For Karl Marx (1994), “ none of the so-called nghts o f men goes 
beyond the egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his pnvate interest and his 
pnvate choice, and separated from the community as a member o f civil society” (p i7) 
Mary Glendon (1991) also highlights the individualistic nature o f nghts when she 
argues that “ the language of nghts is the language of no compromise The winner 
takes all and the loser has to get out o f town” (p9) This may be a little exaggerated on 
Glendon’s part but there can be no doubt that the needs of the individual rather than the 
wider concerns o f the community are highlighted with the language of nghts Tngg 
(2005), too, raises some concerns about nghts and its vision of society “Talk of human 
nghts grows out of an individualist vision of society, which views society not as an 
organic whole but as a collection of separate atoms, which are liable to collide with each 
other” (pp45-46)
The question then is whether this Charter o f nghts could lead to a certain kind of 
individualism where people pursue their own interests rather than the interests o f 
society, whether local or global This would seem to militate not only against the open
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society but also against the closed society in the long-term Rights may give people the 
rational justification not to cohere to the demands o f society voiced through the social 
pressure o f moral obligation
5 3 4 The Implications of the Concept of Person for the Charter of Rights
The immediate implications o f the concept o f person may not be apparent in the 
present European Charter o f Patients’ Rights In the opening section concerning 
fundamental nghts, the Charter states that the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights is the 
mam reference point o f the present European Charter o f Patients’ Rights (European 
Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 p2) The Nice Charter affirms some inalienable 
universal nghts The vanous EU organs and Member States can neither limit nor waive 
these nghts Regarding these inalienable nghts, the Charter of Patients’ Rights states 
that “these nghts transcend citizenship, attaching to a person as such” (ib id ) It then 
goes on to assert that “ the general articulation o f these nghts is enough to empower 
persons to claim that they be translated into concrete procedures and guarantees” 
(ib id) This statement seems fair since it maintains that only persons are patients 
However, the Charter does not explicitly distinguish between “human being” and 
“person”, nor is there an acknowledgement o f this distinction Apart from this section -  
and as I have shown above -  the Charter uses the language o f “individual” rather than 
person perhaps m order to avoid this controversy (see ibid pp4-8) Yet, much is taken 
for granted regarding the custodians of these fourteen nghts If  the “individual”, to 
which the Charter refers, is to be a possessor o f nghts, s/he must display the essential 
charactenstics o f what is deemed a person S/he must be capable o f exercising 
rationality and have a consciousness o f a self Presumably, since this is a charter of
22 The Charter is also linked to “The Declaration on the Promotion of Patients’ Rights in Europe (1994) 
This document states that “everyone has the right to respect o f his or her person as a human being” 
(emphasis mine) (Article 1 1)
23 See general introduction to the thesis p8
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rights m the context of health care, the individual is someone who is, at least, a human 
being, with sufficient cognitional abilities to be capable o f knowing and voicing their 
rights In the nghts approach, in general, it is taken as read that rational beings have 
rights and are capable of exercising those nghts Rational beings are autonomous beings 
that can exercise their autonomy through claiming a nght Indeed, the pnnciple of 
autonomy lies at the heart o f this Charter o f Patients’ Rights In general, the 
philosophical pnnciple grounding the idea o f autonomy is denved from Kant He 
outlines a rational basis for respecting the autonomy of persons One of the central 
maxims of his categoncal imperative is at the core o f the pnnciple o f autonomy “Act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant 1993 
p36) Persons should never be treated merely as means but as ends For Kant, persons 
do not only have free wills and are capable o f deciphenng the universal moral law but 
are also intnnsically valuable This dignity o f the person is not dependent on the 
person’s social or political circumstances in which they find themselves Only rational 
beings (1 e individual persons) ought to be treated as ends in themselves rather than as 
mere means Rational human bemgs are governed by the universal moral law and 
therefore can act from a duty to that law Therefore, not to pay attention to a person’s 
autonomy is morally questionable In this way, Kant is seen as the philosophical 
maestro o f human nghts (Campbell 2003 p25)
Only rational bemgs can be the custodians of nghts As I have demonstrated, 
some concepts o f person logically disallow a number o f entities from being regarded as 
moral agents and therefore from being regarded as bearers o f nghts and responsibilities 
If one does not qualify as a rational being (1 e a person), then one cannot be a possessor 
of nghts If this is accepted, then we can only logically claim that the nghts o f the 
Charter belong to rational adults, who are persons It is difficult to claim that they
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belong to foetuses, PVS patients and even to “normal” healthy children, who are not yet 
fully rational persons However, it may be accepted that some of these non-persons do 
have rights, but this may be due to the fact that we decide to include them in the rights 
domain In this context, it is worth recalling Engelhardt’s remarks about the social and 
the strict senses o f person Person, in the strict sense, is a moral agent who is self- 
conscious, rational, self-determining and morally accountable On the other hand, a 
person, in the social sense, is not a moral agent who is self-conscious, rational and 
morally accountable24 In the strict sense o f the term, some patients who do not exercise 
any signs of self-consciousness, rationality and who cannot be morally accountable, are 
not persons and therefore cannot be said to possess rights Therefore, they cannot 
stnctly belong to the remit of the Charter of Rights 25 However, such people can be 
included in the social sense o f person Bearing this m mind, we could argue that social 
persons can be included m this Charter because we can decide to give them some moral 
standing One obvious problem with this social sense is that it is culturally dependent 
Therefore, one closed society might decide not to include them 26 They may even justify 
this on the basis o f scarce resources in health care, which seems entirely plausible
In the Charter, the right to consent states that those who are considered “minors” 
or legally incompetent, and who have legal representation, must still be involved in the 
decision-makmg regarding their health (presumably to the degree to which they are 
able) (European Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 p5) In this way, full, active 
participation is encouraged at all levels o f intellectual competency, which might seem 
almost impossible This right does not take into account whether the minors can actually 
engage in meaningful decision-making This is certainly a major assumption, which 
seems to go against Tooley’s position regarding what constitutes having a right to life,
24 See chapter two pp80-81
25 As I have already emphasised, according to Engelhardt, only persons (in the strict sense) are at the 
centre o f the medical and moral universe See general introduction to thesis p8
26 See chapter two pp84-85
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for instance If we recall Tooley’s concept o f self, which shows that only persons are 
capable o f having an interest in their own continued existence, then we must accept that 
this Charter is only for persons The person must desire to exist in order to have a’ right 
to life and must be a subject of experiences and other mental states Logically then, in 
order for the person to qualify for any of the rights expressed m the Charter, s/he must 
desire them and have a concept o f self Therefore, only persons are capable o f desiring 
access to proper health care and only persons are capable o f having a sense of who they 
are when desiring such a right For example, they must have a desire not to be put in 
danger by the fourteen risks currently present in our hospitals across the European 
domain Tooley’s analysis demonstrates that logically these nghts belong to a normal, 
fully functioning conscious entity
From Singer’s point of view, perhaps it could be maintained that the Charter is 
intrinsically discriminatory because it focuses on human beings to the exclusion of 
animals But, I suppose we would have to concede that m terms of health care we are 
mainly concerned with the health care o f humans rather than with animals, although 
persons, not human beings, are at the centre o f the moral and medical universe, 
according to Engelhardt29 However, with Singer’s thought, we can conclude that this 
Charter cannot include the severely mentally handicapped, i e those with no self- 
consciousness and who cannot exercise rationality because the Charter is only for “real” 
persons
The Charter does not face the issue o f whether it can include foetuses, PVS 
patients and other so-called non-persons into its remit, nor is there any sense o f the 
debate about this difficult philosophical issue, which has far-ranging ethical 
implications As I have outlined by using Engelhardt’s, Tooley’s and Singer’s thought, 
the criteria for personhood are usually based on clear manifestations o f active
27 See chapter two pp71-74
28 See chapter two, pp74-78
29 See general introduction to thesis p8
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rationality, self-consciousness and a sense o f past, present and future Following this, 
the argument can be made that the foetus cannot be logically considered to be a person 
Therefore, it can be argued that individual rights outlined by the Charter cannot be 
logically applied to foetuses, although we might include them as moral addressees
Can the Charter be applied to those who are senile or possess Alzheimer’s 
disease7 Can people lose their individuality by not being able to actively engage in 
meaningful decision-making concerning their health7 If they are no longer persons, in 
the strict philosophical sense, then they are not capable of making rational choices and 
being held morally accountable Therefore, they cannot be possessors o f rights Of 
course, this is only the case if the bearer o f rights is inextricably linked with full 
cognitive functioning
If we apply such contemporary concepts o f person to this Charter o f Patients’ 
Rights, it is clear that the Charter could end up excluding those who are deemed non­
persons from the moral realm In this way, I think that it could also reflect the static 
morality of a closed society rather than the dynamic morality o f an open society
5 3 5 The Implications of my Definition of Person for the Charter of Rights
I would like to turn now to the implications of my concept of person for the 
European Charter o f Rights If we apply my definition o f person as a self-interpreting- 
dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance, it can be observed that the Charter has the potential to be 
more dynamic than static because this criteria o f personhood attempts to be more 
inclusive than the stnct sense o f person as articulated by Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt
Firstly, the person is a self-interpreting animal As I have outlined in chapter 
three, the representative view of human consciousness purports consciousness to be a 
faculty that enables us to form inner representations of objects We represent different
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life plans and we work out different options available to us One consequence of this 
representative view is that it tends to ignore the fact that human bemgs are also agents 
who are constituted by significances and who constitute experiences with significance 
Persons are not only interpreters of experiences, but by virtue of the act of interpreting, 
they themselves become partly interpreted The person interacts with reality by 
constituting experiences and by being constituted by the same expenences The person 
takes part in strong evaluation whereby s/he identifies the import (1 e something 
meaningful m an event, which we identify as being important to our desires or purposes, 
aspirations or feelings) o f those expenences that have mtnnsic worth by employing the 
language of evaluative distinctions and standards 30 The act o f interpretation is rational 
because it is the work of the intellect, which not only seeks to understand the expenence 
but also judges whether the understanding is correct Therefore, there is an evaluative 
element to this work of self-interpretation From Bergson’s perspective, the ongmating 
expenences that are embedded with meaning and significance are not pnm anly 
accessed by intellectual analysis but by intellectual sym pathy31
Secondly, the person is dependent S/he cannot rely totally on him/herself but 
needs others in order to survive The Charter assumes that the people, for whom it is 
written, are dependent on health care services provided m vanous national states They 
are therefore vulnerable to the perceived fourteen nsks (European Charter o f Patients’ 
Rights 2002 p i ) 32
Thirdly, persons communicate through verbal language and other non-verbal 
symbols and signs This presupposes that what they communicate has meaning, 1 e it is 
understandable The Charter exists in a reality that is mediated by meaning by using
30 See the analysis of “import” in chapter three pp 108-109
31 For a full discussion about the work of the intellect and the work of intellectual sympathy (or intuition), 
see chapter four p p l4 6 -152
32 See the “Preamble” to the Charter (European Charter o f Patients’ Rights 2002 ppl-2)
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language symbols (e g English, French or German) of vanous countnes within the 
European Union
Additionally, persons can also constitute meaning/significance through acts of 
self-interpretmg They can shape the significance of their lives and also give meaningful 
shape to cultures, languages and religions The Charter is constituted by meaning, 1 e 
the meaning of having a nght that is based on the idea o f the universal dignity of 
humanity, which propels the nghts-approach in ethics Sometimes this nghts-approach 
is often refened to as the nghts-agenda, which tends to suggest that there is something 
that is hidden Again, how we even use such terms including “nghts-agenda” can shape 
the meamng of the nghts-approach
If I say that the Charter does not include the mentally handicapped, in our world 
of constituted meaning/significance, this might seem rather absurd, or at least it goes 
against the moral intuition of some people, especially for those whose moral thinking 
has been coloured by a Chnstian world-view If they have not accepted this world 
constituted by Chnstian meaning, for example, then it might seem reasonably plausible 
not to include the mentally handicapped in this Charter O f course, if  we follow another 
ethical tradition -  for example, virtue ethics with its emphasis on human flounshing -  
this statement might also appear to be absurd33 In other words, it is obvious that one 
does not need to be a Chnstian to include the mentally handicapped into any charter of 
nghts So, in our reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by value, then the 
mentally handicapped might have a place in this Charter
Regarding others who might be considered stnctly non-persons, within my 
definition o f person, they still take part in the same reality as fully functioning persons 
As I have said, those who have no concept o f self may not be engaged in their lives On 
the level o f immediate expenence, they may be open to vanous biological and
33 Someone following in the footsteps o f virtue ethics might argue that the inclusion o f the mentally 
handicapped in the Charter will help in the path towards human flourishing
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physiological processes On the level o f reality mediated by meaning, they may not be 
engaged in the mediation o f meaning They are objects to which acts o f mediation refer 
For example, we can still talk about PVS patients They become objects in our world of 
mediated meaning However, they may still take part m a world constituted by 
significance Although, they may not participate in self-mterpretation and therefore 
create significance for themselves, they take part in our reality o f shaping meaning We 
can constitute their significance and they can constitute ours In this world o f meaning, 
they may become subjects or at least not mere objects For instance, our ethical 
response, m the form of a Charter, can contribute to determining the significance of the 
lives of patients in a PVS 34 By using this Charter, health professionals might attempt to 
ensure that PVS patients have a nght o f access to proper health care and that their right 
to consent is upheld -  albeit through a proxy of some kind (European Charter of
T c
Patients’ Rights 2002 p5) Health care practitioners may nevertheless attempt to 
guarantee that such patients still have a nght to safety, a nght to avoid unnecessary pain 
and suffenng Health care providers may also at times feel moved to bnng the life of 
patients in such a condition to a close m a dignified manner There can be no doubt that 
patients in a PVS are dependent on the care that we can provide for them and on our 
world constituted by significance If the Charter o f Rights includes them in its remit, it 
may protect their vulnerability in this world
I think that from the perspective of static concepts of person, many vulnerable 
entities are excluded from this Charter Unfortunately, the Charter does not seem to 
acknowledge the nsk it poses to them by using the language of nghts, which tends to 
belong to rational human persons My definition of person as a selfinterpreting- 
dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and 
constituted by significance attempts to knock down the arbitrary bamers that are erected
34 Although, it could be argued that we may never know the full extent o f this
35 As I have already said, the non-person’s previous self-interpretation ought to be considered in 
exercising this right See chapter four pp 163-165
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by the static morality in a closed society and point towards a more dynamic morality in 
an open society However, I concede that this definition, although pointing to the world 
of value rather than of fact, is still at risk o f becoming codified and static For that 
reason, this understanding of personhood needs to be dynamically affective through 
intellectual sympathy rather than merely through intellectual analysis alone
5 4 Conclusion -  The Concept of Person within the Dynamic Morality of the 
Charter
The Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights - the main point o f reference for the 
Charter o f Patients’ Rights - states that the moral justification o f rights transcends any 
individual state or national sovereignty (ibid p2) The philosophical anthropology that 
underlies the Nice Charter is the dignity o f the person, who has an invaluable worth 
against which the numerous EU organs and member states cannot impose any 
limitations As well as that, it contends that the EU cannot dispense with any of these 
rights because they are not attached to persons qua citizens but are attached to 
individuals qua individuals (ibid p8) In other words, all health care rights stem from 
the fundamental human rights enjoyed by individuals In this way, the universal 
dimension of the inalienability o f human rights is grounded in a European document for 
European members Against the background of the universal dimension of human 
nghts, perhaps we need to ask ourselves why there is a need to give such universal 
nghts a European twist If universal nghts mtnnsically transcend nation states, is it not 
contradictory to place them in a political constitution of a group of nation states that are 
mainly joined together for a common economic goal7
The ongmal dynamic morality that inspired the universality o f nghts from the 
tragedians and Stoics to the emergence o f the natural law can be pulled down into 
specific codes that become stale and can lose their dynamic appeal Charters o f nghts
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can lose their hold on the dynamic source that engendered the desire to uphold the 
universal dignity o f men and women It could be argued that the present Charter is a 
perspicuous example o f society’s way (whether closed or open) of articulating what 
they think is (morally) important for their members, especially when they are faced with 
illness and are required to engaged with a health care system
Bergson (1986) tells us that static morality is dictated by impersonal social 
requirements, whereas dynamic morality is a series o f appeals made by persons who 
represent the best m humanity (p84) In the last analysis, the moral appeal o f the current 
European Charter o f Patients’ Rights may lie in health care professionals who attempt to 
uphold the spirit of these rights in their care for people who are vulnerable It may be 
the exceptional moral lives o f individuals who will create a moral atmosphere in which 
such a charter will have real moral currency In this way, the spirit of the Charter should 
radiate every nook and cranny of the hospital life and eschew becoming a stale mandate 
that quells the natural impulse to care for the patient by pinning health professionals to 
the legal walls o f litigation Naturally, only time will tell whether the Charter becomes a 
living source from which to draw moral guidance or rather a static code that walls off 
health professionals
As I have argued, much is assumed about the custodians o f the rights outlined in 
the new Charter From the perspective of the contemporary concepts of person, many 
individuals are automatically excluded from this Charter However, my definition o f 
person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is 
mediated by meaning and constituted by significance may provide another route through 
which so-called non-persons could be given a moral standing This definition might 
help to halt the original dynamic morality o f the Charter from becoming another static 
code of exclusion My hope is that my definition will appeal to the health care 
practitioner’s intellectual sympathy That there is something more to persons than
200
certain contemporary criteria allow m a world that is constituted by significance and not 
only mediated by fact This “more” may not always be grasped on the level o f the 
intellect As my analysis has shown, it is through the work of intellectual sympathy that 
the “current” of another person’s personhood reacts to the “charges” o f our personhood 
The “current” o f one self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a 
reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance reacts to the 
“charges” of another This “current” is the living meaning that dwells m each person 
This does not take place in the world of mediated meaning (1 e through concepts) but in 
the world o f immediate experience (i e through intellectual sympathy) It may be 
through intellectual sympathy that we connect with other persons and grasp their living 
significance
My hope is that my argument will alert health care practitioners to the intrinsic 
static moralities o f some concepts o f person and point them in the direction o f the 
dynamic morality o f an open society, by relocating the understanding of the concept of 
person within the world of significance and by experiencing this concept through 
intellectual sympathy in the world o f immediate expenence
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This dissertation began with the argument that the creative feats o f technology 
benefiting the world o f health care today have a double-edged sword of both positive 
and negative effects. This is most clearly witnessed by the ethical issues raised from this 
creative revolution in health care. For example, the ability to prolong the life o f a 
patient, who would have otherwise died, raises ethical questions concerning whether we 
should hold on to life at all cost or whether we should let go regardless of the cost. 
Having the technological and medical means to assist in the creation of new embryonic 
life raises ethical questions concerning the destruction of life that is often needed to 
create life (in the case o f some reproductive techniques)1 and to restore life (in the case 
of embryonic stem cell research that seeks to regenerate cells that have become 
dysfunctional).2
I have argued that this positive and negative dimension of the creative revolution 
in health care can find its source in an ideological pursuit o f reaching human perfection 
within history that is generally confined to a select few at the expense of the many. I 
have also argued that this ideological drive is located in a closed society, which is 
spurred on by an inherent static morality that compels its members to sustain the group. 
In contrast to this, I have shown that an open society is spurred on by dynamic morality 
that is inspired by love for humanity beyond the pale o f the particular group. From this 
analysis, I have maintained that the creative impulse of humanity is pulled down and 
utilised in a closed society for its own narrow objectives. When the creative inventions 
are used only for the good of a closed society, it tends to have negative consequences 
for those outside its borders.
Although the creative revolution within health care has the potential to greatly 
benefit many people, there is the possibility that the creative feats will be used for those 
deemed worthy in a closed society. In the literature on health care ethics, this criterion
1 See chapter one p20.
2 See chapter one pp20-21.
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of worth is sometimes based on an understanding of the concept o f person. Therefore, a 
distinction is made between the concept o f person and human being. The concept of 
person can offer a point of reference for deciding whom to include in the moral domain. 
The concept of person is often employed in order to settle difficult ethical issues created 
by the technological revolution in health care. When forced to decide who should 
benefit from the amazing creative feats, the concept o f person is a useful tool. 
Therefore, the concept of person becomes central in the ethical discourse prompted by 
the use of technology in health care.
Using the works of Tooley, Singer and Engelhardt, I have pointed to the fact 
that they confine the concept o f person to those entities who possess self-consciousness, 
who display signs o f rationality and who have a sense o f past, present and future states. 
In this way, their concepts cannot only be applied to human beings but also to other 
entities that fit their criteria (e.g. certain types of chimpanzees). From this, I have 
questioned whether their concepts could be understood as an example of a dynamic 
morality of an open society, i.e. an open society consisting of all entities that display 
rationality and consciousness at a certain level, for example. However, by virtue o f the 
fact that their concepts o f person tend to result in the exclusion of a large number of 
human beings (and other entities, e.g. including certain animals), I believe that they 
reflect more the static morality o f a closed society rather than the dynamic morality of 
an open society. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that such aforementioned 
concepts tend to be static rather than dynamic because they can be used to justify the 
curtailing o f the ensuing medical benefits o f the creative revolution for those who are 
deemed morally worthy.
In order to move from a static to a dynamic concept o f person, I have presented, 
what I described as, an aesthetic presentation o f the concept o f person by situating it 
within the context o f the bifurcation between the world o f facts and the world of
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meaning I made the case that we do not only live in the world o f immediate expenence 
but also in the world of mediated meaning In the world of mediated meamng we 
attempt to understand the world of immediate expenence and we communicate our 
findings with each other through language and other meaningful signs As well as that, 
the capacity to constitute certain expenences and certain objects with particular 
significance demonstrates that we also inhabit a world constituted by significance In 
this world, we partly shape the meaning of our own lives through self-interpretation and 
evaluation We also attempt to partly form the meaning that other people have for us
In outlining an aesthetic presentation o f the concept o f person, I have also 
pointed to the fact that in this world mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance we often find ourselves dependent on others and therefore vulnerable to 
them The level o f dependency vanes and can be due to different stages in our 
developmental process as human beings and/or because of illness and disability From 
all these aspects, I outlined a concept o f person as a selfinterpreting-dependent- 
vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance My concept is offered as a step towards a more inclusive concept, i e a 
more dynamic rather than static concept
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that my concept -  by virtue o f the fact that it is a 
concept -  could be pulled down into a closed society by using it to exclude rather than 
include, I have outlined an instructive way towards preventing this concept o f person 
from becoming the façade for a closed society
I have found that the analysis of the two chief directions in consciousness, 
namely the intellect and intellectual sympathy, offer a window onto the problem of 
concept formulation in general The intellect tends to pull down ongmal dynamic 
expenences into static concepts, whereas intellectual sympathy engages with the 
immediacy of the ongmal concrete expenence From this analysis o f the two major
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directions m consciousness, I have maintained that it is through intellectual sympathy 
that we can recognise the “current” of someone’s personhood reacting to the “charges” 
o f our own personhood in immediate concrete experience It is through intellectual 
sympathy that we can recognise another as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable 
animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance, 1 e as a person Naturally, the formulation of this concept of person is a 
result o f the work of the intellect It results from an intellectual odyssey due to the 
nature o f the subject as well as due to the fact that we do not only live in a world of 
immediate experience but in a world of mediated meaning Therefore, we cannot escape 
from the tendency of the intellect to use concepts that set boundanes between objects in 
order to utilise them successfully However, it is through intellectual sympathy that we 
can attempt to recapture the original dynamic experience, which my concept o f person 
attempts to encapsulate
As I have stated, the intellect uses concepts to set limits and boundanes, and it 
can be morally driven by a static morality o f the closed society Intellectual sympathy 
transcends the limits and boundanes o f concepts in order to penetrate the onginal 
immediate expenence Intellectual sympathy can be morally dnven by a dynamic 
morality o f an open society The pull o f the intellect and push of intellectual sympathy 
highlights the interface between dynamic and static moralities Dynamic morality 
becomes intermixed with static morality when it is pulled down into concepts by the 
intellect However, through intellectual sympathy, the ongmal appeal for love of 
humanity outside the penphery o f a particular society can be rekindled
It is my contention that the concept o f person as a s e l f  interpreting-dependent- 
vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by 
significance may act as an antidote to the static morality o f a closed society, which 
tends towards exclusion rather than inclusion In light o f the fact that health care
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professionals have both the faculties of the intellect and intellectual sympathy, and in 
the light o f the fact that health care professionals work m various societies (both open 
and closed), the concept o f person as a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal 
living within a reality that is mediated by meaning and constituted by significance will 
remain in tension between these various poles For example, in view of the fact that 
health professionals can use the creative feats o f technology to benefit and advance 
patient care, it is often difficult (if not impossible) for the health care professional to 
escape from the web of tensional demands brought about by the paradoxical situation of 
the creative revolution on the one hand and the finite context o f limited resources on the 
other From my experience o f teaching health care ethics, I have found some health care 
practitioners split between the pull of their intellects and the push of their intellectual 
sympathies With their intellects, they will weigh up the pros and cons o f various types 
o f nursing care and intervention in order to deliver the best and most appropriate patient 
care With their intellectual sympathies, they will also attempt to enter into the 
particular patient’s personal need of care and attempt to match the delivery of care to 
that need as far as possible They may be driven by the static morality of seeking to 
maintain the normal procedures on the ward in order that the hospital can function 
favourably as a whole They might also find themselves wanting to transcend this if 
these hospital rules do not totally cater for the patient’s personal needs
After applying my analysis to the present state o f health care, I have argued that 
although the moral source of the new European Charter of Patients’ Rights may be 
dynamic rather than static, there is the danger that the Charter may become a stale code 
in our health care institutions It is my contention that the Charter has the potential to be 
pulled down into a static code in virtue o f the fact that rights can be logically denied to 
those human bemgs who do not fit the abovementioned contemporary understandings of 
the concept o f person In view of this, I have made the case that the concept o f person as
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a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated 
by meaning and constituted by significance may provide one route to preventing the 
Charter falling prey to a static and closed mentality
The Beaune Hospices (Hotel-Dieu) m France provides a perspicuous example of 
dynamic morality in these closing remarks (see Bruillot and Roels 1996) This hospice 
was established shortly after the Hundred Years’ War in 1443, when there was 
widespread poverty and famine, as well as the plague In response to the plight o f the 
people, Nicolas Rolin (the then chancellor) and his wife, Guigone de Salins, felt moved 
to act for the people regardless o f their status m society They sought Pope Eugene IV’s 
support to establish a new hospital m Beaune This was a remarkable act of care in light 
of the fact that the poor had very little standing in the Middle Ages, therefore a hospital 
of this kind was quite exceptional It was the experience of witnessing people dying 
before their very eyes that moved Rolm and his wife to morally respond by establishing 
a hospital for the povres (1 e the poor)
If we ruminate on the actions o f Nicolas Rolin and Guigone de Salins, it could 
be concluded that their accomplishments were enamoured by an expenence of a 
dynamic morality to reach out to those living in the penumbra o f society They did not 
completely follow their intellects and accept that the poor were simply the povres 
Through their intellectual sympathies they entered into the immediate concrete 
expenence o f the povres It is difficult to accept that the rationale for such a move could 
be solely based on intellectual calculation Indeed, perhaps the reasons given for such an 
act of chanty would have had a bnttle standing in the intellect’s tnbunal of evidence 
and would therefore have had to find another court of appeal
In conclusion, I think that the case can be made that the concept o f person as a 
s e l f  interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance will remain m tension between the closed and
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the open, between the static and dynamic and between the intellect and intellectual 
sympathy
As I have already indicated, my concept o f person does not take away from the 
fact that decisions have to be made in terms of prolonging life or not, for example I 
have argued that such decisions should take into account the self-interpretation and 
evaluation of the individual involved as well as the self-interpretation and evaluation of 
his or her family and health care community For instance, a patient m a PVS will have 
a history o f self-interpretations that will need to be taken into account
In the last analysis, my hope is that my discussion will provide a possible 
framework from which to understand the issue of the concept o f person and will act as a 
sort o f warning device to any unquestioning acceptance o f contemporary concepts of 
person in health care ethics My hope is that my definition o f person as a s e l f  
interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a reality that is mediated by 
meaning and constituted by significance may work as a tutelary concept by providing an 
antidote to a closed mentality through appealing to the health care professional’s 
intellectual sympathy
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8.3 Appendix C: Diagram of Taylor’s Philosophical Anthropology
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8.4 Appendix D: Diagram of Definition of “Person”
REALITY
Experience - Emotion 
Constituting Meaning/Significance 
Via Language (verbal & non-verbal)
PERSON
a self-interpreting-dependent-vulnerable animal living within a 
reality that is mediated by meaning 
and constituted by significance
Via Language(verbal & non-verbal) 
Constituting Meaning/Significance 
Experience - Emotion
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The following is the catalogue of rights outlined by the new European Charter of 
Patients’ Rights
1 Right to Preventive Measures Every individual has the right to a proper service 
in order to prevent illness
2 Right o f Access Every individual has the right o f  access to the health services 
that his or her health needs require The health services must guarantee equal 
access to everyone, without discriminating on the basis o f  financial resources, 
place o f  residence, kind o f  illness or time o f  access to services
3 Right to Information Every individual has the right to access to all kind o f  
information regarding their state o f  health, the health services and how to use 
them, and all that scientific research and technological innovation makes 
available
4 Right to Consent Every individual has the right o f  access to all information that 
might enable him or her to actively participate in the decisions regarding his or 
her health, this information is a prerequisite fo r  any procedure and treatment, 
including the participation in scientific research
5 Right to Free Choice Each individual has the right to freely choose from among 
different treatment procedures and providers on the basis o f  adequate 
information
6 Right to Pnvacy and Confidentiality Every individual has the right to the 
confidentiality o f  personal information, including information regarding his or 
her state o f  health and potential diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, as well as 
the protection o f his or her privacy during the performance o f  diagnostic exams, 
specialist visits, and medical/surgical treatments in general
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7 Right to Respect of Patients’ Time Each individual has the right to receive 
necessary treatment m thin a swift and predetermined period o f  time This right 
applies at each phase o f  the treatment
8 Right to the Observance of Quality Standards Each individual has the right o f  
access to high quality health services on the basis o f  the specification and 
observance o f  precise standards
9 Right to Safety Each individual has the right to be free from  harm caused by 
the poor functioning o f  health services, medical malpractice and errors, and the 
right o f  access to health services and treatments that meet high safety standards
10 Right to Innovation Each individual has the right o f  access to innovative 
procedurest including diagnostic procedures, according to international 
standards and independently o f  economic or financial considerations
11 Right to Avoid Unnecessary Suffering and Pain Each individual has the right to 
avoid as much suffering and pain as possible, in each phase o f his or her illness
12 Right to Personalized Treatment Each individual has the right to diagnostic or 
therapeutic programmes tailored as much as possible to his or her personal 
needs
13 Right to Complain Each individual has the right to complain whenever he or 
she has suffered a harm and the right to receive a response or other feedback
14 Right to Compensation Each individual has the right to receive sufficient 
compensation within a reasonably short time whenever he or she has suffered 
physical or moral and psychological harm caused by a health service treatment
(European Charter o f Patients’ Rights)
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